From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mta0.migadu.com (out-52.mta0.migadu.com [91.218.175.52]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 875E147D924 for ; Thu, 3 Sep 2026 10:10:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.52 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788430210; cv=none; b=AsPS7dIpH+7j6AdZ/BcNMlYQi/gyRJpPEF+n7K1JMSSVvxZhanKdVTbnbyl/650fuASeCznAkN+KWpkNqAwiXrjA16gl0qDsbU6ERIFt0PGvO8PyMvcL3Nvefd+KtCzsSTfyyaRe/v6GB0SkQ+lUE7hWb+B61D0wRqlyaHV5yPI= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788430210; c=relaxed/simple; bh=c3BKTF59VZktP3ACG4MFSbcPV9qbzIS6Z4cfOyHB/9I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=KQKf1uBEW6XYmx0mK5h51KGIPJkKGO4KYceVsvk9OO+txmxH3Vr+DsqKow92kxU03E0onPkoHu38jwsgqzzeH0ap0Lp5JcTVNy4Bwb0kwyStno+jwb5FUxtWNVmg+sxkXho21DE/tw40xt2BXEiOarOdgUt1E5sNc5ZEkMOlg/U= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b=XBRwDrpk; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.52 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b="XBRwDrpk" X-Envelope-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; bh=c3BKTF59VZktP3ACG4MFSbcPV9qbzIS6Z4cfOyHB/9I=; c=simple/simple; d=linux.dev; h=from:to:subject:date:message-id:mime-version:content-type; s=key1; t=1788430201; v=1; x=1789035001; b=XBRwDrpk+aESU58UF9DVtthz5RDa8C5f+Fq+ADUnq5W8My8UmMPXRQfAwelYjPlln+oXYaOK lXTu0nouIEr2vGdRmkJ/vJkkPmVtXnlk+FbCElEo/hkhf4JfJPNhplQSwsTa5DkMB4Z/Vyg5hbj IUCsmlaQQaH9nH83kXg6qZYA= X-Envelope-To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Received: by smtp.migadu.com with ESMTPS id 83a0c04ce43bf8e0; Thu, 03 Sep 2026 10:09:51 +0000 X-Mizu-Trace-ID: 83a0c04ce43bf8e0 X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT From: Jiayuan Chen To: bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jiayuan Chen , VEGA , Daniel Borkmann , John Fastabend , Stanislav Fomichev , Martin KaFai Lau , Alexei Starovoitov , Andrii Nakryiko , Eduard Zingerman , Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi , Song Liu , Yonghong Song , Jiri Olsa , Emil Tsalapatis , Ihor Solodrai , "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , Lawrence Brakmo , netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 18:09:20 +0800 Message-ID: <20260903100921.113374-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory. SEC("sockops") int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops) { switch (skops->op) { case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT: leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */ ... } } For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer. Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check. Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t) (s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get() returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset are no longer needed. Before patch: 0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk 1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v After patch: 0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9 1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock 2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0 3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56) 4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk 5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v 6: goto pc+2 7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56) 8: r1 = 0 Fixes: 44f0e43037d3 ("bpf: Add support for reading sk_state and more") Reported-by: VEGA Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen --- net/core/filter.c | 13 +------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 61940e753552..a043d179ff1a 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -11105,18 +11105,7 @@ static u32 sock_ops_convert_ctx_access(enum bpf_access_type type, break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, rtt_min): - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof_field(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) != - sizeof(struct minmax)); - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct minmax) < - sizeof(struct minmax_sample)); - - *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF( - struct bpf_sock_ops_kern, sk), - si->dst_reg, si->src_reg, - offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern, sk)); - *insn++ = BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, si->dst_reg, si->dst_reg, - offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + - sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)); + SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD(rtt_min, rtt_min.s[0].v, struct tcp_sock); break; case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, bpf_sock_ops_cb_flags): -- 2.43.0