From: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Shaobo Huang <huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] kasan: unpoison task stack below watermark only in generic mode
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 19:51:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260916175113.1327454-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com> (raw)
CPU resume and BPF exception handling can discard stack frames without
running their compiler-generated epilogues. Generic KASAN needs
kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below() to clear the redzones left behind by
those frames before the stack is reused.
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK also enables this helper for SW_TAGS. The helper
derives the stack base from an untagged stack pointer, so
kasan_unpoison() writes KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xff) into the shadow for
[base, watermark). For a vmapped task stack, vm_area->addr still
carries the original random allocation tag. This creates a tag mismatch
at the stack base even if that memory has never held an instrumented
stack object.
When the task exits and its stack is not cached, thread_stack_free_rcu()
passes vm_area->addr to vfree(). In RCU callback context this reaches
vfree_atomic(), whose llist_add() writes to the allocation base through
the tagged pointer and triggers a false KASAN invalid-access report:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
Write of size 8 at addr c2ffffc0a8f70000 by task rcuop/7/75
Pointer tag: [c2], memory tag: [ff]
Call trace:
__hwasan_store8_noabort+0xe8/0xf8
vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
vfree+0x220/0x298
thread_stack_free_rcu+0x3c/0x4c
rcu_do_batch+0x308/0xaf0
rcu_nocb_cb_kthread+0x33c/0x708
The deferred-free path started using the tagged vm_area->addr in
commit 449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct
variables in vmap stacks code"). Previously it freed the untagged
pointer derived from tsk->stack, so the write was never tag-checked.
SW_TAGS does not need the blanket shadow reset to make subsequent stack
accesses valid: untagged kernel pointers have the match-all 0xff tag,
and the compiler initializes the shadow tags of instrumented stack
objects before use.
Return early unless CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC is enabled. Keep the mode check
in the common helper so it covers both resume and bpf_throw().
Fixes: 449e0b4ed5a1 ("fork: clean-up naming of vm_stack/vm_struct variables in vmap stacks code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Shaobo Huang <huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260806123020.90869-1-huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com/
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index b7d05c2a6d93..7d21c4db68d2 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -114,12 +114,23 @@ void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
+ void *base;
+
+ /*
+ * Only the generic mode needs this. In the tag-based mode the
+ * compiler fully initializes the shadow of stack variables on
+ * function entry, so stale tags left below the watermark are
+ * harmless.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
+ return;
+
/*
* Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
* because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
* yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
*/
- void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
+ base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false);
}
--
2.55.0
reply other threads:[~2026-09-16 17:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: [no followups] expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260916175113.1327454-1-ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com \
--to=ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andreyknvl@gmail.com \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=vincenzo.frascino@arm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®