From: zjamg <ndaugoing@gmail.com>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: "Simon Horman" <horms@kernel.org>,
"Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@toke.dk>,
"Jamal Hadi Salim" <jhs@mojatatu.com>,
"Jiri Pirko" <jiri@resnulli.us>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
zjamg <ndaugoing@gmail.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] net: fix OOB read in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() on negative transport offset
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 20:21:52 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260917122153.62722-2-ndaugoing@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260917122153.62722-1-ndaugoing@gmail.com>
In qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init(), the header length up to the transport layer
is computed via skb_transport_offset() or skb_inner_transport_offset():
/* mac layer + network layer */
if (!skb->encapsulation) {
if (unlikely(!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)))
return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET;
hdr_len = skb_transport_offset(skb);
} else {
hdr_len = skb_inner_transport_offset(skb);
}
Both offset accessors return a signed int, but hdr_len is declared as
unsigned int.
If a packet undergoes header operations (such as skb_vlan_untag() pulling
stacked VLAN tags without updating inner_transport_header, or other header
stripping that advances skb->data past the transport header), the offset
becomes negative.
When stored into unsigned int hdr_len, negative values are converted to
large positive numbers near UINT_MAX (e.g. (unsigned int)-16 is
0xFFFFFFF0). Subsequently:
1. pskb_may_pull(skb, hdr_len + sizeof(struct tcphdr)) evaluates
0xFFFFFFF0 + 20, which overflows 32-bit unsigned arithmetic to 4.
Since the packet length exceeds 4 bytes, pskb_may_pull() returns true,
bypassing the bounds check.
2. th = (const struct tcphdr *)(skb->data + hdr_len) zero-extends hdr_len
on 64-bit architectures, creating a wild pointer pointing ~4 GiB past
skb->data into unmapped memory.
3. __tcp_hdrlen(th) dereferences th->doff, triggering an immediate kernel
crash (page fault / KASAN wild-memory-access panic).
A similar unsigned overflow occurs for UDP (SKB_GSO_UDP_L4).
Fix this by declaring hdr_len as int to match the return types of
skb_transport_offset() and skb_inner_transport_offset(), and explicitly
rejecting negative offsets by returning SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO.
Fixes: 7fb4c1967011 ("net: pull headers in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: zjamg <ndaugoing@gmail.com>
---
net/core/dev.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
index ecfbd72d5d1a..f2dbf99181ec 100644
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -4159,8 +4159,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(validate_xmit_skb_list);
static enum skb_drop_reason qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
- unsigned int hdr_len, tlen;
+ unsigned int tlen;
u16 gso_segs;
+ int hdr_len;
qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = skb->len;
if (!shinfo->gso_size) {
@@ -4182,6 +4183,8 @@ static enum skb_drop_reason qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init(struct sk_buff *skb)
} else {
hdr_len = skb_inner_transport_offset(skb);
}
+ if (unlikely(hdr_len < 0))
+ return SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_BAD_GSO;
/* + transport layer */
if (likely(shinfo->gso_type & (SKB_GSO_TCPV4 | SKB_GSO_TCPV6))) {
const struct tcphdr *th;
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-17 12:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-17 12:21 [PATCH 0/2] net: fix negative transport offset handling in GSO pkt len calculation zjamg
2026-09-17 12:21 ` zjamg [this message]
2026-09-17 12:21 ` [PATCH 2/2] net/sched: sch_cake: check negative transport offset in cake_overhead() zjamg
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