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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin@broadcom.com>
Cc: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>,
	Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	virtualization@lists.linux.dev,
	bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Bo Gan <bo.gan@broadcom.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>,
	Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
	Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/6] percpu: Bound decrypted storage for all x86 encrypted guests
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:54:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260930085413.GH88198@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABQX2QP0+Jr6gG0nZkDggvyGWCSHMNVKPPavZTYBqH+wg7rdMg@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 01:12:45PM -0400, Zack Rusin wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 3:54 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 29, 2026 at 12:02:51AM -0400, Zack Rusin wrote:
> > > @@ -1022,11 +1024,13 @@
> > >   * Note: We use a separate section so that only this section gets
> > >   * decrypted to avoid exposing more than we wish.
> > >   */
> > > -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> > > +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
> > >  #define PERCPU_DECRYPTED_SECTION                                     \
> > >       . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);                                           \
> > > +     __start_percpu_decrypted = .;                                   \
> > >       *(.data..percpu..decrypted)                                     \
> > > -     . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
> > > +     . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);                                           \
> > > +     __end_percpu_decrypted = .;
> > >  #else
> > >  #define PERCPU_DECRYPTED_SECTION
> > >  #endif
> >
> > So you're page aligning something that will get different protection and
> > will thus shatter large pages?
> >
> > That is somewhat uncool. We like large pages, large pages are good.
> 
> I'm a huge large pages fan too. I have a poster in my office and
> everything... And I never do things that are uncool. I have a wwcdd
> (what would cool dude do) bracelet and I look at it every time I make
> a decision, which given that I'm old gets on my wife's nerves a lot.
> That is to say I'm handsome and innocent.

:-)

> The alignment isn't new. It has been there since ac26963a1175
> ("percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED") under AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT,
> which common distro kernels enable. This patch extends it to TDX-only
> builds and adds the boundary symbols. On bare metal and in ordinary
> guests nothing changes protection, so no large pages are split.

Right, I saw it is pre-existing, but you made me notice ;-)

Anyway, the thing that wasn't immediately obvious was that we only
really change the protection for (sekjoer) guests. This means I mostly
don't care.

> In confidential guests, yes, converting each CPU's page splits the
> direct map around it. The alignment doesn't cause that: a large

Nit you could 2M align, so alignment is somewhat related.

> mapping can't be part private and part shared, so a converted page
> can't stay inside one. The alignment only keeps unrelated per-CPU data
> out of the shared page. Because that page sits in every CPU's per-CPU
> unit, each 2M mapping that holds one of them becomes 4K mappings,
> including the ordinary per-CPU data around it. In the layouts we've
> tested that's most of the first per-CPU chunk.

So perhaps a little more invasive would be poking at the per-cpu
allocator and having a whole 'decrypted' pcpu_chunk which is 2M aligned
or something.


Anyway, as long as this is sekjoer guests only, I really could not be
bothered much. Proceed, but perhaps put on a comment in the
vmlinux.lds.h to clarify this, for those of us who do not live in
coconut land?

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-30  8:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-29  4:02 [PATCH v2 0/6] x86/percpu: Share decrypted storage before guest setup Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] percpu: Page-align decrypted data in UP kernels Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] percpu: Bound decrypted storage for all x86 encrypted guests Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  7:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-09-29 17:12     ` Zack Rusin
2026-09-30  8:54       ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] x86/percpu: Require embedded allocation in " Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] x86/mm: Provide common early memory decryption Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] x86/tdx: Support early sharing of kernel data Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  4:02 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] x86/percpu: Share decrypted storage before guest CPU setup Zack Rusin
2026-09-29  5:39 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] x86/percpu: Share decrypted storage before guest setup Borislav Petkov
2026-09-29 17:25   ` Zack Rusin

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