From: Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
To: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
Subject: [PATCH v1] ucount: take the rlimit reference before checking the limit
Date: Sat, 17 Oct 2026 19:48:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261017234834.797456-1-nickolai@csail.mit.edu> (raw)
On a kernel with user namespaces enabled (CONFIG_USER_NS=y, the default on
most distributions) an unprivileged user can free a live struct ucounts,
and the user_namespace it pins, while they are still in use, giving a use-
after-free on the next signal-accounting access or an rcuref "imbalanced
put()" warning. It needs no privilege beyond creating a user namespace: in
a namespace whose RLIMIT_SIGPENDING is 0, race a thread queueing real-time
signals (which obey the limit and fail at that namespace's ucounts level)
against one taking a synchronous fault such as SIGSEGV (delivered with
override_rlimit set, crossing the same level without the limit check);
both charge the same per-namespace SIGPENDING counter. The defect has been
present since inc_rlimit_get_ucounts() was introduced in v5.15.
inc_rlimit_get_ucounts() walks the ucounts chain and, for each level,
increments iter->rlimit[type] and then grabs one extra reference on the
ucounts when the counter goes from 0 to 1 -- the reference that pins the
ucounts for as long as the rlimit count stays non-zero, released by
dec_rlimit_put_ucounts() when the counter returns to 0. The reference is
taken only by the thread that observes new == 1, and only after the limit
check: a level that fails "new > max" jumps to dec_unwind, which decrements
iter->rlimit[type] again but takes no reference.
That ordering is unsafe under concurrency. The thread that performs the
0 -> 1 transition is not guaranteed to keep its increment:
CPU0 (fails the limit) CPU1 (overrides it)
new = add_return(1) -> 1
new = add_return(1) -> 2
new != 1, no get_ucounts()
new > max -> dec_unwind
sub_return(1) -> 1 (no put)
The count is left at 1 with no reference held: CPU0 took the increment to 1
but backed out without taking the reference, while CPU1's surviving
increment never took one. When CPU1 later frees its charge,
dec_rlimit_put_ucounts() drops the count 1 -> 0 and calls put_ucounts() for
a reference nobody ever took. struct ucounts is freed with kfree_rcu() when
its last reference goes away, so this stray put drops a live ucounts and
frees it while it is still charged and still on the ucounts hash, giving a
use-after-free of the ucounts (and of the user_namespace it pinned). The
symmetric interleaving instead leaks a reference (CPU0 succeeds and takes
the reference, CPU1 fails and unwinds the level to 0 with no put), pinning
the ucounts and its user_namespace forever.
The invariant the code wants is "rlimit[type] > 0 implies exactly one
ucounts reference held for that level".
Take the reference on the 0 -> 1 transition before the limit is decided, so
the thread that raises the count from zero owns that level's reference even
when its own request is rejected; the rejecting path then unwinds iter
through do_dec_rlimit_put_ucounts(), which releases that reference when the
counter returns to 0. The get_ucounts() failure path is unchanged: no
reference was taken, so iter is decremented without a put.
Fixes: 15bc01effefe ("ucounts: Fix signal ucount refcounting")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Nickolai Zeldovich <nickolai@csail.mit.edu>
---
Notes:
A reproducer, available on request, wins the race within seconds
under KASAN or rcuref debugging.
kernel/ucount.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index ec8b1445e287..44a78ae80579 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -308,23 +308,30 @@ long inc_rlimit_get_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum rlimit_type type,
for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) {
long new = atomic_long_add_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
- if (new < 0 || new > max)
+ /*
+ * Grab the extra reference when this walk observes the 0 -> 1
+ * transition, before the limit is checked: the thread that
+ * raises the count from zero owns this level's reference, even
+ * when the limit check below rejects the request. Otherwise a
+ * concurrent walk that raised the count past 1 is left holding
+ * the surviving increment with no reference, and its later
+ * dec_rlimit_put_ucounts() drops a reference nobody took.
+ */
+ if (new == 1 && !get_ucounts(iter))
goto dec_unwind;
+ if (new < 0 || new > max) {
+ /* undo iter too, releasing the reference taken above */
+ do_dec_rlimit_put_ucounts(ucounts, iter->ns->ucounts, type);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (iter == ucounts)
ret = new;
if (!override_rlimit)
max = get_userns_rlimit_max(iter->ns, type);
- /*
- * Grab an extra ucount reference for the caller when
- * the rlimit count was previously 0.
- */
- if (new != 1)
- continue;
- if (!get_ucounts(iter))
- goto dec_unwind;
}
return ret;
dec_unwind:
+ /* get_ucounts() failed for iter: undo iter without a put */
dec = atomic_long_sub_return(1, &iter->rlimit[type]);
WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0);
do_dec_rlimit_put_ucounts(ucounts, iter, type);
base-commit: 70dd4ee72eb2d5793c62e71c14e3aba78e5a4e56
--
2.53.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-17 23:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-17 23:48 Nickolai Zeldovich [this message]
2026-10-18 11:38 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-10-19 11:34 ` Alexey Gladkov
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