From: Natasha Klaus <natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Natasha Klaus <natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] userns: reject uid_map/gid_map values that do not fit in u32
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2026 10:25:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260928072537.115668-2-natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260928072537.115668-1-natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com>
map_write() parses each line written to uid_map, gid_map or projid_map
with simple_strtoul() and stores the results in the u32 fields of
struct uid_gid_extent. On 64-bit kernels a value above U32_MAX is
silently truncated modulo 2^32. The coding assistant flagged this
truncation site while reading map_write(), and I confirmed it by hand
on a running kernel, where writing to the uid_map of a fresh user
namespace installs a different mapping than the one requested:
"4294967296 1000 1" -> installed as "0 1000 1"
"4294967297 1000 1" -> installed as "1 1000 1"
"4294967301 1000 1" -> installed as "5 1000 1"
The same happens to the lower_first and count fields. Only a literal of
2^64 or more is rejected, and only because simple_strtoul() saturates
to ULLONG_MAX, which truncates onto the (u32)-1 value map_write()
already refuses.
The write succeeds, so a runtime that computes ranges and gets one
wrong ends up with a different map than it asked for and no error to
tell it so.
Parse each field with simple_strtoull() into unsigned long long locals
and fail the write with -EINVAL if any of them exceeds U32_MAX, before
the existing checks, which are kept unchanged and in the same order.
On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32 bits wide and the truncation
happens inside simple_strtoul() itself, so a range check on its return
value would never fire there; that is why the values are parsed as
unsigned long long. simple_strtoull() keeps the end pointer behaviour
the multi-line parser relies on.
This is hardening, not a security fix: the truncated values are valid
ids and every later check still applies to them.
Signed-off-by: Natasha Klaus <natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com>
Assisted-by: LLM
---
checkpatch warns that simple_strtoull() is obsolete. kstrtoull() does not
fit here: the buffer holds several lines of three space-separated fields,
and the parser relies on the end pointer to step from one field to the
next, which kstrto*() does not provide.
kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 +++++++++++---
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 0bed462e9b2a..e7ed475c3685 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -940,6 +940,7 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
struct uid_gid_map new_map;
unsigned idx;
struct uid_gid_extent extent;
+ unsigned long long first, lower_first, cnt;
char *kbuf, *pos, *next_line;
ssize_t ret;
@@ -1001,17 +1002,17 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
- extent.first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
+ first = simple_strtoull(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
- extent.lower_first = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
+ lower_first = simple_strtoull(pos, &pos, 10);
if (!isspace(*pos))
goto out;
pos = skip_spaces(pos);
- extent.count = simple_strtoul(pos, &pos, 10);
+ cnt = simple_strtoull(pos, &pos, 10);
if (*pos && !isspace(*pos))
goto out;
@@ -1020,6 +1021,13 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (*pos != '\0')
goto out;
+ /* Verify the values fit in the u32 fields of the extent */
+ if (first > U32_MAX || lower_first > U32_MAX || cnt > U32_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ extent.first = first;
+ extent.lower_first = lower_first;
+ extent.count = cnt;
+
/* Verify we have been given valid starting values */
if ((extent.first == (u32) -1) ||
(extent.lower_first == (u32) -1))
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-28 7:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-28 7:25 [PATCH 0/2] userns: reject out-of-range uid_map/gid_map values Natasha Klaus
2026-09-28 7:25 ` Natasha Klaus [this message]
2026-09-28 7:25 ` [PATCH 2/2] selftests/namespaces: add uid_map/gid_map range tests Natasha Klaus
2026-09-28 13:58 ` [PATCH 0/2] userns: reject out-of-range uid_map/gid_map values Eric W. Biederman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260928072537.115668-2-natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com \
--to=natalie.klaus@runtimeverification.com \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
--cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®