From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/3] certs: blacklist: define skid: entries and add is_key_blacklisted()
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 07:12:25 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261105121227.4089147-2-zohar@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105121227.4089147-1-zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A "tbs:" blacklist entry is only compared against certificates being
added to a keyring or presented in a signature chain, so it does not
stop a key that is already loaded from being used as a trust anchor.
Define a new "skid:<hex>" blacklist entry, holding a Subject Key
Identifier, and add is_key_blacklisted(), which looks up the SKID of an
asymmetric key in the system blacklist. Entries are added like "tbs:"
and "bin:" entries and are subject to CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE.
blacklist_vet_description() now uses a prefix table, since the prefixes
no longer all have the same length. "tbs:" and "bin:" entries behave
as before.
For example, to add an entry for a certificate (the signed string must
not include a trailing newline):
skid=$(openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -ext subjectKeyIdentifier |
sed -n '2s/[ :]//gp' | tr A-F a-f)
printf 'skid:%s' "$skid" > skid.txt
openssl smime -sign -binary -noattr -in skid.txt -signer signer.crt \
-inkey signer.key -outform DER -out skid.p7s
keyctl padd blacklist "skid:$skid" %:.blacklist < skid.p7s
The SKID is also the hex string in the description of the key on a
keyring, and its last four bytes are the key ID in the security.ima
xattr, so an entry is easy to correlate with the key it revokes:
# keyctl show %:.ima | grep 073d
927946571 --als--v 0 0 \_ asymmetric: test signing key: b7809c3372a07fe87248dcec7ff047a40fb3073d
# keyctl show %:.blacklist | grep skid
1014808518 ----s--v 0 0 \_ blacklist: skid:b7809c3372a07fe87248dcec7ff047a40fb3073d
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
certs/Kconfig | 7 +--
certs/blacklist.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 8 ++++
3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index 9d2bf7fb5b9e..9e51f988ba3b 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -155,10 +155,11 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C
wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> must be a
- string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and
- finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128).
+ string starting with a prefix ("tbs", "bin" or "skid"), then a colon
+ (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters
+ (up to 128).
Certificate hashes can be generated with
- tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
+ tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh.
config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
index fa561c12eabf..b1e2c178d378 100644
--- a/certs/blacklist.c
+++ b/certs/blacklist.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
+static const char skid_prefix[] = "skid";
static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
@@ -40,36 +41,30 @@ extern __initconst const u8 revocation_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long revocation_certificate_list_size;
#endif
+static bool blacklist_prefix_valid(const char *desc, size_t len)
+{
+ return (len == sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1 &&
+ !strncmp(desc, tbs_prefix, len)) ||
+ (len == sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1 &&
+ !strncmp(desc, bin_prefix, len)) ||
+ (len == sizeof(skid_prefix) - 1 &&
+ !strncmp(desc, skid_prefix, len));
+}
+
/*
- * The description must be a type prefix, a colon and then an even number of
- * hex digits. The hash is kept in the description.
+ * The description must be a type prefix ("tbs", "bin" or "skid"), a colon and
+ * then an even number of lower-case hex digits. The hash (or, for "skid", the
+ * Subject Key Identifier) is kept in the description.
*/
static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
{
- int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
-
- /* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
- prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
- for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
- if (*desc == ':') {
- if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
- goto found_colon;
- if (bin_step == prefix_len)
- goto found_colon;
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- if (i >= prefix_len)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
- tbs_step++;
- if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
- bin_step++;
- }
- return -EINVAL;
+ const char *colon = strchr(desc, ':');
+ int i;
-found_colon:
- desc++;
+ if (!colon || !blacklist_prefix_valid(desc, colon - desc))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ desc = colon + 1;
for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -160,6 +155,10 @@ static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
type_prefix = bin_prefix;
break;
+ case BLACKLIST_HASH_SKID:
+ type_len = sizeof(skid_prefix) - 1;
+ type_prefix = skid_prefix;
+ break;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -244,6 +243,38 @@ int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
+/**
+ * is_key_blacklisted - Determine if a key is blacklisted by its SKID
+ * @key: The key to be checked, e.g. a trust anchor found in a keyring
+ *
+ * Unlike a "tbs:" entry, which is only compared against certificates being
+ * added or presented in a chain, this checks a key that is already loaded, so
+ * that keys that cannot be unlinked from their keyring can still be revoked.
+ * The identifier is taken from the key itself, not from the caller.
+ *
+ * Returns -EKEYREJECTED if the key's Subject Key Identifier is blacklisted,
+ * 0 if it is not (or the key has no SKID), or another negative error.
+ */
+int is_key_blacklisted(const struct key *key)
+{
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;
+
+ if (!key || key->type != &key_type_asymmetric)
+ return 0;
+
+ kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ if (!kids)
+ return 0;
+
+ skid = kids->id[1];
+ if (!skid || !skid->len)
+ return 0;
+
+ return is_hash_blacklisted(skid->data, skid->len, BLACKLIST_HASH_SKID);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_key_blacklisted);
+
int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
{
if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index a6c2897bcc63..48c830850b70 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ enum blacklist_hash_type {
BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
/* Raw data hash */
BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
+ /* Subject Key Identifier of a key (not a hash) */
+ BLACKLIST_HASH_SKID = 3,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
+extern int is_key_blacklisted(const struct key *key);
#else
static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
@@ -90,6 +93,11 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline int is_key_blacklisted(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
struct pkcs7_message;
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-05 12:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-05 12:12 [RFC PATCH 0/3] ima: use the system blacklist in lieu of the IMA blacklist keyring Mimi Zohar
2026-11-05 12:12 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2026-11-05 12:12 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] integrity: use is_key_blacklisted() in asymmetric_verify() Mimi Zohar
2026-11-05 12:12 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] ima: remove the experimental IMA blacklist keyring Mimi Zohar
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