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From: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>,
	lvc-project@linuxtesting.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Christopher J. PeBenito" <cpebenito@tresys.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()
Date: Mon,  7 Sep 2026 17:39:55 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260907144009.162239-3-alexevgmart@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260907144009.162239-1-alexevgmart@gmail.com>

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>

commit 22b05fec62c0fe9864cfceb52f7d0f3a34d9b1dd upstream.

security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at
value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL.
sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same
d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table
is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that),
but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has
no such predicate.

Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the
NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are
unaffected.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy")
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
---
Backport fix for CVE-2026-80912
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 80340bc0ee6a..a1e3520596d6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3414,6 +3414,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
+	u32 i;
 	int rc;
 
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3426,16 +3427,29 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 
 	rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			 *classes);
-	if (rc) {
-		u32 i;
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
-			kfree((*classes)[i]);
-		kfree(*classes);
+	/*
+	 * The class symtab may be sparse, which policydb_class_isvalid() exists
+	 * to absorb; the callback fills this array by value, so an unclaimed
+	 * one leaves a NULL that sel_make_classes() hands to sel_make_dir().
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++) {
+		if (!(*classes)[i]) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 
 out:
 	return rc;
+
+err:
+	for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+		kfree((*classes)[i]);
+	kfree(*classes);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-07 14:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-07 14:39 [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1 0/2] " Alexander Martyniuk
2026-09-07 14:39 ` [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1] selinux: avoid implicit conversions in services code Alexander Martyniuk
2026-09-07 14:39 ` Alexander Martyniuk [this message]
2026-09-08  0:53 ` [PATCH 5.10/5.15/6.1 0/2] selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes() Sasha Levin

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