From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com>,
Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>,
Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/6] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:19:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261015201940.1655956-3-sohil.mehta@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015201940.1655956-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
TSS I/O permission bitmap reads are implicit supervisor accesses which
are subject to Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) enforcement.
Though highly unlikely, if a guest configures a TSS base in the user
half, hardware would raise a #GP on access when LASS is enabled.
Currently, the emulator reads the I/O permission bitmap from the TSS by
calling read_std() directly which is inconsistent with other implicit
accesses in the emulator such as IDT reads, GDT/LDT reads and TSS reads
during task switch.
An upcoming change will add a check to linear_read_system() to catch
LASS violations. For consistency as well as to keep LASS enforcement
centralized, switch both I/O bitmap reads to linear_read_system().
Note, emulator_io_port_access_allowed() doesn't propagate faults, so
even though linear_read_system() will set the exception details they
will be ignored.
While at it, fix an off-by-one in the I/O bitmap bounds check to account
for the 2-byte read and ensure both bytes are within the TSS limit. The
SDM mandates a trailing 0xFF byte after the bitmap so any out-of-bounds
access would be all 1s (denying access). Make the change primarily to
ensure hardware fidelity. A correctly configured OS will not run into
this issue.
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
---
v5:
- Picked up Tested-by tags
v4:
- New patch
There could be a pre-existing issue here. It is unlikely that any OS
demand-pages the I/O bitmap portion of the TSS. But if it does, the #PF
details could get lost and the guest would get a #GP instead of a
restartable #PF. Propagating the #PF to the callers is a larger change
that is beyond the scope of this series.
---
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
index 15872e722af8..fbf47f5ae298 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -2555,12 +2555,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allowed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
#endif
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
+ r = linear_read_system(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
- if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
+ if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 + 1 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
return false;
- r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
+ r = linear_read_system(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2);
if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return false;
if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-15 20:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-15 20:19 [PATCH v5 0/6] KVM: x86: Add LASS virtualization support Sohil Mehta
2026-10-15 20:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/6] KVM: x86: Add an emulator flag to differentiate branch targets from fetches Sohil Mehta
2026-10-15 20:19 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-10-15 20:19 ` [PATCH v5 3/6] KVM: x86: Add LASS violation checks during instruction emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-10-15 20:19 ` [PATCH v5 4/6] KVM: VMX: Implement LASS violation check Sohil Mehta
2026-10-15 20:19 ` [PATCH v5 5/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize LASS and advertise support to userspace Sohil Mehta
2026-10-15 20:19 ` [PATCH v5 6/6] KVM: selftests: Extend set_sregs_test to cover LASS Sohil Mehta
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