From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
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Subject: [RFC PATCH kernel 06/17] x86/io/tsm: Allow mixed ioremap for shared+private BARs
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 21:51:46 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260916115159.1938195-7-aik@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260916115159.1938195-1-aik@amd.com>
A TDISP device advertises private MMIO ranges via a TDI report.
Upon transitioning to RUN, accesses to those must be made with
the encrypted bit set in a PTE.
A device can allow private access to a part of a BAR, for example,
MSIX BAR (when MSIX config is not locked or MSIX is emulated by the HV).
The existing __ioremap_caller() fails if not every single page has
the same protection in PTE and this breaks device drivers (usually
TDISP-unaware) calling pci_iomap() and such.
Adjust __ioremap_caller() to map such MMIO BAR in chunks.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
---
include/linux/io.h | 8 +++
include/linux/ioport.h | 3 +
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 2 +-
kernel/resource.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++
mm/ioremap.c | 2 +-
5 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/io.h b/include/linux/io.h
index 0642c7ee41db..9f5d5928f30c 100644
--- a/include/linux/io.h
+++ b/include/linux/io.h
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ void __iowrite64_copy(void __iomem *to, const void *from, size_t count);
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
int ioremap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot);
+int ioremap_map_page_range(unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot);
int vmap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot);
#else
@@ -35,6 +37,12 @@ static inline int ioremap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
{
return 0;
}
+static inline int ioremap_map_page_range(unsigned long vaddr,
+ phys_addr_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
static inline int vmap_page_range(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
phys_addr_t phys_addr, pgprot_t prot)
{
diff --git a/include/linux/ioport.h b/include/linux/ioport.h
index 122f1eefb4b9..49d35b31f22d 100644
--- a/include/linux/ioport.h
+++ b/include/linux/ioport.h
@@ -444,8 +444,11 @@ walk_iomem_res_desc(unsigned long desc, unsigned long flags, u64 start, u64 end,
void *arg, int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
extern int walk_soft_reserve_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
+extern int walk_encrypted_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
+ int (*func)(struct resource *, void *));
extern int
region_intersects_soft_reserve(resource_size_t start, size_t size);
+extern int region_intersects_encrypted(resource_size_t start, size_t size);
struct resource *devm_request_free_mem_region(struct device *dev,
struct resource *base, unsigned long size);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 12c8180ca1ba..976ce6d5cf70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ __ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
if (memtype_kernel_map_sync(phys_addr, size, pcm))
goto err_free_area;
- if (ioremap_page_range(vaddr, vaddr + size, phys_addr, prot))
+ if (ioremap_map_page_range(vaddr, phys_addr, size, prot))
goto err_free_area;
ret_addr = (void __iomem *) (vaddr + offset);
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c
index 1b9cf2244b3f..c575ed87d67a 100644
--- a/kernel/resource.c
+++ b/kernel/resource.c
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/resource_ext.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -713,6 +715,67 @@ int region_intersects_soft_reserve(resource_size_t start, size_t size)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(region_intersects_soft_reserve);
+/*
+ * Walk encrypted MMIO ranges registered for TDISP/TSM private device
+ * regions (see encrypted_iomem_resource).
+ */
+int walk_encrypted_mem_res(u64 start, u64 end, void *arg,
+ int (*func)(struct resource *, void *))
+{
+ return walk_res_desc(&encrypted_iomem_resource, start, end,
+ IORESOURCE_MEM, IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED, arg, func);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(walk_encrypted_mem_res);
+
+int region_intersects_encrypted(resource_size_t start, size_t size)
+{
+ guard(read_lock)(&resource_lock);
+ return __region_intersects(&encrypted_iomem_resource, start, size,
+ IORESOURCE_MEM, IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(region_intersects_encrypted);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+/*
+ * Map @size bytes at @vaddr to @phys_addr using @prot, splitting the mapping
+ * when TDISP/TSM has registered only part of the range in
+ * encrypted_iomem_resource and per-page encryption attributes are required.
+ */
+int ioremap_map_page_range(unsigned long vaddr, phys_addr_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) ||
+ region_intersects_encrypted(phys_addr, size) == REGION_DISJOINT)
+ return ioremap_page_range(vaddr, vaddr + size, phys_addr, prot);
+
+ while (size) {
+ bool enc = region_intersects_encrypted(phys_addr, PAGE_SIZE) ==
+ REGION_INTERSECTS;
+ unsigned long run = PAGE_SIZE;
+ pgprot_t run_prot = enc ? pgprot_encrypted(prot) : prot;
+
+ phys_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ size -= PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ while (size &&
+ (region_intersects_encrypted(phys_addr, PAGE_SIZE) ==
+ REGION_INTERSECTS) == enc) {
+ run += PAGE_SIZE;
+ phys_addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ size -= PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (vmap_page_range(vaddr - run, vaddr, phys_addr - run, run_prot))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ioremap_map_page_range);
+#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
+
void __weak arch_remove_reservations(struct resource *avail)
{
}
diff --git a/mm/ioremap.c b/mm/ioremap.c
index c36dd9f62fd5..ccf938628e55 100644
--- a/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ void __iomem *generic_ioremap_prot(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size,
vaddr = (unsigned long)area->addr;
area->phys_addr = phys_addr;
- if (ioremap_page_range(vaddr, vaddr + size, phys_addr, prot)) {
+ if (ioremap_map_page_range(vaddr, phys_addr, size, prot)) {
free_vm_area(area);
return NULL;
}
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-16 11:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-16 11:51 [RFC PATCH kernel 00/17] PCI/TSM: coco/sev-guest: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe TDISP (phase2) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 01/17] pci/dma/tsm: Call disable DMA bus hook on cleanup Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 17:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-09-17 2:28 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 02/17] pci/tsm: Fix stale comment about TDI report range start Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 03/17] tsm/core: Store range_id in pci_tsm_mmio_entry Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 04/17] crypto/ccp/tsm: Use TSM API for DOE Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 05/17] tsm-core: Register nevertheless Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 07/17] x86/dma: Revert "x86: Remove unnecessary architecture-specific <asm/device.h>" Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 08/17] x86/dma: Add ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 09/17] dma/swiotlb: Force shared DMA for allocatios from SWIOTLB Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 10/17] x86, dma: Allow accepted devices to map private memory Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 12:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 11/17] tsm/core: Add TDI status Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 12/17] coco/sev-guest: Allow multiple source files in the driver Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 13/17] x86/sev: Pass HV features to sev-guest device via platform data Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 14/17] x86/sev: Add GHCB calls for SEV-TIO Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 15/17] x86/sev: Implement guest TSM driver for SEV-TIO (phase2, DMA) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 16/17] x86/sev: Enable secure MMIO (phase2) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-16 11:51 ` [RFC PATCH kernel 17/17] x86/sev: Flush IOMMU TLB for trusted devices Alexey Kardashevskiy
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