From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 13:42:23 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261105-device-trust-core-v1-10-1e536825b4eb@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105-device-trust-core-v1-0-1e536825b4eb@nvidia.com>
From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
An initrd must authorize a disabled device after attestation even if a
built-in driver already attempted to probe it.
Expose requested trust_policy and read-only active trust. Allow explicit
disabled policy to advance once to adversary or full, fixing that decision
immediately. Reject later policy changes, including for a device claimed
before registration, while allowing same-value writes on live devices.
Keep initial unrestricted selection separate from explicit authorization
and bind-time commitment. Serialize writes with probing under the device
lock. Include the attributes in device ownership changes.
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust | 51 +++++++++++++
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
drivers/base/base.h | 6 ++
drivers/base/core.c | 15 +++-
drivers/base/trust.c | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..97e07a174769c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+What: /sys/devices/.../trust
+Date: September 2026
+Contact: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
+Description:
+ (RO) The active trust level for the device. The values are
+ "disabled", "adversary", and "full". Driver core resolves
+ the level before DMA configuration and probe, and retains it
+ through removal and DMA cleanup. Outside a bind transaction
+ the level is "disabled". This does not imply that policy is
+ writable or that the device has never operated.
+
+What: /sys/devices/.../trust_policy
+Date: September 2026
+Contact: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
+Description:
+ (RW) The requested trust policy for the device. The initial
+ value may be selected by the bus before the device is
+ registered; otherwise it is "default". The policy is resolved
+ to an active trust level before the device is probed.
+
+ The values are "default", "disabled", "adversary", and
+ "full". "default" lets the bus select the active trust level.
+ "disabled" prevents a functional driver from binding.
+ "adversary" requests operation with the restrictions that the
+ bus and DMA layers can enforce for a potentially malicious
+ device; it does not isolate DMA by itself. "full" requests
+ normal operation.
+
+ Before an operating level is committed, policy may change
+ freely until "disabled" is selected. Explicit "disabled"
+ blocks binding while allowing a later write of "adversary" or
+ "full". Repeated rejected probes preserve this opportunity.
+ Authorization immediately fixes the requested policy.
+ Returning to "default" or "disabled", or selecting another
+ mode, fails.
+
+ Successful resolution to an allowed level commits policy
+ and operating level before driver or DMA setup. Both remain
+ fixed for the device object's lifetime, including through
+ failed or deferred probes, unbind, reset, and driver reload.
+ Later binds must resolve to the same level, including when
+ the policy is "default". A resolver error or disabled result
+ before commitment leaves the policy's writability unchanged.
+
+ For a live device, writing the existing value succeeds
+ without changing state. Other forbidden writes fail with
+ EBUSY; invalid strings fail with EINVAL. Removed devices
+ reject writes with ENODEV. Writes do not trigger probing or
+ attestation.
+ Queued probes may proceed immediately after authorization,
+ so userspace must complete verification before granting it.
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index b726344362b41..a145aaaca2ef3 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -8150,6 +8150,7 @@ L: driver-core@lists.linux.dev
S: Supported
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/driver-core/driver-core.git
F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-drivers-probe
+F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-trust
F: Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst
F: Documentation/driver-api/driver-model/
F: drivers/base/
diff --git a/drivers/base/base.h b/drivers/base/base.h
index 4683b9c2a8d83..c88b3302969f2 100644
--- a/drivers/base/base.h
+++ b/drivers/base/base.h
@@ -180,6 +180,12 @@ void bus_remove_driver(struct device_driver *drv);
void device_release_driver_internal(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv,
struct device *parent);
+extern const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
+int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev, enum device_trust_policy policy);
+#endif
+
/* All active trust level transitions are serialized by the device lock. */
void device_trust_init_state(struct device *dev);
int device_trust_prepare(struct device *dev, const struct device_driver *drv);
diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c
index a0ffe74993677..dca0179714c82 100644
--- a/drivers/base/core.c
+++ b/drivers/base/core.c
@@ -2989,10 +2989,14 @@ static int device_add_attrs(struct device *dev)
if (error)
goto err_remove_type_groups;
+ error = device_add_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
+ if (error)
+ goto err_remove_dev_groups;
+
if (device_supports_offline(dev) && !dev_offline_disabled(dev)) {
error = device_create_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
if (error)
- goto err_remove_dev_groups;
+ goto err_remove_dev_trust_group;
}
if (fw_devlink_flags && !fw_devlink_is_permissive() && dev->fwnode) {
@@ -3022,6 +3026,8 @@ static int device_add_attrs(struct device *dev)
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_waiting_for_supplier);
err_remove_dev_online:
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
+ err_remove_dev_trust_group:
+ device_remove_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
err_remove_dev_groups:
device_remove_groups(dev, dev->groups);
err_remove_type_groups:
@@ -3047,6 +3053,7 @@ static void device_remove_attrs(struct device *dev)
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_removable);
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_waiting_for_supplier);
device_remove_file(dev, &dev_attr_online);
+ device_remove_group(dev, &device_trust_attr_group);
device_remove_groups(dev, dev->groups);
if (type)
@@ -4790,6 +4797,12 @@ static int device_attrs_change_owner(struct device *dev, kuid_t kuid,
if (error)
return error;
+ /* Change the trust attributes of @dev to @kuid/@kgid. */
+ error = sysfs_group_change_owner(kobj, &device_trust_attr_group, kuid,
+ kgid);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
if (device_supports_offline(dev) && !dev_offline_disabled(dev)) {
/* Change online device attributes of @dev to @kuid/@kgid. */
error = sysfs_file_change_owner(kobj, dev_attr_online.attr.name,
diff --git a/drivers/base/trust.c b/drivers/base/trust.c
index 10a135b8bf399..884e7c2dfbbb6 100644
--- a/drivers/base/trust.c
+++ b/drivers/base/trust.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <kunit/visibility.h>
#include "base.h"
@@ -122,3 +123,104 @@ bool device_is_adversarial(const struct device *dev)
return device_get_trust_level(dev) == DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(device_is_adversarial);
+
+static const char * const device_trust_policy_names[] = {
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DEFAULT] = "default",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED] = "disabled",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY] = "adversary",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL] = "full",
+};
+
+static const char * const device_trust_level_names[] = {
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_DISABLED] = "disabled",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY] = "adversary",
+ [DEVICE_TRUST_FULL] = "full",
+};
+
+static ssize_t trust_show(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ device_trust_level_names[device_get_trust_level(dev)]);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(trust);
+
+static ssize_t trust_policy_show(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n",
+ device_trust_policy_names[READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy)]);
+}
+
+VISIBLE_IF_KUNIT int device_trust_set_policy(struct device *dev,
+ enum device_trust_policy policy)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (policy < DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DEFAULT ||
+ policy > DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ device_lock(dev);
+ if (dev->p->dead) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ if (policy == dev->trust_policy)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ /* A driver that claimed the device before registration was not admitted. */
+ if (READ_ONCE(dev->driver)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ switch (dev->p->trust_state) {
+ case DEVICE_TRUST_SELECTABLE:
+ if (policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED)
+ dev->p->trust_state = DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING;
+ break;
+ case DEVICE_TRUST_WAITING:
+ if (policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY &&
+ policy != DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_FULL) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ dev->p->trust_state = DEVICE_TRUST_AUTHORIZED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ WRITE_ONCE(dev->trust_policy, policy);
+unlock:
+ device_unlock(dev);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_IF_KUNIT(device_trust_set_policy);
+
+static ssize_t trust_policy_store(struct device *dev,
+ const struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ int policy, ret;
+
+ policy = sysfs_match_string(device_trust_policy_names, buf);
+ if (policy < 0)
+ return policy;
+
+ ret = device_trust_set_policy(dev, policy);
+
+ return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(trust_policy);
+
+static struct attribute *device_trust_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_trust.attr,
+ &dev_attr_trust_policy.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group device_trust_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = device_trust_attrs,
+};
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-05 11:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-05 11:42 [PATCH 00/17] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 01/17] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/17] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:05 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 19:19 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:34 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 03/17] net: phy: Attach generic PHY " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:50 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:35 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 15:33 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:45 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 04/17] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 05/17] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:24 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 18:44 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:04 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 06/17] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 07/17] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 08/17] driver core: Allow userspace to detect EPROBE_DEFER when using sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 09/17] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-05 13:10 ` [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:27 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:59 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:17 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:26 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 15:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 14:43 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 14:59 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:09 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 13:42 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 17:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 19:06 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 11/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 12/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 13/17] driver core: Preserve trust commitment beyond driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 14/17] driver core: Add a global initial device trust policy Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 15/17] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 16/17] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:18 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 16:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 18:26 ` Leon Romanovsky
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