[PATCH 13/13] security: convert VMA flag tests to use vma_flags_t

["Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>]

Replace use of the legacy vm_flags_t flags with vma_flags_t values in the
mmap and mprotect LSM hooks of SELinux, AppArmor, IMA and IPE.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
---
 security/apparmor/lsm.c           |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c |  2 +-
 security/ipe/hooks.c              |  2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c          | 14 +++++++-------
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index c73681d820a0..00099a32b3f6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 				  unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
 {
 	return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
-			   !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
+			   !vma_test(vma, VMA_SHARED_BIT) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index fed80da3ee09..92032afe4cd1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 
 	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
 	if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
-	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
+	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || vma_test(vma, VMA_EXEC_BIT))
 		return 0;
 
 	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
diff --git a/security/ipe/hooks.c b/security/ipe/hooks.c
index d878b52ceec8..247b07748b1d 100644
--- a/security/ipe/hooks.c
+++ b/security/ipe/hooks.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
 
 	/* Already Executable */
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+	if (vma_test(vma, VMA_EXEC_BIT))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6168dd5f91c2..1bf78c2a6aba 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4206,16 +4206,16 @@ static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 {
 	unsigned long prot = 0;
 
-	/* translate vma->vm_flags perms into PROT perms */
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_READ)
+	/* translate VMA flag perms into PROT perms */
+	if (vma_test(vma, VMA_READ_BIT))
 		prot |= PROT_READ;
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)
+	if (vma_test(vma, VMA_WRITE_BIT))
 		prot |= PROT_WRITE;
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
+	if (vma_test(vma, VMA_EXEC_BIT))
 		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
 
 	return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file, prot,
-					vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED,
+					vma_test(vma, VMA_SHARED_BIT),
 					true);
 }
 
@@ -4229,13 +4229,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	u32 av;
 	const struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
 	bool backing_file;
-	bool shared = vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
+	bool shared = vma_test(vma, VMA_SHARED_BIT);
 
 	/* check if we need to trigger the "backing files are awful" mode */
 	backing_file = file && (file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING);
 
 	if (default_noexec &&
-	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+	    (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !vma_test(vma, VMA_EXEC_BIT)) {
 		/*
 		 * We don't use the vma_is_initial_heap() helper as it has
 		 * a history of problems and is currently broken on systems

-- 
2.56.0