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From: Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay <devnull+vladimir.genproof.com@kernel.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	 "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	 "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	 Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	 Vladimir Kukharenko <vladimir@genproof.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] lib/crypto: chacha: Take a size_t length in chacha_crypt()
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2026 21:31:22 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261012-libcrypto-4gib-lengths-v1-5-ea566c129a2e@genproof.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261012-libcrypto-4gib-lengths-v1-0-ea566c129a2e@genproof.com>

From: Vladimir Kukharenko <vladimir@genproof.com>

chacha20poly1305_encrypt(), chacha20poly1305_decrypt() and the
xchacha20poly1305 variants take size_t lengths.  They pass these lengths
to chacha20_crypt(), which takes an unsigned int.

For a message of 2^32 + k bytes, chacha20_crypt() processes only the
first k bytes.  In-place encryption leaves the remaining bytes as
plaintext.  Until poly1305_update() took a size_t, those bytes were not
authenticated either.  Commit ed20078b7e33 ("crypto: chacha20poly1305 -
import construction and selftest from Zinc") introduced this behavior.

Change chacha_crypt() and chacha20_crypt() to take size_t lengths, as
poly1305_update() and the other library functions do.  The architecture
code takes an unsigned int length.  Split inputs larger than UINT_MAX
into chunks of at most UINT_MAX bytes.  Round each non-final chunk down
to a multiple of CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE to keep the keystream continuous.

Lengths up to UINT_MAX make the same single call as before.  The
RFC 8439 limit of 2^38 - 64 bytes per message still applies.

No in-tree caller passes messages this large, so this is an ABI
robustness improvement.  I found the bug while writing a Coq/VST proof
of this code with LLM agents, and reproduced it in userspace.

Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Kukharenko <vladimir@genproof.com>
---
 include/crypto/chacha.h |  4 ++--
 lib/crypto/chacha.c     | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
index 1cc301a48469..4c18e99eb4f7 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -86,10 +86,10 @@ static inline void chacha_init(struct chacha_state *state,
 }
 
 void chacha_crypt(struct chacha_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
-		  unsigned int bytes, int nrounds);
+		  size_t bytes, int nrounds);
 
 static inline void chacha20_crypt(struct chacha_state *state,
-				  u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes)
+				  u8 *dst, const u8 *src, size_t bytes)
 {
 	chacha_crypt(state, dst, src, bytes, 20);
 }
diff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha.c b/lib/crypto/chacha.c
index 86e5d382a4e0..ffa0c75ce501 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/chacha.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha.c
@@ -39,8 +39,21 @@ chacha_crypt_generic(struct chacha_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 #endif
 
 void chacha_crypt(struct chacha_state *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
-		  unsigned int bytes, int nrounds)
+		  size_t bytes, int nrounds)
 {
+	/*
+	 * chacha_crypt_arch() takes an unsigned int length.  Process longer
+	 * messages in chunks that are a multiple of CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE, so that
+	 * the keystream continues correctly from one chunk to the next.
+	 */
+	while (bytes > UINT_MAX) {
+		unsigned int l = round_down(UINT_MAX, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+		chacha_crypt_arch(state, dst, src, l, nrounds);
+		dst += l;
+		src += l;
+		bytes -= l;
+	}
 	chacha_crypt_arch(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(chacha_crypt);

-- 
2.43.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-12 21:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-12 21:31 [PATCH 0/5] lib/crypto: Handle large lengths in poly1305 and chacha20poly1305 Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
2026-10-12 21:31 ` [PATCH 1/5] lib/crypto: riscv/poly1305: Fix 32-bit length treated as 64-bit Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
2026-10-12 21:31 ` [PATCH 2/5] lib/crypto: mips/poly1305: " Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
2026-10-12 21:31 ` [PATCH 3/5] lib/crypto: arm64/poly1305: " Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
2026-10-12 21:31 ` [PATCH 4/5] lib/crypto: poly1305: Take a size_t length in poly1305_update() Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay
2026-10-12 21:31 ` Vladimir Kukharenko via B4 Relay [this message]
2026-10-13 17:35 ` [PATCH 0/5] lib/crypto: Handle large lengths in poly1305 and chacha20poly1305 Eric Biggers
2026-10-14 15:29   ` Eric Biggers

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