From: Yuansheng Yang <0xbeac@gmail.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5] KEYS: Protect pkey method checks against type removal
Date: Sun, 8 Nov 2026 21:14:17 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261108131417.77287-1-0xbeac@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <au3fT5HMq7IF-M3e@kernel.org>
keyctl_pkey_query(), keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and keyctl_pkey_verify() check
that key->type has the ->asym_*() method they need and call it later,
without holding key->sem. A reference keeps the key alive, but does not
pin the module that provides its type.
When that module is unloaded, unregister_key_type() waits for the key GC
to process every remaining key of the type. For each such key, the GC
takes key->sem for writing, switches key->type to key_type_dead, whose
->asym_*() methods are NULL, and destroys the payload. If this happens
between the check and the call, the keyctl calls a NULL method:
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN task Module unload and key GC
------------------------ ------------------------
keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
if (!key->type->asym_eds_op) unregister_key_type()
GC: down_write(&key->sem)
GC: retype to key_type_dead
GC: up_write(&key->sem)
free_module()
in = memdup_user(...)
key->type->asym_eds_op(...) -> NULL call
If it happens while the method is running, the method is left running in
freed module text. In-tree, turris-signing-key provides ->asym_query()
and ->asym_eds_op() and can be built as a module.
Take key->sem for reading around each ->asym_*() call, and check the
method again under it, right before the call. While key->sem is held,
the GC cannot switch the key to key_type_dead, so unregister_key_type(),
and with it the module unload, cannot complete: the type, its module and
the payload stay in place until the method returns. If the type is
already gone when key->sem is taken, the check finds key_type_dead and
the keyctl fails with -EOPNOTSUPP, as it does for any key type without
the method.
Otherwise, behaviour is unchanged:
- The existing checks in keyctl_pkey_params_get(), keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
and keyctl_pkey_verify() are kept, so key types without the method
still fail at the same point with the same error. No call relies on
them any more.
- memdup_user() and copy_to_user() stay outside key->sem, as in
keyctl_read_key(), so no page fault is taken with key->sem held.
- key->sem is only taken for reading, so pkey operations and KEYCTL_READ
on the same key still run concurrently. Writers such as KEYCTL_UPDATE,
KEYCTL_REVOKE and KEYCTL_SETPERM now wait for a pkey operation in
progress, as they already wait for ->read(). The in-tree ->asym_*()
methods do not take key->sem themselves.
Nothing else in the kernel calls these three methods, so the four call
sites below are the full coverage:
- keyctl_pkey_query(): ->asym_query() for KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
- keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(): ->asym_query() to check the buffer sizes
for KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, _DECRYPT, _SIGN and _VERIFY
- keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(): ->asym_eds_op() for KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
_DECRYPT and _SIGN
- keyctl_pkey_verify(): ->asym_verify_signature() for
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
This problem was recently fixed for keyctl_read_key() by 925c84e3cc21
("keys: Protect the read method check against type removal") and for
key_update() by aef3a8a4f988 ("KEYS: Protect the update method check
against type removal").
LLM assistants, OpenAI Codex (gpt-6.1-sol) and Anthropic Claude
(claude-opus-5-5), found this while looking for other cases of the
KEYCTL_READ problem, and drafted this patch and this description.
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yuansheng Yang <0xbeac@gmail.com>
---
Changes in v5:
- Keep the asym_query check in keyctl_pkey_params_get() (Jarkko), and
for the same reason keep the asym_eds_op and asym_verify_signature
checks that keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and keyctl_pkey_verify() do before
copying the input. All four call sites now get the same change and
nothing else moves. This also restores the error for
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY with a bad input pointer on a key type without
->asym_verify_signature, such as turris-signing-key: v4 returned
-EFAULT there instead of -EOPNOTSUPP.
- Rewrite the commit message around that change: what it does, why it
is safe, and why the four call sites are all of them.
- Say in the changelog that LLM assistants found this bug and drafted
the patch and its description. They also wrote the tests below.
Tested on x86_64 under QEMU/KVM, with KASAN and lockdep, on 7.4-rc1
with and without this patch. A test-only key type module (not for
merging) is unloaded while KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN or KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY waits
in memdup_user() on a userfaultfd page, after the early check:
without the patch: NULL call from keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and
keyctl_pkey_verify()
with the patch: both return -EOPNOTSUPP
When the module's ->asym_eds_op() is sleeping as the unload starts, the
unpatched kernel faults on the freed module text; with the patch,
delete_module() returns only after the method has returned.
KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, _ENCRYPT, _DECRYPT, _SIGN and _VERIFY on an RSA-2048
asymmetric key give the same results with and without the patch.
In the two forced races lockdep also reports "bad unlock balance" for
key->sem. Its lock class is the type's lock_class, which lockdep drops
when the module is freed, so any key->sem user that took its key
reference before the unload can hit this, e.g. keyctl_read_key().
Not tested on Turris hardware.
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261105193632.34363-1-0xbeac@gmail.com/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/9d47e202bd11857b3555e6b95694b3c3a4f2460b.1793852399.git.0xbeac@gmail.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261104021414.50696-1-0xbeac@gmail.com/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261103032940.51826-1-0xbeac@gmail.com/
security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
index 15b6bf6399..0ea6f2790e 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -129,7 +129,16 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ down_read(¶ms->key->sem);
+ if (!params->key->type->asym_query) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_up_key_sem;
+ }
+
ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
+
+out_up_key_sem:
+ up_read(¶ms->key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -185,7 +194,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_query) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_up_key_sem;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_query(¶ms, &res);
+
+out_up_key_sem:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -260,7 +278,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (!out)
goto error_in;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_up_key_sem;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(¶ms, in, out);
+
+out_up_key_sem:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;
@@ -305,31 +332,41 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
¶ms);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error_params;
+ goto out_free_params;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
- goto error_params;
+ goto out_free_params;
in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
if (IS_ERR(in)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(in);
- goto error_params;
+ goto out_free_params;
}
in2 = memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len);
if (IS_ERR(in2)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(in2);
- goto error_in;
+ goto out_free_in;
}
params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
+ down_read(¶ms.key->sem);
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature) {
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_up_key_sem;
+ }
+
ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(¶ms, in, in2);
+out_up_key_sem:
+ up_read(¶ms.key->sem);
kfree(in2);
-error_in:
+
+out_free_in:
kfree(in);
-error_params:
+
+out_free_params:
keyctl_pkey_params_free(¶ms);
return ret;
}
--
2.43.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-08 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-03 3:29 [PATCH] " BeaCox
2026-11-03 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-04 2:14 ` [PATCH v2] " BeaCox
2026-11-04 14:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-04 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-05 2:24 ` Yuansheng Yang
2026-11-05 3:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-05 4:38 ` [PATCH v3] " Yuansheng Yang
2026-11-05 16:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-05 19:36 ` [PATCH v4] " Yuansheng Yang
2026-11-06 14:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-08 12:59 ` Yuansheng Yang
2026-11-08 13:14 ` Yuansheng Yang [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261108131417.77287-1-0xbeac@gmail.com \
--to=0xbeac@gmail.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®