[PATCH 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation

["Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>]

Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not
hold for every capability check.  Remove them instead of listing their
exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
 Documentation/security/landlock.rst      | 8 ++++----
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++----
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h            | 6 +++---
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
 ==================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
 
 Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing).  To
 harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
@@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG``
 (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``).
 
 Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log
-flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire unconditionally,
-independent of these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
-always incremented regardless of logging configuration.
+flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``.  Tracepoints fire independently of
+these settings.  The denial counter (``num_denials``) is
+incremented regardless of logging configuration.
 
 Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the
 audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
 =====================================
 
 :Author: Mickaël Salaün
-:Date: October 2026
+:Date: November 2026
 
 The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global
 filesystem or network access) for a set of processes.  Because Landlock
@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`.  Namespaces
 the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly
 allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe
 which new namespace types the process may acquire.
-``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability
+``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities
 after the domain is enforced, regardless
 of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER``
 grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.).  Configuring
@@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`;
 privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain
 capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities.
 In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets,
-but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised.  Do not rely
+but any denied capability will fail when exercised.  Do not rely
 on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given
-capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial.
+capability.
 
 Truncating files
 ----------------
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr {
  * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux
  *   capabilities.  A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission
  *   is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a
- *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This hook is purely restrictive: it can
- *   deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never
- *   grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
+ *   %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule.  This permission is purely restrictive: it
+ *   can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can
+ *   never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied.  Support added in
  *   Landlock ABI version 12.
  */
 #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE			(1ULL << 0)
-- 
2.56.0