From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
To: <mic@digikod.net>, <gnoack@google.com>, <paul@paul-moore.com>,
<jmorris@namei.org>, <serge@hallyn.com>, <corbet@lwn.net>,
<skhan@linuxfoundation.org>, <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
<caixinchen1@huawei.com>
Cc: <ast@kernel.org>, <daniel@iogearbox.net>, <andrii@kernel.org>,
<eddyz87@gmail.com>, <memxor@gmail.com>, <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
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<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 -next 10/18] LSM: rename inode_setattr to path_setattr
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2026 20:11:43 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261027121151.1887650-11-caixinchen1@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261027121151.1887650-1-caixinchen1@huawei.com>
The inode_setattr hook receives a struct path, so rename it to
path_setattr to follow the path_* naming convention used for the
other hooks that take a struct path (path_chmod, path_chown, ...).
Rename the security_inode_setattr() inline wrapper to
security_path_setattr() and the SELinux, Smack and EVM
implementations accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
---
fs/attr.c | 4 ++--
fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c | 2 +-
fs/exfat/file.c | 4 ++--
fs/fat/file.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 6 +++---
security/security.c | 8 ++++----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 +++---
11 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
index 67fa5ee6b30e..62f3dc759f76 100644
--- a/fs/attr.c
+++ b/fs/attr.c
@@ -519,7 +519,7 @@ static int do_notify_change(const struct path *const path,
* filesystem, were already checked on the user-facing path.
*/
if (path) {
- error = security_inode_setattr(idmap, path, attr, file);
+ error = security_path_setattr(idmap, path, attr, file);
if (error)
return error;
}
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static int do_notify_change(const struct path *const path,
* @attr: new attributes
* @delegated_inode: returns inode, if the inode is delegated
*
- * Like notify_change(), but no security_inode_setattr() hook is called:
+ * Like notify_change(), but no security_path_setattr() hook is called:
* this is the variant to use for internal forwards, where the LSM
* checks were already performed on the user-facing path.
*
diff --git a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 35ccd98a4de6..6500d8419bc1 100644
--- a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rmdir)
-BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_setattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_unlink)
BTF_SET_END(d_inode_locked_hooks)
diff --git a/fs/exfat/file.c b/fs/exfat/file.c
index 27b4917e02cb..c108c1ad22a2 100644
--- a/fs/exfat/file.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/file.c
@@ -551,8 +551,8 @@ static int exfat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr)
* out the RO attribute for checking by the security
* module, just because it maps to a file mode.
*/
- err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
- &file->f_path, &ia, file);
+ err = security_path_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
+ &file->f_path, &ia, file);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
diff --git a/fs/fat/file.c b/fs/fat/file.c
index a044270379e4..dd06c68ebcd4 100644
--- a/fs/fat/file.c
+++ b/fs/fat/file.c
@@ -92,8 +92,8 @@ static int fat_ioctl_set_attributes(struct file *file, u32 __user *user_attr)
* out the RO attribute for checking by the security
* module, just because it maps to a file mode.
*/
- err = security_inode_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
- &file->f_path, &ia, file);
+ err = security_path_setattr(file_mnt_idmap(file),
+ &file->f_path, &ia, file);
if (err)
goto out_unlock_inode;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 0f7712f51644..f64a8a0f94a4 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_permission, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* are subject to change. Implementations must not rely on its
* properties.
*/
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr, struct file *file)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_setattr, const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1e9382fb16a9..17a46b413ed3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
bool rcu);
int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
struct inode *inode, int mask);
-int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+int security_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr,
struct file *file);
void security_inode_post_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static inline int security_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr,
struct file *file)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index 293f849879e2..32f84356933e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_readlink)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_removexattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rename)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_rmdir)
-BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_setattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_setxattr)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_symlink)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_unlink)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 5c24111a9ba7..962b31a97ec9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static int evm_attr_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
+ * evm_path_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: pointer to the affected object
* @attr: iattr structure containing the new file attributes
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static int evm_attr_change(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature,
* except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature.
*/
-static int evm_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static int evm_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path,
struct iattr *attr, struct file *file)
{
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static int __init init_evm(void)
}
static struct security_hook_list evm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, evm_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setattr, evm_path_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setattr, evm_inode_post_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, evm_inode_copy_up_xattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, evm_inode_setxattr),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d91268f88760..01d4a463c6b1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1865,7 +1865,7 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
}
/**
- * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed
+ * security_path_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: file (the VFS makes no guarantees with regard to @path->mnt)
* @attr: new attributes
@@ -1878,15 +1878,15 @@ int security_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+int security_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path, struct iattr *attr,
struct file *file)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return call_int_hook(inode_setattr, idmap, path, attr, file);
+ return call_int_hook(path_setattr, idmap, path, attr, file);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_path_setattr);
/**
* security_inode_post_setattr() - Update the inode after a setattr operation
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e07b45fba392..4751e300bde6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3316,7 +3316,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static int selinux_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path,
struct iattr *iattr, struct file *file)
{
@@ -7734,7 +7734,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setattr, selinux_path_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, selinux_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 1aa94331c980..1cbcba3fa62b 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *i
}
/**
- * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * smack_path_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
* @idmap: idmap of the mount
* @path: the object
* @iattr: for the force flag
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int smack_inode_permission(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *i
*
* Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
*/
-static int smack_inode_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
+static int smack_path_setattr(const struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct path *path,
struct iattr *iattr, struct file *file)
{
@@ -5198,7 +5198,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_setattr, smack_path_setattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_getattr, smack_path_getattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
--
2.18.0.huawei.25
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 11:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-27 12:11 [PATCH v3 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 01/18] fs: pass struct path to notify_change() Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 02/18] LSM: pass struct path to the inode_setsecctx hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 03/18] fs: pass struct path to xattr helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 04/18] fs: pass struct path to POSIX ACL helpers Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 05/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode_setattr hook Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 06/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 07/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode posix acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 08/18] LSM: pass struct path and struct file to the inode fileattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 09/18] LSM: rename inode_getattr to path_getattr and pass struct file Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` Cai Xinchen [this message]
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 11/18] LSM: rename the inode xattr hooks to path_xattr hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 12/18] LSM: rename the inode posix acl hooks to path_*_acl hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 13/18] LSM: rename the inode fileattr hooks to path_file_* hooks Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 14/18] LSM: rename inode_setsecctx to path_setsecctx Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 15/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 16/18] selftests/landlock: Add tests for metadata " Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 17/18] samples/landlock: Add metadata rights to sandboxer Cai Xinchen
2026-10-27 12:11 ` [PATCH v3 -next 18/18] Documentation: Update landlock doc for metadata rights Cai Xinchen
2026-11-10 16:52 ` [PATCH v3 -next 00/18] landlock: Add READ_METADATA and WRITE_METADATA access rights Christian Brauner
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