From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>, Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v10 21/28] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context
Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2026 14:36:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260911213659.2025974-22-sohil.mehta@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260911213659.2025974-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Extend nested VMX context management to include FRED-related VMCS fields,
enabling proper handling of FRED state during nested virtualization.
Because KVM always sets SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED, FRED MSRs are
always saved to vmcs02. However an L1 VMM may choose to clear this bit,
i.e., not to save FRED MSRs to vmcs12. This is not a problem when the L1
VMM sets SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, as KVM then immediately loads
host FRED MSRs of vmcs12 to guest FRED MSRs of vmcs01. However if the L1
VMM clears SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, KVM should retain FRED MSRs
to run the L1 VMM.
To propagate guest FRED MSRs from vmcs02 to vmcs01, save them in
sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12() regardless of whether
SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED is set in vmcs12. Then, use the saved
values to set guest FRED MSRs in vmcs01 within load_vmcs12_host_state()
when !nested_cpu_load_host_fred_state().
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
---
v10:
- Simplify nested FRED MSRs update with read/write helpers (Chao).
- Add other FRED MSRS to MSR bitmap nested filtering (Chao).
- Add {ORIGINAL,INJECTED}_EVENT_DATA to shadow fields in a separate
patch (Sean).
- Add a new parameter to load_vmcs12_host_state() to indicate the call
is from a failed VM entry.
- Update exception status member variable nested to is_nested (Sean).
v9:
- Rebase to kvm-x86/next.
- Guard FRED state save/restore with guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu,
X86_FEATURE_FRED) (syzbot & Chao).
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h | 17 +++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 11 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c | 18 ++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h | 39 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 23 +++++++
7 files changed, 214 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 9cca65b226fd..74456f4533e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -82,6 +82,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_basic_no_hw_errcode_cc(void)
return vmcs_config.basic & VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_nested_exception(void)
+{
+ return vmcs_config.basic & VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
+}
+
static inline bool cpu_has_virtual_nmis(void)
{
return vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 6576935b9d43..83e846fb3fc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -812,6 +812,15 @@ static inline bool nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_FS_BASE);
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_GS_BASE);
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP0);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP1);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP2);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_RSP3);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP1);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP2);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_SSP3);
+ nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_FRED_CONFIG);
#endif
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_rw(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
nested_vmx_merge_msr_bitmaps_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD);
@@ -1356,9 +1365,11 @@ static int vmx_restore_vmx_basic(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
const u64 feature_bits = VMX_BASIC_DUAL_MONITOR_TREATMENT |
VMX_BASIC_INOUT |
VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS |
- VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC;
+ VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC |
+ VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
- const u64 reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(63, 57) |
+ const u64 reserved_bits = GENMASK_ULL(63, 59) |
+ BIT_ULL(57) |
GENMASK_ULL(47, 45) |
BIT_ULL(31);
@@ -2599,6 +2610,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs0
vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info);
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_fred())
+ vmcs_write64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, vmcs12->injected_event_data);
vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
!(vmcs12->guest_interruptibility_info & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
} else {
@@ -2632,6 +2645,30 @@ static void vmcs_write_cet_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 s_cet,
}
}
+static void vmcs_read_fred_msrs(struct vmcs_fred_msrs *msrs)
+{
+ msrs->fred_config = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG);
+ msrs->fred_rsp1 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1);
+ msrs->fred_rsp2 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2);
+ msrs->fred_rsp3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3);
+ msrs->fred_stklvls = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS);
+ msrs->fred_ssp1 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1);
+ msrs->fred_ssp2 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2);
+ msrs->fred_ssp3 = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3);
+}
+
+static void vmcs_write_fred_msrs(struct vmcs_fred_msrs *msrs)
+{
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, msrs->fred_config);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, msrs->fred_rsp1);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, msrs->fred_rsp2);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, msrs->fred_rsp3);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, msrs->fred_stklvls);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, msrs->fred_ssp1);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, msrs->fred_ssp2);
+ vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, msrs->fred_ssp3);
+}
+
static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *hv_evmcs = nested_vmx_evmcs(vmx);
@@ -2755,6 +2792,10 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
vmcs12->guest_ssp, vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
+
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
+ nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state(vmcs12))
+ vmcs_write_fred_msrs(&vmcs12->guest_fred_msrs);
}
/*
@@ -2821,6 +2862,10 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vcpu->arch.pat);
}
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
+ (!vmx->vcpu.arch.nested_run_pending || !nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state(vmcs12)))
+ vmcs_write_fred_msrs(&vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_msrs);
+
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_calc_nested_tsc_offset(
vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_offset,
vmx_get_l2_tsc_offset(vcpu),
@@ -3630,7 +3675,8 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_permission(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
}
static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+ bool from_failed_vmentry);
/*
* If from_vmentry is false, this is being called from state restore (either RSM
@@ -3680,6 +3726,10 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
&vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_ssp,
&vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_ssp_tbl);
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED) &&
+ (!vmx->vcpu.arch.nested_run_pending || !nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state(vmcs12)))
+ vmcs_read_fred_msrs(&vmx->nested.pre_vmenter_fred_msrs);
+
/*
* Stash L1's CR3, so that in the event of a "late" VM-Fail, i.e. a
* VM-Fail detected by hardware but not KVM, KVM can unwind its
@@ -3794,7 +3844,7 @@ enum nvmx_vmentry_status nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
nested_put_vmcs12_pages(vcpu);
- load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+ load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12, true);
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = exit_reason.full;
if (enable_shadow_vmcs || nested_vmx_is_evmptr12_valid(vmx))
vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync = true;
@@ -3983,6 +4033,8 @@ static void vmcs12_save_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 idt_vectoring;
unsigned int nr;
+ vmcs12->original_event_data = 0;
+
/*
* Per the SDM, VM-Exits due to double and triple faults are never
* considered to occur during event delivery, even if the double/triple
@@ -4021,6 +4073,13 @@ static void vmcs12_save_pending_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
}
+ if ((vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) &&
+ (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED) &&
+ (vcpu->arch.exception.is_nested))
+ idt_vectoring |= VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
+
+ vmcs12->original_event_data = vcpu->arch.exception.event_data;
+
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field = idt_vectoring;
} else if (vcpu->arch.nmi_injected) {
vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field =
@@ -4744,6 +4803,15 @@ static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
vmcs_read_cet_state(&vmx->vcpu, &vmcs12->guest_s_cet,
&vmcs12->guest_ssp,
&vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
+
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ vmcs_read_fred_msrs(&vmx->nested.at_vmexit_fred_msrs);
+
+ if (nested_cpu_save_guest_fred_state(vmcs12))
+ memcpy(&vmcs12->guest_fred_msrs,
+ &vmx->nested.at_vmexit_fred_msrs,
+ sizeof(struct vmcs_fred_msrs));
+ }
}
/*
@@ -4788,6 +4856,21 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = exit_insn_len;
+
+ /*
+ * When there is a valid original event, the exiting event is a nested
+ * event during delivery of the earlier original event.
+ *
+ * FRED event delivery reflects this relationship by setting the value
+ * of the nested exception bit of VM-exit interruption information
+ * (aka exiting-event identification) to that of the valid bit of the
+ * IDT-vectoring information (aka original-event identification).
+ */
+ if ((vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
+ (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) &&
+ (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_FRED))
+ vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info |= INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
+
vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
/*
@@ -4814,8 +4897,10 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
* This function should be called when the active VMCS is L1's (vmcs01).
*/
static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
+ bool from_failed_vmentry)
{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
enum vm_entry_failure_code ignored;
struct kvm_segment seg;
@@ -4890,6 +4975,14 @@ static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
WARN_ON_ONCE(__kvm_emulate_msr_write(vcpu, MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl));
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ if (nested_cpu_load_host_fred_state(vmcs12)) {
+ vmcs_write_fred_msrs(&vmcs12->host_fred_msrs);
+ } else if (!from_failed_vmentry) {
+ vmcs_write_fred_msrs(&vmx->nested.at_vmexit_fred_msrs);
+ }
+ }
+
/* Set L1 segment info according to Intel SDM
27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers */
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
@@ -5209,7 +5302,7 @@ void __nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_error_code,
KVM_ISA_VMX);
- load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
+ load_vmcs12_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12, false);
/*
* Process events if an injectable IRQ or NMI is pending, even
@@ -7370,6 +7463,8 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_basic(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_INOUT;
if (cpu_has_vmx_basic_no_hw_errcode_cc())
msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC;
+ if (cpu_has_vmx_nested_exception())
+ msrs->basic |= VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION;
}
static void nested_vmx_setup_cr_fixed(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
index 371fc3498b12..dc5a1e9cb4e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h
@@ -272,6 +272,23 @@ static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING);
}
+static inline bool nested_cpu_load_guest_fred_state(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ return vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_save_guest_fred_state(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ return nested_cpu_has_secondary_vm_exit_controls(vmcs12) &&
+ vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED;
+}
+
+static inline bool nested_cpu_load_host_fred_state(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ return nested_cpu_has_secondary_vm_exit_controls(vmcs12) &&
+ vmcs12->secondary_vm_exit_controls & SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED;
+}
+
/*
* if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1
* if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index ca341c59bab1..58af10f73789 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -52,6 +52,17 @@ struct vmcs_controls_shadow {
u64 tertiary_exec;
};
+struct vmcs_fred_msrs {
+ u64 fred_config;
+ u64 fred_rsp1;
+ u64 fred_rsp2;
+ u64 fred_rsp3;
+ u64 fred_stklvls;
+ u64 fred_ssp1;
+ u64 fred_ssp2;
+ u64 fred_ssp3;
+};
+
/*
* Track a VMCS that may be loaded on a certain CPU. If it is (cpu!=-1), also
* remember whether it was VMLAUNCHed, and maintain a linked list of all VMCSs
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
index 9d64a89aff00..837cb3d568c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c
@@ -67,6 +67,24 @@ static const u16 kvm_supported_vmcs12_field_offsets[] __initconst = {
FIELD64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_ia32_efer),
FIELD64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl),
FIELD64(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, secondary_vm_exit_controls),
+ FIELD64(INJECTED_EVENT_DATA, injected_event_data),
+ FIELD64(ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA, original_event_data),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, guest_ia32_fred_config),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, guest_ia32_fred_rsp1),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, guest_ia32_fred_rsp2),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, guest_ia32_fred_rsp3),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, guest_ia32_fred_stklvls),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, guest_ia32_fred_ssp1),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, guest_ia32_fred_ssp2),
+ FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, guest_ia32_fred_ssp3),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_CONFIG, host_ia32_fred_config),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP1, host_ia32_fred_rsp1),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP2, host_ia32_fred_rsp2),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP3, host_ia32_fred_rsp3),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_STKLVLS, host_ia32_fred_stklvls),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP1, host_ia32_fred_ssp1),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP2, host_ia32_fred_ssp2),
+ FIELD64(HOST_IA32_FRED_SSP3, host_ia32_fred_ssp3),
FIELD(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, pin_based_vm_exec_control),
FIELD(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, cpu_based_vm_exec_control),
FIELD(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, exception_bitmap),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
index bb2f406be63d..c4c5cd3722a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h
@@ -191,6 +191,27 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
u16 host_gs_selector;
u16 host_tr_selector;
u16 guest_pml_index;
+ u16 padding16[1]; /* align to 64-bit boundary */
+ struct vmcs_fred_msrs guest_fred_msrs;
+#define guest_ia32_fred_config guest_fred_msrs.fred_config
+#define guest_ia32_fred_rsp1 guest_fred_msrs.fred_rsp1
+#define guest_ia32_fred_rsp2 guest_fred_msrs.fred_rsp2
+#define guest_ia32_fred_rsp3 guest_fred_msrs.fred_rsp3
+#define guest_ia32_fred_stklvls guest_fred_msrs.fred_stklvls
+#define guest_ia32_fred_ssp1 guest_fred_msrs.fred_ssp1
+#define guest_ia32_fred_ssp2 guest_fred_msrs.fred_ssp2
+#define guest_ia32_fred_ssp3 guest_fred_msrs.fred_ssp3
+ struct vmcs_fred_msrs host_fred_msrs;
+#define host_ia32_fred_config host_fred_msrs.fred_config
+#define host_ia32_fred_rsp1 host_fred_msrs.fred_rsp1
+#define host_ia32_fred_rsp2 host_fred_msrs.fred_rsp2
+#define host_ia32_fred_rsp3 host_fred_msrs.fred_rsp3
+#define host_ia32_fred_stklvls host_fred_msrs.fred_stklvls
+#define host_ia32_fred_ssp1 host_fred_msrs.fred_ssp1
+#define host_ia32_fred_ssp2 host_fred_msrs.fred_ssp2
+#define host_ia32_fred_ssp3 host_fred_msrs.fred_ssp3
+ u64 injected_event_data;
+ u64 original_event_data;
};
/*
@@ -373,6 +394,24 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)
CHECK_OFFSET(host_gs_selector, 992);
CHECK_OFFSET(host_tr_selector, 994);
CHECK_OFFSET(guest_pml_index, 996);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_config, 1000);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_rsp1, 1008);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_rsp2, 1016);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_rsp3, 1024);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_stklvls, 1032);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_ssp1, 1040);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_ssp2, 1048);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(guest_ia32_fred_ssp3, 1056);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_config, 1064);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_rsp1, 1072);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_rsp2, 1080);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_rsp3, 1088);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_stklvls, 1096);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_ssp1, 1104);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_ssp2, 1112);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(host_ia32_fred_ssp3, 1120);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(injected_event_data, 1128);
+ CHECK_OFFSET(original_event_data, 1136);
}
extern u16 vmcs12_field_offsets[] __ro_after_init;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
index 14fd3f57d5c1..cc1e4038cd44 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -182,6 +182,29 @@ struct nested_vmx {
u64 pre_vmenter_ssp;
u64 pre_vmenter_ssp_tbl;
+ /*
+ * Used to snapshot FRED MSRs that may NOT be saved to vmcs12 as specified
+ * in the VM-Exit controls of vmcs12 configured by L1 VMM.
+ *
+ * FRED MSRs are *always* saved into vmcs02 because KVM always sets
+ * SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED. However an L1 VMM may choose to clear
+ * this bit, resulting in FRED MSRs not being propagated to vmcs12 from
+ * vmcs02. When the L1 VMM sets SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, this is
+ * not a problem, since KVM then immediately loads the host FRED MSRs of
+ * vmcs12 to the guest FRED MSRs of vmcs01.
+ *
+ * But if the L1 VMM clears SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED, KVM should
+ * retain the FRED MSRs, i.e., propagate the guest FRED MSRs of vmcs02 to
+ * the guest FRED MSRs of vmcs01.
+ *
+ * This structure stores guest FRED MSRs that an L1 VMM opts not to save
+ * during VM-Exits from L2 to L1. These MSRs may still be retained for
+ * running the L1 VMM if SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED is cleared in
+ * vmcs12.
+ */
+ struct vmcs_fred_msrs pre_vmenter_fred_msrs;
+ struct vmcs_fred_msrs at_vmexit_fred_msrs;
+
u16 vpid02;
u16 last_vpid;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-11 21:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-11 21:36 [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 01/28] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 02/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 03/28] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 04/28] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 05/28] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 06/28] x86/fred: Export this_cpu_fred_rsp() for KVM usage Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 07/28] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 08/28] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 09/28] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Sohil Mehta
2026-09-14 7:04 ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-14 16:14 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2026-09-15 8:43 ` Binbin Wu
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 10/28] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 11/28] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 12/28] KVM: x86: Add a new save/restore flag for FRED metadata Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 13/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 14/28] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 15/28] KVM: x86: Include CR4.FRED in the emulator CR4 write mask Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 16/28] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 17/28] KVM: x86: Handle CR4.FRED when emulating RSM Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 18/28] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 19/28] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 20/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 22/28] KVM: nVMX: Restrict event data VMCS fields to FRED-supported hosts Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 23/28] KVM: nVMX: Shadow ORIGINAL_EVENT_DATA and INJECTED_EVENT_DATA fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 24/28] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 25/28] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 26/28] KVM: selftests: Add FRED MSRs to msrs_test Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 27/28] KVM: selftests: Add a new VM guest mode to run user level code Sohil Mehta
2026-09-11 21:36 ` [PATCH v10 28/28] KVM: selftests: Add fred exception tests Sohil Mehta
2026-09-15 6:03 ` [PATCH v10 00/28] KVM: Enable FRED support with KVM VMX Xin Li
2026-09-15 10:00 ` [EXTERNAL] " David Woodhouse
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