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Fri, 23 Oct 2026 09:30:39 -0700 (PDT) Received: from toxicpanda.com ([153.61.196.253]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id af79cd13be357-94047b52582sm56415085a.41.2026.10.23.09.30.37 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 23 Oct 2026 09:30:37 -0700 (PDT) From: Josef Bacik Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 16:30:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH v5 5/5] capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20261023-b4-setfcap-userns-v5-5-0620223be951@toxicpanda.com> References: <20261023-b4-setfcap-userns-v5-0-0620223be951@toxicpanda.com> In-Reply-To: <20261023-b4-setfcap-userns-v5-0-0620223be951@toxicpanda.com> To: Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Christian Brauner Cc: James Morris , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , "Andrew G. Morgan" , Serge Hallyn , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Josef Bacik X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openssh-sha256; t=1792773019; l=5986; i=josef@toxicpanda.com; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=7nZhFjQPJ5b+azEi1eZhhmLccT8uOOzebcebv/k6Evk=; b=U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgUBr36M/n0nWN0DNbnxwzIiCZez6MG JiruuNaSCI/zXsAAAAGcGF0YXR0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA QJ9h6KQ0L9h+vH5v8gb9+KPPTp03Fbrlbk8eq3lYfZ++eu7oLeO6QwH0KZ1VFqfFf5nmUspmTn1 +7ilZ+tIH+A0= X-Developer-Key: i=josef@toxicpanda.com; a=openssh; fpr=SHA256:C8kOX2QUJCMqnCX+KEeoqRAjLo9L+ELOSH2NSAJHqGA Tasks in a user namespace created by a task with CAP_SETFCAP may map uid 0 of the parent and write file capabilities that are honoured there. That is the one privilege they keep outside of their namespace. setns() no longer lets anybody in who doesn't have it, but the ptrace checks don't know about it: for a target in another user namespace cap_ptrace_access_check() is satisfied with CAP_SYS_PTRACE over the target's namespace, which the owner rule hands to any task with the right euid. task A: uid 0, full caps task B: uid 0, no CAP_SETFCAP unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, A) uids match, euid == ns->owner make A write "0 0 1" to its uid_map, or set file capabilities A is entitled -> allowed The same goes for /proc//mem, process_vm_writev() and pidfd_getfd(). Require for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH and PTRACE_TRACEME what setns() requires to get into the target's namespace: CAP_SETFCAP of the tracer has to reach the root users of ancestors that tasks in the namespace can write file capabilities for, or the tracer has CAP_SYS_PTRACE over the topmost of those ancestors, which gives control of tasks there that have CAP_SETFCAP anyway. As in setns(), root users stored through an idmapped mount are not considered. A tracer in the target's namespace got in with as much and always passes. Targets in the initial namespace, in namespaces created without CAP_SETFCAP (what unprivileged users create) and in namespaces that don't map the root user of an ancestor (the usual container) are not affected. What remains is a tracer that gave up CAP_SETFCAP and CAP_SYS_PTRACE and a target in a namespace that maps the root user of an ancestor and was created by a task that didn't give it up, which the tracer can't setns() into either. PTRACE_MODE_READ is unchanged. Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0") Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik --- security/commoncap.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 3551ce9b046a..bb126aba8736 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -254,14 +254,41 @@ int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) return 0; } +/* + * Tasks in a user namespace have CAP_SETFCAP that can count in ancestors of + * the namespace, see cap_setfcap_level(). That is a privilege outside of the + * namespace, so capabilities over the namespace are not enough to take + * control of such a task. + */ +static bool cap_covers_setfcap(const struct cred *cred, + const struct cred *child_cred) +{ + struct user_namespace *ns = child_cred->user_ns, *top; + + /* setns() only lets in tasks whose CAP_SETFCAP reaches as far. */ + if (cred->user_ns == ns) + return true; + + top = setfcap_top(ns); + if (!top) + return true; + + /* CAP_SYS_PTRACE up there gives control of tasks with CAP_SETFCAP. */ + return cred_setfcap_reaches(cred, ns->parent, top->level) || + !cap_capable(cred, top, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT); +} + /** * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access * another * @child: The process to be accessed * @mode: The mode of attachment. * - * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target - * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. + * For PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, if the target task may make use of CAP_SETFCAP in + * an ancestor of its user_ns that our CAP_SETFCAP or CAP_SYS_PTRACE doesn't + * reach, then ptrace access is denied. + * Otherwise, if we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the + * target task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. @@ -282,11 +309,15 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective; else caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted; + if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) && + !cap_covers_setfcap(cred, child_cred)) + goto deny; if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps)) goto out; if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; +deny: ret = -EPERM; out: rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -297,8 +328,11 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer * - * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's - * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. + * If current may make use of CAP_SETFCAP in an ancestor of its user_ns that + * parent's CAP_SETFCAP or CAP_SYS_PTRACE doesn't reach, then ptrace access + * is denied. + * Otherwise, if parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all + * current's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace * access is allowed. * Else denied. @@ -314,11 +348,14 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) rcu_read_lock(); cred = __task_cred(parent); child_cred = current_cred(); + if (!cap_covers_setfcap(cred, child_cred)) + goto deny; if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) goto out; if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out; +deny: ret = -EPERM; out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.55.0