From: Anil Kaushik <anilkaushikwireless@gmail.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>, Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>,
Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>,
Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>, Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>,
Mat Martineau <martineau@kernel.org>,
XingWang Xiang <v3rdant.xiang@gmail.com>,
Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Anil Kaushik <anilkaushikwireless@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH net v4 2/2] netlink: Check a group again if it was released while joining it
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 15:58:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261102155819.4100930-3-anilkaushikwireless@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102155819.4100930-1-anilkaushikwireless@gmail.com>
genl_bind() checks a group under cb_lock, but netlink_setsockopt() and
netlink_bind() set the membership bit only after it returns and the lock
is dropped. If the family is unregistered in between, its members are
cleared before this socket is one. The socket then becomes a member of a
group ID that no family owns, or that a family registered in the
meantime got, and the GENL_MCAST_CAP_* flags of that family are never
checked for it.
Count per group in the netlink table how many times its members were
cleared, which genetlink does when it frees the group IDs of a family.
Read the count before and after ->netlink_bind(), and again once the
table is grabbed. If it changed since the first read, the group was
released, so check it again against its current owner.
If the count changed only after ->netlink_bind() returned, the family
that was bound is gone, so ->netlink_unbind() is not called for it.
Otherwise it is called before the new check, as ->netlink_bind() most
likely reached the new owner. The core cannot tell for sure: if a family
is unregistered and another one registers just after ->netlink_bind()
returned, and before the second read, the new family gets an unbind
without a bind. The check is still done again. In the tree, only the
thermal family has these callbacks, and it is never unregistered.
bind() can then fail after it gave the socket its port ID. This only
happens when a family is unregistered meanwhile.
Found by the Sashiko review of the previous patch, not seen in
production. Triggered in a VM as an unprivileged user, with a test-only
msleep() after the bind callback, and a test family that registers again
with GENL_MCAST_CAP_NET_ADMIN:
Before:
setsockopt() and bind(): the socket is a member of the group
After:
setsockopt() and bind(): -EPERM, not a member
setsockopt(), no family owns the group yet: -ENOENT, not a member
genl_bind() was added, with its first capability check, in the commit
in the Fixes tag.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/179340003139.3131.11274717768928642724@kernel.org/
Fixes: 4d54cc32112d ("mptcp: avoid lock_fast usage in accept path")
Signed-off-by: Anil Kaushik <anilkaushikwireless@gmail.com>
---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
net/netlink/af_netlink.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index fec2879c497d..96bfebc57899 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -780,6 +780,8 @@ static int netlink_release(struct socket *sock)
old = nl_deref_protected(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners, NULL);
kfree_rcu(old, rcu);
+ kfree(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].mc_gen);
+ nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].mc_gen = NULL;
nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].module = NULL;
nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].bind = NULL;
nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].unbind = NULL;
@@ -990,6 +992,9 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_nl *nladdr = (struct sockaddr_nl *)addr;
+ struct netlink_table *tbl = &nl_table[sk->sk_protocol];
+ unsigned int bound_gen[BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)];
+ unsigned int gen[BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)];
int err = 0;
unsigned long groups;
bool bound;
@@ -1023,9 +1028,14 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
return -EINVAL;
}
+retry:
if (nlk->netlink_bind && groups) {
int group;
+ netlink_lock_table();
+ memcpy(gen, tbl->mc_gen, sizeof(gen));
+ netlink_unlock_table();
+
/* nl_groups is a u32, so cap the maximum groups we can bind */
for (group = 0; group < BITS_PER_TYPE(u32); group++) {
if (!test_bit(group, &groups))
@@ -1036,6 +1046,10 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
netlink_undo_bind(group, groups, sk);
return err;
}
+
+ netlink_lock_table();
+ memcpy(bound_gen, tbl->mc_gen, sizeof(bound_gen));
+ netlink_unlock_table();
}
/* No need for barriers here as we return to user-space without
@@ -1057,6 +1071,26 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *addr,
netlink_unlock_table();
netlink_table_grab();
+ if (nlk->netlink_bind && groups) {
+ unsigned long gone = 0;
+ bool released = false;
+ int group;
+
+ for_each_set_bit(group, &groups, BITS_PER_TYPE(u32)) {
+ if (gen[group] != tbl->mc_gen[group])
+ released = true;
+ if (bound_gen[group] != tbl->mc_gen[group])
+ __set_bit(group, &gone);
+ }
+ /* see netlink_setsockopt(), undo all but gone and retry all */
+ if (released) {
+ netlink_table_ungrab();
+ netlink_undo_bind(BITS_PER_TYPE(u32), groups & ~gone,
+ sk);
+ bound = true;
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ }
netlink_update_subscriptions(sk, nlk->subscriptions +
hweight32(groups) -
hweight32(nlk->groups[0]));
@@ -1686,6 +1720,8 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
break;
case NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP:
case NETLINK_DROP_MEMBERSHIP: {
+ struct netlink_table *tbl = &nl_table[sk->sk_protocol];
+ unsigned int gen = 0, bound_gen = 0;
int err;
if (!netlink_allowed(sock, NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV))
@@ -1695,12 +1731,34 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
return err;
if (!val || val - 1 >= nlk->ngroups)
return -EINVAL;
+retry:
if (optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP && nlk->netlink_bind) {
+ netlink_lock_table();
+ gen = tbl->mc_gen[val - 1];
+ netlink_unlock_table();
err = nlk->netlink_bind(sock_net(sk), val);
if (err)
return err;
+ netlink_lock_table();
+ bound_gen = tbl->mc_gen[val - 1];
+ netlink_unlock_table();
}
netlink_table_grab();
+ /* The group was released around ->netlink_bind(), and may have
+ * a new owner now, so check it again. If it was released only
+ * after ->netlink_bind() returned, the owner that was bound is
+ * gone: no ->netlink_unbind() for it. Otherwise assume that the
+ * current owner was bound.
+ */
+ if (optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP && nlk->netlink_bind &&
+ gen != tbl->mc_gen[val - 1]) {
+ bool unbind = bound_gen == tbl->mc_gen[val - 1];
+
+ netlink_table_ungrab();
+ if (unbind && nlk->netlink_unbind)
+ nlk->netlink_unbind(sock_net(sk), val);
+ goto retry;
+ }
netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk, val,
optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP);
netlink_table_ungrab();
@@ -2031,6 +2089,7 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,
struct sock *sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
struct listeners *listeners = NULL;
+ unsigned int *mc_gen = NULL;
unsigned int groups;
BUG_ON(!nl_table);
@@ -2052,7 +2111,8 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,
groups = cfg->groups;
listeners = kzalloc(sizeof(*listeners) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!listeners)
+ mc_gen = kcalloc(groups, sizeof(*mc_gen), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!listeners || !mc_gen)
goto out_sock_release;
sk->sk_data_ready = netlink_data_ready;
@@ -2069,6 +2129,7 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,
if (!nl_table[unit].registered) {
nl_table[unit].groups = groups;
rcu_assign_pointer(nl_table[unit].listeners, listeners);
+ nl_table[unit].mc_gen = mc_gen;
nl_table[unit].module = module;
if (cfg) {
nl_table[unit].bind = cfg->bind;
@@ -2079,6 +2140,7 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,
nl_table[unit].registered = 1;
} else {
kfree(listeners);
+ kfree(mc_gen);
nl_table[unit].registered++;
}
netlink_table_ungrab();
@@ -2086,6 +2148,7 @@ __netlink_kernel_create(struct net *net, int unit, struct module *module,
out_sock_release:
kfree(listeners);
+ kfree(mc_gen);
netlink_kernel_release(sk);
return NULL;
@@ -2113,6 +2176,17 @@ int __netlink_change_ngroups(struct sock *sk, unsigned int groups)
if (groups < 32)
groups = 32;
+ if (tbl->groups < groups) {
+ unsigned int *mc_gen;
+
+ mc_gen = kcalloc(groups, sizeof(*mc_gen), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mc_gen)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ memcpy(mc_gen, tbl->mc_gen, tbl->groups * sizeof(*mc_gen));
+ kfree(tbl->mc_gen);
+ tbl->mc_gen = mc_gen;
+ }
+
if (NLGRPSZ(tbl->groups) < NLGRPSZ(groups)) {
new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new) + NLGRPSZ(groups), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new)
@@ -2157,6 +2231,9 @@ void __netlink_clear_multicast_users(struct sock *ksk, unsigned int group)
struct netlink_table *tbl = &nl_table[ksk->sk_protocol];
struct hlist_node *tmp;
+ /* the group can be given to another user, see netlink_setsockopt() */
+ tbl->mc_gen[group - 1]++;
+
sk_for_each_bound_safe(sk, tmp, &tbl->mc_list) {
/* bitmap predates the group, can't be a member */
if (group - 1 >= nlk_sk(sk)->ngroups)
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
index 778a3809361f..d5e2e404fd11 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct netlink_table {
struct listeners __rcu *listeners;
unsigned int flags;
unsigned int groups;
+ unsigned int *mc_gen;
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
struct module *module;
int (*bind)(struct net *net, int group);
--
2.25.1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-02 15:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-02 15:58 [PATCH net v4 0/2] genetlink: fix joining multicast groups no family owns Anil Kaushik
2026-11-02 15:58 ` [PATCH net v4 1/2] genetlink: Reject " Anil Kaushik
2026-11-02 15:58 ` Anil Kaushik [this message]
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