From: Rishikesh Jethwani <rjethwani@purestorage.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>,
Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Rishikesh Jethwani <rjethwani@purestorage.com>
Subject: [PATCH net v3 0/2] kcm: reject the combination of KCM and TLS
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 11:35:31 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261028173533.2658096-1-rjethwani@purestorage.com> (raw)
KCM's data_ready callback calls the lower socket's read_sock() inline,
from softirq. With kTLS RX that is tls_sw_read_sock(), which can sleep.
v2 deferred KCM parsing to a workqueue whenever read_sock() is not
tcp_read_sock(), and reworked the strparser workqueue to go with it. As
suggested in review [1], v3 instead rejects the combination, as was
done for sockmap in commit 460e6486617c ("tls: reject the combination
of TLS and sockmap"). It has never worked with kTLS RX: before commit
662fbcec32f4 ("net/tls: implement ->read_sock()") KCM parsed TLS
ciphertext as messages, and since then it sleeps in atomic context.
Patch 1 makes kcm_attach() refuse sockets that have any ULP, and
tls_init() refuse sockets attached to KCM. Patch 2 adds tls selftests
for both orders.
Patch 1 changes user-visible behaviour and is tagged for stable. Its
message calls out the errno change and the one refused setup that
previously passed data: TLS TX-only, in either order.
On the new sock flag: patch 1 adds SOCK_KCM to enum sock_flags, which
leaves one free sk_flags bit on 32-bit. I looked at the alternatives
first:
- sk_user_data alone cannot be the marker. sunrpc and nvme-tcp set it
on sockets that tlshd later upgrades to TLS, so it is already set
when tls_init() runs and tls_init() cannot reject on it.
- A new SK_USER_DATA_KCM tag, alongside SK_USER_DATA_PSOCK, is not
safe. The tags live in the low bits of the stored pointer, and bit 3
is not free: reuseport_array stores &array->ptrs[index] | NOCOPY |
BPF, where ptrs[] holds 8-byte pointers, so every odd index has bit 3
set and widening SK_USER_DATA_PTRMASK would corrupt it. It would also
need masking at each of KCM's raw sk_user_data reads.
- There is precedent for a flag owned by one subsystem: SOCK_XDP
(commit e4a2a3048ed9) is set only by tun.
If you'd rather not spend an sk_flags bit on this, the alternative I
would implement is a bool in struct tcp_sock under
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_KCM), like is_mptcp and syn_smc. KCM only attaches
TCP sockets and the TLS ULP is TCP-only, so both checks can use
tcp_sk(). Happy to respin that way.
Changes in v3:
- Reject KCM and ULPs in both orders instead of deferring KCM parsing
to a workqueue.
- Drop the strparser workqueue patch; it is no longer needed for this
fix and may be posted to net-next separately.
- Add selftests.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261013033920.2069285-1-rjethwani@purestorage.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261016025059.289202-1-rjethwani@purestorage.com/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/3108e934-ec00-458b-8720-450554b35b55@linux.dev/
Rishikesh Jethwani (2):
kcm: reject attaching sockets with a ULP, and TLS on KCM sockets
selftests: tls: test that TLS and KCM are mutually exclusive
include/net/sock.h | 1 +
net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 12 +++
net/tls/tls_main.c | 6 ++
tools/testing/selftests/net/config | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 144 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 164 insertions(+)
--
2.50.1
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 17:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 17:35 Rishikesh Jethwani [this message]
2026-10-28 17:35 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] kcm: reject attaching sockets with a ULP, and TLS on KCM sockets Rishikesh Jethwani
2026-10-28 20:41 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-29 3:17 ` Jiayuan Chen
2026-10-28 17:35 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] selftests: tls: test that TLS and KCM are mutually exclusive Rishikesh Jethwani
2026-10-28 20:43 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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