From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>,
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>,
Ronnie Sahlberg <ronniesahlberg@gmail.com>,
Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>,
Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>, Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org (open list:COMMON INTERNET FILE
SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3)),
samba-technical@lists.samba.org (moderated list:COMMON INTERNET
FILE SYSTEM CLIENT (CIFS and SMB3)),
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list),
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY
SUBSYSTEM)
Subject: [PATCH v4 1/3] KEYS: Expand key->{datalen,quotalen} to unsigned int
Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2026 20:43:19 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261020174325.2229448-2-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261020174325.2229448-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
In key_alloc() and key_payload_reserve(), key->quotalen and key->datalen
can receive values larger than USHRT_MAX.
Example:
keyctl new_session >/dev/null
owner=$(keyctl newring owner @s)
keeper=$(keyctl newring keeper @s)
for ((i=0; i<16384; i++)); do
key=$(keyctl add user "k$i" x "$keeper")
keyctl link "$key" "$owner"
done
awk -v uid="$(id -u):" '$1 == uid {print $NF}' /proc/key-users
keyctl clear "$owner"
awk -v uid="$(id -u):" '$1 == uid {print $NF}' /proc/key-users
Because key->datalen wraps around 65535, the quota refunded upon clearing
is truncated, causing quota bytes to leak in /proc/key-users.
Change the types of key->datalen and key->quotalen from unsigned short to
unsigned int so that they can carry the full payload length without
truncation.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c | 6 +++---
include/linux/key.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
index c5e47a835f99..de2acc7234be 100644
--- a/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/cifsacl.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct smb_sid *ssid)
goto out_revert_creds;
} else if (sidkey->datalen < CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) {
rc = smb_EIO1(smb_eio_trace_malformed_sid_key, sidkey->datalen);
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen);
goto invalidate_key;
}
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct smb_sid *ssid)
if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) {
rc = smb_EIO2(smb_eio_trace_malformed_ksid_key,
ksid_size, sidkey->datalen);
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu, ksid_size=%u)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u, ksid_size=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen, ksid_size);
goto invalidate_key;
}
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ sid_to_id(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct smb_sid *psid,
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(uid_t) != sizeof(gid_t));
if (sidkey->datalen != sizeof(uid_t)) {
- cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%hu)\n",
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: Downcall contained malformed key (datalen=%u)\n",
__func__, sidkey->datalen);
key_invalidate(sidkey);
goto out_key_put;
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e40b5267658f..26139c3adf62 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ struct key {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
key_perm_t perm; /* access permissions */
- unsigned short quotalen; /* length added to quota */
- unsigned short datalen; /* payload data length
+ unsigned int quotalen; /* length added to quota */
+ unsigned int datalen; /* payload data length
* - may not match RCU dereferenced payload
* - payload should contain own length
*/
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-20 17:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-20 17:43 [PATCH v4 0/3] KEYS: rhashtable bug fixes Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-20 17:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH v4 2/3] KEYS: Reject descriptions larger than KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-20 17:43 ` [PATCH v4 3/3] KEYS: Verify the key identity in __key_unlink_begin Jarkko Sakkinen
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