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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-rt-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2026 09:18:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260909091849.C5D7F1F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260909-work-ntfs3-d_instantiate_new-v1-1-2db697162ce8@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] If `ntfs_init_acl()` fails, the error path skips the necessary cleanup for `ATTR_EA`, permanently leaking disk clusters allocated for non-resident extended attributes.
--

commit 44a39faac2ebabd21da92b47785ce2d1e97401b0
Author: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

fs/ntfs3: use d_instantiate_new() in ntfs_create_inode() and murder syzbot's "WARNING in do_new_mount" saga

This commit fixes a bug where d_instantiate() was called on an I_NEW inode
before unlock_new_inode(). This caused lockdep lock owner corruption when
paths concurrently locked the directory. The fix switches to using
d_instantiate_new() and drops the trailing unlock_new_inode().

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/6a9beced.a5e650b3.26d8a.000b.GAE@google.com

> diff --git a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
> index 56b4f6469a280..4ac26c80bd34f 100644
> --- a/fs/ntfs3/inode.c
> +++ b/fs/ntfs3/inode.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -1917,9 +1917,6 @@ int ntfs_create_inode(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
>  	if (!fnd)
>  		ni_unlock(dir_ni);
>  
> -	if (!err)
> -		unlock_new_inode(inode);
> -
>  	return err;
>  }

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does ntfs_create_inode()
permanently leak disk clusters if ntfs_init_acl() fails?

If ntfs_init_acl() returns an error, the error path jumps to out5:

fs/ntfs3/inode.c:ntfs_create_inode() {
    ...
#ifdef CONFIG_NTFS3_FS_POSIX_ACL
	if (!S_ISLNK(mode) && (sb->s_flags & SB_POSIXACL)) {
		err = ntfs_init_acl(idmap, inode, dir);
		if (err)
			goto out5;
	} else
#endif
    ...
}

Jumping to out5 bypasses the out6 label, which contains the essential
cleanup logic for ATTR_EA:

out6:
	attr = ni_find_attr(ni, NULL, NULL, ATTR_EA, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
	if (attr && attr->non_res) {
		/* Delete ATTR_EA, if non-resident. */
		struct runs_tree run;
		run_init(&run);
		attr_set_size(ni, ATTR_EA, NULL, 0, &run, 0, NULL, false);
		run_close(&run);
	}

out5:
	if (!S_ISDIR(mode))
    ...

If ntfs_init_acl() creates the first ACL (which allocates non-resident
clusters for ATTR_EA via ntfs_set_acl_ex -> ntfs_set_ea -> attr_set_size)
but fails on the second ACL (e.g. ENOMEM), the non-resident ATTR_EA is left
attached to the inode.

The error path then proceeds to out4, clearing RECORD_FLAG_IN_USE on the MFT
record. Later, when the inode is evicted and ni_clear() is called, it checks
is_rec_inuse(). Because the flag was cleared, ni_clear() skips calling
ni_delete_all(), which is the only other function capable of freeing
non-resident attribute clusters.

Could an unprivileged user repeatedly trigger this failure (e.g. by exhausting
memory) to systematically exhaust disk space?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260909-work-ntfs3-d_instantiate_new-v1-1-2db697162ce8@kernel.org?part=1

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-09  9:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-09  9:03 Christian Brauner
2026-09-09  9:18 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-09 11:11 ` Jan Kara
2026-09-10  7:22 ` Christian Brauner

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