From: Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
To: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<xin@zytor.com>, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
<sohil.mehta@intel.com>, <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>, <yosry@kernel.org>,
<nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>, <santosh.shukla@amd.com>,
<shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 8/9] KVM: SVM: Enable FRED virtualization
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2026 11:40:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260925114017.2208531-9-shivansh.dhiman@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260925114017.2208531-1-shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
Set the FRED_VIRT_ENABLE bit (bit 4) in the misc_ctl2 field of the VMCB to
enable FRED virtualization. This enables hardware to automatically save and
restore the FRED MSRs on VMRUN and #VMEXIT.
Set the bit in svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() when FRED is exposed to the
guest, and clear it otherwise.
FRED virtualization requires vNMI to handle guest NMIs correctly, so, clear
FRED when vNMI is unavailable.
Signed-off-by: Shivansh Dhiman <shivansh.dhiman@amd.com>
---
Changes in v3:
* Renamed FRED_VIRT_ENABLE_MASK to SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_FRED.
* Set the bit in misc_ctl2, the current name of the VMCB field.
* Removed the unconditional kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED).
* Clear FRED when vNMI is unavailable (Andrew Cooper).
Changes in v2:
* Confined the enabling of vFRED to svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid() only
(Sean Christopherson).
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 11 ++++++++---
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 1a6d4509b05b..288a8a78f1c7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_LBR BIT_ULL(0)
#define SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_VMLOAD_VMSAVE BIT_ULL(1)
+#define SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_FRED BIT_ULL(4)
#define SVM_TSC_RATIO_RSVD 0xffffff0000000000ULL
#define SVM_TSC_RATIO_MIN 0x0000000000000001ULL
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 86a3ba54aab2..25dd379725d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4912,6 +4912,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible(vcpu))
guest_cpu_cap_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_V_VMSAVE_VMLOAD);
+ if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED))
+ svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 |= SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_FRED;
+ else
+ svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl2 &= ~SVM_MISC2_ENABLE_V_FRED;
+
if (is_sev_guest(vcpu))
sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(svm);
}
@@ -5675,9 +5680,6 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
- /* SVM FRED virtualization not implemented yet */
- kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
-
/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */
if (nested) {
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SVM);
@@ -5751,6 +5753,9 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
/* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
sev_set_cpu_caps();
+ if (!vnmi)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
/*
* Clear capabilities that are automatically configured by common code,
* but that require explicit SVM support (that isn't yet implemented).
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-25 11:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-25 11:40 [PATCH v3 0/9] KVM: SVM: Enable FRED support Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 1/9] KVM: SVM: Initialize FRED VMCB fields Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 2/9] KVM: SVM: Disable interception of FRED MSRs for FRED supported guests Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 3/9] KVM: SVM: Save/restore FRED_RSP0 " Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 4/9] KVM: SVM: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 5/9] KVM: SVM: Populate FRED event data on event injection Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 6/9] KVM: SVM: Support FRED nested exception injection Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 7/9] KVM: SVM: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcb() Shivansh Dhiman
2026-09-25 11:40 ` Shivansh Dhiman [this message]
2026-09-25 11:40 ` [PATCH v3 9/9] KVM: SVM: Don't intercept ICEBP while the guest has FRED enabled Shivansh Dhiman
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