From: "Songsen Yang" <yangsongsen@insta360.com>
To: "Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: "Martin KaFai Lau" <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
"Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
"Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>,
"Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
"Yonghong Song" <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
"Jiri Olsa" <jolsa@kernel.org>,
"Ihor Solodrai" <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>,
"Emil Tsalapatis" <emil@etsalapatis.com>, <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<syzbot+72a43cdb78469f7fbad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Always hold RCU read lock around perf callchain in __bpf_get_stack()
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 20:18:59 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261028121859.994-1-yangsongsen@insta360.com> (raw)
__bpf_get_stack() only takes rcu_read_lock() around get_perf_callchain()
when may_fault is true, assuming that non-faultable callers already run
inside an RCU read-side critical section.
That assumption does not hold for BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL programs. They
are always sleepable and bpf_prog_test_run_syscall() only holds
rcu_read_lock_trace() while running them, yet through
tracing_prog_func_proto() they are given the non-sleepable
bpf_get_stack_raw_tp() helper, which calls __bpf_get_stack() with
may_fault == false. get_callchain_entry() then does
rcu_dereference(callchain_cpus_entries) without rcu_read_lock() held,
and lockdep complains:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
kernel/events/callchain.c:163 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
1 lock held by repro:
#0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall
Call Trace:
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
get_callchain_entry
get_perf_callchain
__bpf_get_stack
bpf_get_stack_raw_tp
bpf_prog_test_run_syscall
__sys_bpf
The callchain buffers are freed with call_rcu(), and an RCU Tasks Trace
read-side section does not imply a normal RCU read-side section, so
holding rcu_read_lock_trace() alone is not what get_callchain_entry()
expects.
Take rcu_read_lock() unconditionally. Nesting it inside an existing RCU
read-side critical section is cheap and harmless, as suggested by Andrii
in an earlier discussion.
bpf_get_stackid() is not affected: sleepable programs cannot use
BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE maps, so syscall programs cannot reach it.
Testing: on top of bpf/master at commit c8a8a68d3ab4 ("bpf: Don't re-sort
subprog_info[] for every new subprogram"), x86_64 under QEMU TCG with
CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y (syzbot config with KASAN/KCOV/modules disabled), the
syzbot C reproducer
triggers the splat above without this patch and does not with it. A
minimal BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program calling bpf_get_stack() was also
run via BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN: it warns before, and returns 0 without a
warning after. BPF selftests were not run.
This issue was located, and the fix, changelog and tests were prepared,
with the help of an AI coding assistant (Claude); the submitter has
reviewed the change.
Fixes: 79a7f8bdb159 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sys_bpf() helper and program type.")
Reported-by: syzbot+72a43cdb78469f7fbad1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=72a43cdb78469f7fbad1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAEf4BzYN33yQhO-tsF8pUWDMZoiLAXkV+Z1oP6fJkByocYcjpw@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Songsen Yang <yangsongsen@insta360.com>
---
kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 +++------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
index f7e8d766d128..e452ca7c859a 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c
@@ -812,8 +812,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
max_depth = stack_map_calculate_max_depth(size, elem_size, flags);
preempt_disable();
- if (may_fault)
- rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */
+ rcu_read_lock(); /* need RCU for perf's callchain below */
if (kernel && task) {
trace = get_callchain_entry_for_task(task, max_depth);
@@ -823,8 +822,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
}
if (unlikely(!trace) || trace->nr < skip) {
- if (may_fault)
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ rcu_read_unlock();
preempt_enable();
goto err_fault;
}
@@ -832,8 +830,7 @@ static long __bpf_get_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, struct task_struct *task,
trace_nr = callchain_store(trace, trace->nr, buf, elem_size, flags);
/* trace should not be dereferenced after this point */
- if (may_fault)
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ rcu_read_unlock();
preempt_enable();
return callchain_finalize(buf, size, trace_nr, elem_size, flags, may_fault);
--
2.50.1
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 12:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 12:18 Songsen Yang [this message]
2026-10-28 12:57 ` bot+bpf-ci
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