From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Cc: "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Andy Shevchenko" <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
"David Gow" <david@davidgow.net>,
"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
"Shuvam Pandey" <shuvampandey1@gmail.com>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Sergey Senozhatsky" <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Jiri Kosina" <jikos@kernel.org>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
"Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>,
"Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
"Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Emil Tsalapatis" <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
"Ihor Solodrai" <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
"Uwe Kleine-König" <u.kleine-koenig@baylibre.com>,
"Madhavan Srinivasan" <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
"Michael Ellerman" <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
"Nicholas Piggin" <npiggin@gmail.com>,
"Shivaprasad G Bhat" <sbhat@linux.ibm.com>,
"Thorsten Blum" <blum@kernel.org>,
"Alison Schofield" <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
"Dave Jiang" <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Guangshuo Li" <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>,
"Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
"Uwe Kleine-König" <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>,
"Vishal Verma" <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, nvdimm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 05/11] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_strlen()
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2026 20:59:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261003035921.1918874-5-kees@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261003035906.too.263-kees@kernel.org>
Several strlcat() call sites being converted to seq_buf need behavior
seq_buf doesn't currently provide. The return from seq_buf_used() is
not the length of the string in a seq_buf. Once the buffer is full or
has overflowed it returns the buffer size, which counts the byte that
seq_buf_str() replaces with the NUL, so a caller that needs the string
and its length has to call seq_buf_str() and then walk the string with
strlen().
Move the termination out of seq_buf_str() into a helper that returns
where it put the NUL, and add seq_buf_strlen(), which terminates the
buffer in the same way and returns that offset.
As discussed in review, don't add WARN_ON() for seq_buf_strlen() and
drop it from seq_buf_str().
Add tests comparing seq_buf_strlen() against strlen() of seq_buf_str()
for empty, appended, truncated, exactly full, and overflowed buffers,
checking that seq_buf_strlen() alone terminates a full buffer, and
checking that a zero-sized seq_buf reports an empty string from both
accessors without touching the buffer.
Tests passed under qemu on ARCH=x86_64 with GCC 16.2.0 and CONFIG_KASAN=y,
and on big-endian ARCH=s390 with GCC s390x-linux-gnu 16.2.0.
Assisted-by: LLM
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/seq_buf.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++--
lib/tests/seq_buf_kunit.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/seq_buf.h b/include/linux/seq_buf.h
index 0c0a0db04b09..87ccc62f1c62 100644
--- a/include/linux/seq_buf.h
+++ b/include/linux/seq_buf.h
@@ -89,6 +89,27 @@ static inline unsigned int seq_buf_used(struct seq_buf *s)
return min(s->len, s->size);
}
+/*
+ * NUL-terminate the buffer in @s: directly after the data when there is
+ * room for it, otherwise in the last byte of the buffer. @s->size must not
+ * be zero.
+ *
+ * Returns: the offset of the NUL.
+ */
+static inline size_t __seq_buf_terminate(struct seq_buf *s)
+{
+ size_t end;
+
+ if (seq_buf_buffer_left(s))
+ end = s->len;
+ else
+ end = s->size - 1;
+
+ s->buffer[end] = 0;
+
+ return end;
+}
+
/**
* seq_buf_str - get NUL-terminated C string from seq_buf
* @s: the seq_buf handle
@@ -98,7 +119,12 @@ static inline unsigned int seq_buf_used(struct seq_buf *s)
*
* Note, if this is called when the buffer has overflowed, then
* the last byte of the buffer is zeroed, and the len will still
- * point passed it.
+ * point passed it. The same happens when the buffer is exactly
+ * full: the NUL takes the place of the last byte written, which is
+ * lost, though seq_buf_used() still counts it.
+ *
+ * A zero-sized seq_buf has nowhere to put a NUL, so the empty string
+ * is returned instead of writing to @s->buffer.
*
* After this function is called, s->buffer is safe to use
* in string operations.
@@ -107,17 +133,44 @@ static inline unsigned int seq_buf_used(struct seq_buf *s)
*/
static inline const char *seq_buf_str(struct seq_buf *s)
{
- if (WARN_ON(s->size == 0))
+ if (s->size == 0)
return "";
- if (seq_buf_buffer_left(s))
- s->buffer[s->len] = 0;
- else
- s->buffer[s->size - 1] = 0;
+ __seq_buf_terminate(s);
return s->buffer;
}
+/**
+ * seq_buf_strlen - get the length of the NUL-terminated C string in seq_buf
+ * @s: the seq_buf handle
+ *
+ * This makes sure that the buffer in @s is NUL-terminated, exactly as
+ * seq_buf_str() does, and returns the length of the resulting string
+ * without walking it. Unlike seq_buf_used(), this does not count the byte
+ * given up to the NUL when the buffer is full or has overflowed. When the
+ * buffer is exactly full, that byte is the last one written, and calling
+ * either function loses it.
+ *
+ * A zero-sized seq_buf holds no string, so 0 is returned without writing
+ * to @s->buffer, matching what seq_buf_str() returns for one.
+ *
+ * After this function is called, s->buffer is safe to use
+ * in string operations.
+ *
+ * Returns: the offset of the NUL that terminates @s->buffer. That is the
+ * length of the string unless an earlier NUL is in the way, either one the
+ * data written to @s carried itself, or one seq_buf_set_overflow() left
+ * behind when it cleared what no writer had claimed.
+ */
+static inline size_t seq_buf_strlen(struct seq_buf *s)
+{
+ if (s->size == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return __seq_buf_terminate(s);
+}
+
/**
* seq_buf_get_buf - get buffer to write arbitrary data to
* @s: the seq_buf handle
diff --git a/lib/tests/seq_buf_kunit.c b/lib/tests/seq_buf_kunit.c
index d5b819fc0ff3..569ab3d96f10 100644
--- a/lib/tests/seq_buf_kunit.c
+++ b/lib/tests/seq_buf_kunit.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ static void seq_buf_init_test(struct kunit *test)
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_buffer_left(&s), 32);
KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_used(&s), 0);
KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 0);
}
static void seq_buf_declare_test(struct kunit *test)
@@ -510,6 +511,128 @@ static void seq_buf_path_overflow_test(struct kunit *test)
KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), expected);
}
+static void seq_buf_strlen_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 16);
+
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "");
+
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, "hello");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 5);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, " %s", "world");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 11);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+}
+
+static void seq_buf_strlen_printf_overflow_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 16);
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(t, 8);
+
+ seq_buf_printf(&s, "%s", "1234567890abcdefghij");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_used(&s), 16);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 15);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "1234567890abcde");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+
+ /* Output one byte too long for the NUL. */
+ seq_buf_printf(&t, "%s", "12345678");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&t));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_used(&t), 8);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&t), 7);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&t), "1234567");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&t), strlen(seq_buf_str(&t)));
+}
+
+static void seq_buf_strlen_full_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 4);
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(t, 8);
+ char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /* Filled exactly, with no room left for a NUL, but not overflowed. */
+ seq_buf_putc(&s, 'a');
+ seq_buf_putc(&s, 'b');
+ seq_buf_putc(&s, 'c');
+ seq_buf_putc(&s, 'd');
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_used(&s), 4);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 3);
+ /* seq_buf_strlen() terminates the buffer by itself. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, s.buffer[3], '\0');
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strnlen(s.buffer, s.size), 3);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "abc");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+
+ /* A printf into a full buffer writes nothing. */
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_printf(&s, "%s", "x"), -1);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 3);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "abc");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+
+ len = seq_buf_get_buf(&t, &buf);
+ KUNIT_ASSERT_EQ(test, len, 8);
+ memset(buf, 'z', len);
+ seq_buf_commit(&t, len);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_FALSE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&t));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&t), 7);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, t.buffer[7], '\0');
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strnlen(t.buffer, t.size), 7);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&t), "zzzzzzz");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&t), strlen(seq_buf_str(&t)));
+}
+
+static void seq_buf_strlen_puts_overflow_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 16);
+
+ /* A puts that does not fit copies as much as fits. */
+ seq_buf_puts(&s, "hello");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_puts(&s, " this does not fit"), -1);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_TRUE(test, seq_buf_has_overflowed(&s));
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 15);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "hello this does");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)));
+}
+
+static void seq_buf_strlen_embedded_nul_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ static const char data[] = "ab\0cd";
+ DECLARE_SEQ_BUF(s, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * seq_buf_strlen() reports where it put the terminator, not where
+ * the first NUL is, so data carrying a NUL of its own makes the two
+ * disagree. That is expected, and is what the documented caveat is
+ * about.
+ */
+ seq_buf_putmem(&s, data, sizeof(data) - 1);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 5);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, strlen(seq_buf_str(&s)), 2);
+}
+
+static void seq_buf_strlen_zero_size_test(struct kunit *test)
+{
+ char buf[] = "untouched";
+ struct seq_buf s;
+
+ /*
+ * A zero-sized seq_buf has nowhere to put a terminator. Both
+ * accessors report an empty string and leave the buffer alone
+ * rather than writing outside it.
+ */
+ seq_buf_init(&s, buf, 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_EQ(test, seq_buf_strlen(&s), 0);
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, seq_buf_str(&s), "");
+ KUNIT_EXPECT_STREQ(test, buf, "untouched");
+}
+
static struct kunit_case seq_buf_test_cases[] = {
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_init_test),
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_declare_test),
@@ -527,6 +650,12 @@ static struct kunit_case seq_buf_test_cases[] = {
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_putmem_partial_overflow_test),
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_putmem_hex_partial_overflow_test),
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_path_overflow_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_printf_overflow_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_full_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_puts_overflow_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_embedded_nul_test),
+ KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_strlen_zero_size_test),
KUNIT_CASE(seq_buf_do_printk_test),
{}
};
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-03 3:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-03 3:59 [PATCH v4 00/11] " Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 01/11] seq_buf: Do not print an empty line from an overflowed seq_buf_do_printk() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 4:50 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 02/11] seq_buf: Do not pop from an overflowed seq_buf Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 03/11] seq_buf: Copy what fits when seq_buf_puts() and seq_buf_putmem() overflow Kees Cook
2026-10-03 4:50 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 04/11] seq_buf: Clear what a writer did not claim when a seq_buf overflows Kees Cook
2026-10-03 4:50 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-03 3:59 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2026-10-03 15:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/11] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_strlen() Andy Shevchenko
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 06/11] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_terminate() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 07/11] bpf: Remove dead newline stripping from format_disasm_line() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 08/11] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_init_append() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 4:33 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-03 10:31 ` Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 09/11] powerpc/papr_scm: Return the string length from the sysfs show functions Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 10/11] nvdimm: ndtest: Return the string length from flags_show() Kees Cook
2026-10-03 3:59 ` [PATCH v4 11/11] docs: core-api: Document the seq_buf API Kees Cook
2026-10-03 6:32 ` [PATCH v4 00/11] seq_buf: Add seq_buf_strlen() Alexei Starovoitov
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