From: Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
To: ebiggers@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org, Jason@zx2c4.com
Cc: skhan@linuxfoundation.org, me@brighamcampbell.com,
jkoolstra@xs4all.nl, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3] lib/crypto: chacha20poly1305: zeroize state in __chacha20poly1305_decrypt
Date: Mon, 5 Oct 2026 20:33:24 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261005150324.5621-1-raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com> (raw)
The `__chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function does not zeroize the chacha
state, unlike its encrypt counterpart. The regular
`chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function handles this by manually calling
chacha_zeroize_state(). However, `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` returns
the result directly without clearing the state, leaving the derived
chacha20 subkey on the stack.
Because this function is EXPORT_SYMBOL()ed, this is an ABI robustness
improvement. To ensure consistent and safe cleanup for any future
callers, move the chacha_zeroize_state() call into
`__chacha20poly1305_decrypt()` itself, so the helper cleans up after its
own state just like `__chacha20poly1305_encrypt()` does.
Additionally, moved the src_len check to the callers so the state is not
initialized on invalid inputs, matching the logic in
chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace().
Suggested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen <raizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Remove Fixes and Cc: stable tags, as this is an ABI robustness
improvement rather than a fix.
- Move the src_len check to the callers so the state is not initialized
on invalid inputs.
- Fix whitespace and ordering of the chacha_zeroize_state() to match
chacha20poly1305_crypt_sg_inplace().
Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/asMfBGbckJAhCa45@kernel/T/
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
index ea42a28f4ff7..c3995ac8acb7 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -137,9 +137,6 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
__le64 lens[2];
} b;
- if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
- return false;
-
chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, b.block0, pad0, sizeof(b.block0));
poly1305_init(&poly1305_state, b.block0);
@@ -162,6 +159,7 @@ __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
if (likely(!ret))
chacha20_crypt(chacha_state, dst, src, dst_len);
+ chacha_zeroize_state(chacha_state);
memzero_explicit(&b, sizeof(b));
return !ret;
@@ -177,6 +175,9 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
__le64 iv[2];
bool ret;
+ if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ return false;
+
chacha_load_key(k, key);
iv[0] = 0;
@@ -186,7 +187,6 @@ bool chacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
ret = __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,
&chacha_state);
- chacha_zeroize_state(&chacha_state);
memzero_explicit(iv, sizeof(iv));
memzero_explicit(k, sizeof(k));
return ret;
@@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,
{
struct chacha_state chacha_state;
+ if (unlikely(src_len < POLY1305_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ return false;
+
xchacha_init(&chacha_state, key, nonce);
return __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,
&chacha_state);
--
2.53.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-05 15:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-05 15:03 Mohamad Raizudeen [this message]
2026-10-05 15:20 ` Eric Biggers
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