From: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, outbounddisclosures@openai.com
Subject: [PATCH] macsec: reject frames that decapsulate into runt Ethernet frames
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 21:22:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261030042237.74106-1-kylebot@openai.com> (raw)
When an SCI is unknown and the C bit is clear, macsec_handle_frame()
removes the SecTAG and the default ICV without checking how much of the
frame remains. A short frame can therefore become an skb shorter than
ETH_HLEN. eth_type_trans() cannot pull its Ethernet header, and a second
stacked MACsec device can copy stale skb headroom into a packet delivered
to a packet socket.
The matched-SCI path has a related hole: macsec_validate_skb() accepts a
short_length of one, so a frame that passes the existing length check can
still become a 13-byte Ethernet frame.
Require enough bytes for the MACsec overhead and a complete Ethernet
header before decapsulating an unknown-SCI frame. Apply the same bound
in macsec_validate_skb(), using the selected SecY's ICV length, to cover
the no-SA, synchronous-decrypt and asynchronous-decrypt delivery paths.
Leave other unknown-SCI handling unchanged.
Fixes: c09440f7dcb3 ("macsec: introduce IEEE 802.1AE driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
---
I have a reproducer for this issue and can share via DM
drivers/net/macsec.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
index 87f3f4bdb026..240ba0ae07d1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
+++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
@@ -408,8 +408,10 @@ static bool macsec_validate_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 icv_len, bool xpn)
int len = skb->len - 2 * ETH_ALEN;
int extra_len = macsec_extra_len(!!(h->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_SC)) + icv_len;
- /* a) It comprises at least 17 octets */
- if (skb->len <= 16)
+ /* a) It comprises at least 17 octets. The SecTAG and ICV must
+ * also leave a complete Ethernet header.
+ */
+ if (skb->len < ETH_HLEN + extra_len)
return false;
/* b) MACsec EtherType: already checked */
@@ -1331,9 +1333,12 @@ static rx_handler_result_t macsec_handle_frame(struct sk_buff **pskb)
nosci:
/* 10.6.1 if the SC is not found */
cbit = !!(hdr->tci_an & MACSEC_TCI_C);
- if (!cbit)
- macsec_finalize_skb(skb, MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN,
- macsec_extra_len(macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci));
+ if (!cbit) {
+ len = macsec_extra_len(macsec_skb_cb(skb)->has_sci);
+ if (skb->len < ETH_HLEN + len + MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN)
+ goto drop_nosc;
+ macsec_finalize_skb(skb, MACSEC_DEFAULT_ICV_LEN, len);
+ }
list_for_each_entry_rcu(macsec, &rxd->secys, secys) {
struct sk_buff *nskb;
base-commit: d89e1d186ec9271bf78e62771779e9fc03bf0fc3
--
2.56.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-30 4:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-30 4:22 Kyle Zeng [this message]
2026-10-30 4:29 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261030042237.74106-1-kylebot@openai.com \
--to=kylebot@openai.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=outbounddisclosures@openai.com \
--cc=sd@queasysnail.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®