From: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>,
lvc-project@linuxtesting.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()
Date: Mon, 7 Sep 2026 17:39:55 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260907144009.162239-3-alexevgmart@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260907144009.162239-1-alexevgmart@gmail.com>
From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
commit 22b05fec62c0fe9864cfceb52f7d0f3a34d9b1dd upstream.
security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at
value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL.
sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same
d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table
is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that),
but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has
no such predicate.
Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the
NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are
unaffected.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-80912
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 80340bc0ee6a..a1e3520596d6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3414,6 +3414,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
+ u32 i;
int rc;
policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3426,16 +3427,29 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
*classes);
- if (rc) {
- u32 i;
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
- kfree((*classes)[i]);
- kfree(*classes);
+ /*
+ * The class symtab may be sparse, which policydb_class_isvalid() exists
+ * to absorb; the callback fills this array by value, so an unclaimed
+ * one leaves a NULL that sel_make_classes() hands to sel_make_dir().
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++) {
+ if (!(*classes)[i]) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err;
+ }
}
out:
return rc;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ kfree((*classes)[i]);
+ kfree(*classes);
+ return rc;
}
static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-07 14:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-07 14:39 [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1 0/2] " Alexander Martyniuk
2026-09-07 14:39 ` [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1] selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code Alexander Martyniuk
2026-09-07 14:39 ` Alexander Martyniuk [this message]
2026-09-08 0:53 ` [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1 0/2] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes() Sasha Levin
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