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Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:00:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from toxicpanda.com ([153.61.196.245]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d75a77b69052e-5383973f314sm63147121cf.24.2026.10.26.14.00.36 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:00:36 -0700 (PDT) From: Josef Bacik Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 21:00:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH v7 3/6] userns: check the opener and the writer before mapping uid 0 X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v7-3-bf8a576f7259@toxicpanda.com> References: <20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v7-0-bf8a576f7259@toxicpanda.com> In-Reply-To: <20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v7-0-bf8a576f7259@toxicpanda.com> To: Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Christian Brauner Cc: James Morris , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , "Andrew G. Morgan" , Serge Hallyn , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Josef Bacik X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openssh-sha256; t=1793048427; l=6694; i=josef@toxicpanda.com; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=Tq4QC700hpQ0XsVb6nesQjcXMRFBl8Nnhz0SoKNdw/Q=; b=U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgUBr36M/n0nWN0DNbnxwzIiCZez6MG JiruuNaSCI/zXsAAAAGcGF0YXR0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA QM9aieuT++ilR+Qz7gxmzZu8MAed36/c5amF8PT3lZXNvhnW0pB2ZVMa2WNXF9bqnonpkcmUG7V pCusIkYSsVAo= X-Developer-Key: i=josef@toxicpanda.com; a=openssh; fpr=SHA256:C8kOX2QUJCMqnCX+KEeoqRAjLo9L+ELOSH2NSAJHqGA verify_root_map() looks at the cred that opened the map file: it asks whether it has CAP_SETFCAP over the parent, or, for an opener inside the namespace, whether the creator had. Two things are missing. The writer isn't checked. For every other privileged mapping new_idmap_permitted() wants the capability from the opener and from the task that calls write(), but a map that consists of the single line "0 0 1" takes the unprivileged branch, where only the opener's euid counts. So an open uid_map file is a token for mapping uid 0: task A: uid 0, full caps task B: uid 0, no CAP_SETFCAP fd = open("/proc//uid_map") B gets fd by inheritance or SCM_RIGHTS write(fd, "0 0 1") opener had CAP_SETFCAP -> allowed And the check only happens for a map with an extent that starts at the parent's uid 0, and only asks for CAP_SETFCAP over the parent. But the root user of an ancestor can be mapped into the parent at any uid, and the parent's own root user can be the root user of ancestors further up. A task without CAP_SETFCAP that unshared a namespace, which a privileged task then mapped "1000 0 1" for, can unshare again and map "0 1000 1": host uid 0 is uid 0 of the new namespace, and nothing was checked. Find every ancestor whose root user the new map contains, at whatever uid it has in the parent, and require that the opener and the writer both reach the topmost of them. A task outside the namespace that is being mapped needs CAP_SETFCAP over the parent, reaching that far by cap_setfcap_level(). A task inside it needs CAP_SETFCAP there, and ns->setfcap_level has to reach that far: a task in the namespace that gave up CAP_SETFCAP would otherwise map uid 0 and get it back from execve(). This only affects maps that contain the root user of the parent or of one of its ancestors. A write by a task without CAP_SETFCAP to a file opened by one with it, and a map by a task whose CAP_SETFCAP stops short of the root user it passes on, now fail with -EPERM. Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0") Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik --- kernel/user_namespace.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 7bd3692c2f3e..db078dd6406a 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -881,15 +881,55 @@ VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int uid_gid_map_sort(struct uid_gid_map *map) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(uid_gid_map_sort); +static bool map_has_id(struct uid_gid_map *map, u32 id) +{ + struct uid_gid_extent *extent; + int idx; + + for (idx = 0; idx < map->nr_extents; idx++) { + if (map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) + extent = &map->extent[idx]; + else + extent = &map->forward[idx]; + if (id >= extent->lower_first && + id - extent->lower_first < extent->count) + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/* + * The lowest ->level among @parent and its ancestors whose root user @new_map + * maps, whatever uid that root user has in @parent; INT_MAX if there is none. + */ +static int map_root_level(struct user_namespace *parent, + struct uid_gid_map *new_map) +{ + struct user_namespace *p; + int level = INT_MAX; + uid_t id; + + for (p = parent; p; p = p->parent) { + id = from_kuid(parent, make_kuid(p, 0)); + if (id != (uid_t)-1 && map_has_id(new_map, id)) + level = p->level; + } + + return level; +} + /** * verify_root_map() - check the uid 0 mapping * @file: idmapping file * @map_ns: user namespace of the target process * @new_map: requested idmap * - * If a process requests mapping parent uid 0 into the new ns, verify that the - * process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the target process - * will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user namespaces. + * If a process requests mapping the root user of the parent ns, or of one of + * its ancestors, into the new ns, verify that the process that opened the map + * file and the process writing the map had the CAP_SETFCAP capability as the + * target process will be able to write fscaps that are valid in ancestor user + * namespaces. * * Return: true if the mapping is allowed, false if not. */ @@ -897,42 +937,43 @@ static bool verify_root_map(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *map_ns, struct uid_gid_map *new_map) { - int idx; const struct user_namespace *file_ns = file->f_cred->user_ns; - struct uid_gid_extent *extent0 = NULL; - - for (idx = 0; idx < new_map->nr_extents; idx++) { - if (new_map->nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) - extent0 = &new_map->extent[idx]; - else - extent0 = &new_map->forward[idx]; - if (extent0->lower_first == 0) - break; - - extent0 = NULL; - } + int level; - if (!extent0) + level = map_root_level(map_ns->parent, new_map); + if (level == INT_MAX) return true; if (map_ns == file_ns) { /* The process unshared its ns and is writing to its own * /proc/self/uid_map. User already has full capabilites in - * the new namespace. Verify that the parent had CAP_SETFCAP - * when it unshared. + * the new namespace. Verify that it still has CAP_SETFCAP + * there, and that the parent had it when it unshared, as far up + * as those root users go. * */ - if (file_ns->setfcap_level >= file_ns->level) + if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns, CAP_SETFCAP) || + file_ns->setfcap_level > level) return false; } else { /* Process p1 is writing to uid_map of p2, who is in a child * user namespace to p1's. Verify that the opener of the map * file has CAP_SETFCAP against the parent of the new map - * namespace */ - if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP)) + * namespace, and as far up as those root users go. + */ + if (!file_ns_capable(file, map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP) || + !cred_setfcap_reaches(file->f_cred, map_ns->parent, level)) return false; } - return true; + /* The file may have been handed to someone else since it was opened, + * so the same goes for the process that is doing the write. + */ + if (map_ns == current_user_ns()) + return ns_capable(map_ns, CAP_SETFCAP) && + map_ns->setfcap_level <= level; + + return ns_capable(map_ns->parent, CAP_SETFCAP) && + cred_setfcap_reaches(current_cred(), map_ns->parent, level); } /* -- 2.55.0