From: Andrey Zakharov <dedemorow@gmail.com>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
hpa@zytor.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrey Zakharov <dedemorow@gmail.com>
Subject: [RFC] x86/ioperm: boot-time switch to disable iopl()/ioperm()?
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 01:09:04 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261027220904.15896-1-dedemorow@gmail.com> (raw)
Hi,
KSPP issue #97 (https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/97) asks for a way
to disable iopl() and ioperm() at boot time, so that a distro can keep
CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM enabled while system owners can still turn the
syscalls off.
I read Thomas's recent explanation in the "iopl - change I/O privilege
level" man page thread, and Andy's reply that iopl() is low maintenance.
So before writing any code I would like to ask whether such a knob is
wanted at all, or whether CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM=n and lockdown are
considered enough.
As far as I can tell, the options today are the build-time
CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM and lockdown=integrity, which also restricts
/dev/mem, kexec and other features. I did not find a boot parameter for
this in next-20261022, nor a previous series on lore (I searched for
iopl and ioperm).
If it is wanted, the change would be small:
- an early parameter, modelled on ia32_emulation= (kstrtobool() in an
early_param handler), that sets an __ro_after_init flag;
- a check of that flag in ksys_ioperm() and SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl) in
arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c, next to the existing capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)
/ security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_IOPORT) checks, which today already
reject only requests to gain port access;
- an entry in Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt;
- default behaviour unchanged.
Questions:
1. Is a boot parameter wanted, given lockdown and the compile-time
option?
2. Thomas mentioned that the permission bitmap can also be changed
through x86-specific VT ioctls. Should such a knob cover those as
well, or would it be incomplete without them? I have not looked at
that code yet.
3. Which error should be returned when access is refused this way:
-EPERM, as for lockdown, or -ENOSYS, as when CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
is disabled?
No patch yet. I will send one only if there is interest, and I am fine
with "not needed" as an answer.
Thanks,
Andrey Zakharov
reply other threads:[~2026-10-27 22:09 UTC|newest]
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