From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Gow <david@davidgow.net>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
Shuvam Pandey <shuvampandey1@gmail.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
nikitash.mariiaw@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_strlen()
Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:28:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202609291927.9D27E60@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026092037-antsy-shrapnel-6139@gregkh>
On Sun, Sep 20, 2026 at 06:34:32AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> WARN on the init makes more sense, but even then it feels odd as if we
> wanted to make a seq_buf with data from a device or userspace, we would
> have to verify the size is non-zero _before_ creating the seq_buf or we
> would crash. So someone has to check the "untrusted" data somewhere,
> right?
>
> And why can't we have buffers of 0 size work just fine? What prevents
> that? People have "empty" strings for lots of things.
Yeah, okay. I'll not add the WARN for seq_buf_strlen() and remove it
from seq_buf_str().
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-30 2:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-19 0:26 [PATCH v2 0/9] " Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:26 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] seq_buf: Do not print an empty line from an overflowed seq_buf_do_printk() Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] seq_buf: Do not pop from an overflowed seq_buf Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] seq_buf: Copy what fits when seq_buf_puts() and seq_buf_putmem() overflow Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] seq_buf: Clear what a writer did not claim when a seq_buf overflows Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_strlen() Kees Cook
2026-09-19 7:38 ` Greg KH
2026-09-19 21:15 ` Kees Cook
2026-09-20 5:34 ` Greg KH
2026-09-20 8:58 ` David Laight
2026-09-30 2:28 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2026-09-21 9:46 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-09-30 2:31 ` Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_init_append() Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] powerpc/papr_scm: Return the string length from the sysfs show functions Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] nvdimm: ndtest: Return the string length from flags_show() Kees Cook
2026-09-19 0:27 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] docs: core-api: Document the seq_buf API Kees Cook
2026-09-19 1:54 ` Randy Dunlap
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