From: Anastasios Papagiannis <tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
brauner@kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, david@kernel.org,
ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
eddyz87@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
matt@bobrowski.net, song@kernel.org, utilityemal77@gmail.com,
sun.jian.kdev@gmail.com, tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 17:53:33 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260904145340.40212-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> (raw)
On MMU systems, during exec, argument and environment strings are copied
into the new address space held by struct linux_binprm before that address
space is installed on the task_struct. Existing BPF user memory helpers
operate on the current address space or one associated with a task_struct.
Because no task_struct refers to the new address space at this point,
programs cannot access these strings from the bprm_check_security LSM
hook.
This series adds two sleepable BPF kfuncs for copying bytes or
NUL-terminated strings from a trusted struct mm_struct. It also marks
linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null, allowing BPF LSM programs to pass it
to the kfuncs after a NULL check and inspect exec arguments before
allowing the exec to continue.
Changing bprm->mm to trusted-or-null would otherwise reject existing BPF
programs that read through it without a NULL check. Preserve that behavior
by allowing fault-protected reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers.
Pointer arithmetic, writes, atomic RMW operations, BPF_LOAD_ACQ accesses,
and passing the pointer to a kfunc that requires a non-NULL trusted
argument continue to require an explicit NULL check.
On NOMMU systems, exec argument and environment strings remain in
bprm->page[] until they are transferred to the new process stack. They
cannot be accessed through bprm->mm at the bprm_check_security hook.
The new kfuncs remain available on NOMMU for address ranges represented
by a supplied struct mm_struct.
The series also adds selftests covering both kfuncs when reading argument
and environment strings, and verifier tests covering trusted-or-null BTF
pointer reads.
Changes in v4:
- Add negative verifier tests for atomic RMW and load-acquire accesses
through trusted-or-null BTF pointers.
- Preserve explicit nullability-marking coverage for tracepoint
arguments, dentry->d_inode, and sched_ext .dispatch.
- Use the already-nullable mmap_file argument for the negative store
test, avoiding dependency on the later linux_binprm->mm marking.
- Clarify the bprm->mm lifetime invariant and move its lifetime fix
before the mm_struct kfunc patch.
- Document that the existing task-based user-memory interfaces delegate
to the new mm-based implementations, reorder the string-copy kfuncs to
remove an unnecessary declaration, and annotate the remaining
declaration with __bpf_kfunc.
Changes in v3:
- Replace the linux_binprm-specific kfuncs with generic struct mm_struct
kfuncs, as suggested by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Move the kfuncs next to the existing user memory helpers and make the
task-based variants delegate to the new mm-based implementations, as
suggested by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference on exec error paths.
- Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null.
- Allow fault-protected reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers to
preserve compatibility with existing BPF programs, as suggested by
Andrii Nakryiko.
- Add verifier and runtime selftests for trusted-or-null BTF pointer
reads.
- Rename __copy_remote_vm_str() to __copy_remote_mm_str(), as suggested
by Andrii Nakryiko.
- Clarify that reading exec strings through bprm->mm is limited to MMU
systems, while the generic mm-based kfuncs remain available on NOMMU.
Changes in v2:
- Register the kfuncs on NOMMU systems and return -EOPNOTSUPP when called,
as suggested by Justin Suess.
- Add selftest coverage for reading environment strings, as suggested by
Justin Suess.
- Clarify that copy_remote_mm_str() leaves the destination untouched when
called with a zero-length buffer.
- Use sizeof() instead of hardcoded argument lengths in the selftests.
- Use ~0ULL for invalid-flags checks in the selftests.
v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260831092305.42062-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260820131801.68759-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260812111140.7762-1-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com/
Anastasios Papagiannis (7):
mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str()
exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference
bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct
bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers
selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads
bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null
selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm
fs/exec.c | 7 +-
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 9 +-
include/linux/mm.h | 2 +
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 142 ++++++++++++++----
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 17 ++-
mm/memory.c | 33 +++-
mm/nommu.c | 33 +++-
.../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c | 6 +-
.../bpf/prog_tests/copy_from_user_bprm.c | 72 +++++++++
.../prog_tests/test_struct_ops_maybe_null.c | 13 +-
.../bpf/prog_tests/tp_btf_nullable.c | 28 ++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/copy_from_user_bprm.c | 123 +++++++++++++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/raw_tp_null_fail.c | 75 ++++++++-
.../bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable.c | 45 +++++-
.../bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable_runtime.c | 35 +++++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c | 18 ++-
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_accept.c | 14 ++
.../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 14 --
.../selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 1 +
.../sched_ext/maybe_null_fail_dsp.bpf.c | 5 +-
20 files changed, 616 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/copy_from_user_bprm.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/copy_from_user_bprm.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable_runtime.c
base-commit: 7bf591f26545f5776a4e42d08c06fd94469766dd
--
2.55.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-09-04 14:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-04 14:53 Anastasios Papagiannis [this message]
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/7] mm: Add copy_remote_mm_str() Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 10:59 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-09-07 13:41 ` Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-07 14:01 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-07 14:04 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 2/7] exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 4/7] bpf: Allow reads through trusted-or-null BTF pointers Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 5/7] selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 6/7] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 14:53 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 7/7] selftests/bpf: Test mm_struct user memory kfuncs with linux_binprm Anastasios Papagiannis
2026-09-04 18:26 ` [PATCH bpf-next v4 0/7] bpf: Add user memory access kfuncs for mm_struct Andrew Morton
2026-09-07 6:58 ` Anastasios Papagiannis
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