From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>,
"Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 5/5] tpm-buf: Make tpm_buf_read*() fallible
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 02:51:04 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116005105.1573016-6-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116005105.1573016-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Make tpm_buf_read_u8(), tpm_buf_read_u16() and tpm_buf_read_u32() flows
unambiguous, and fallible by writing the updated offset to @offset.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 56 ++++---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 188 ++++++++++++++++------
include/linux/tpm_buf.h | 6 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +-
4 files changed, 178 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
index 233e81d3f149..a2d79b3a9385 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c
@@ -204,39 +204,35 @@ void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle)
* @offset: offset within the buffer
* @count: the number of bytes to read
* @output: the output buffer
+ *
+ * Return: true on success, and @offset is advanced by @count bytes, or false
+ * if the read would cross the end of the buffer.
*/
-static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void *output)
+static bool tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, size_t count, void *output)
{
off_t next_offset;
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID)
- return;
-
next_offset = *offset + count;
- if (next_offset > buf->length) {
- WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n");
- buf->flags |= TPM_BUF_INVALID;
- return;
- }
+ if (next_offset > buf->length)
+ return false;
memcpy(output, &buf->data[*offset], count);
*offset = next_offset;
+ return true;
}
/**
* tpm_buf_read_u8() - Read 8-bit word from a TPM buffer
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
* @offset: offset within the buffer
+ * @value: returns the 8-bit word
*
- * Return: next 8-bit word
+ * Return: true on success, and @offset is advanced, or false if the read
+ * would cross the end of the buffer.
*/
-u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+bool tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u8 *value)
{
- u8 value = 0;
-
- tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
-
- return value;
+ return tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(*value), value);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u8);
@@ -244,16 +240,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u8);
* tpm_buf_read_u16() - Read 16-bit word from a TPM buffer
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
* @offset: offset within the buffer
+ * @value: returns the 16-bit word
*
- * Return: next 16-bit word
+ * Return: true on success, and @offset is advanced, or false if the read
+ * would cross the end of the buffer.
*/
-u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+bool tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u16 *value)
{
- u16 value = 0;
+ __be16 value_be;
- tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value_be), &value_be))
+ return false;
- return be16_to_cpu(value);
+ *value = be16_to_cpu(value_be);
+ return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u16);
@@ -261,16 +261,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u16);
* tpm_buf_read_u32() - Read 32-bit word from a TPM buffer
* @buf: &tpm_buf instance
* @offset: offset within the buffer
+ * @value: returns the 32-bit word
*
- * Return: next 32-bit word
+ * Return: true on success, and @offset is advanced, or false if the read
+ * would cross the end of the buffer.
*/
-u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset)
+bool tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u32 *value)
{
- u32 value = 0;
+ __be32 value_be;
- tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value), &value);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read(buf, offset, sizeof(value_be), &value_be))
+ return false;
- return be32_to_cpu(value);
+ *value = be32_to_cpu(value_be);
+ return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_read_u32);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
index fa107719b4f9..185bae525519 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL;
int rc, name_size_alg;
+ u16 size;
if (mso != TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT && mso != TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE &&
mso != TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) {
@@ -199,8 +200,10 @@ int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
/* Skip TPMT_PUBLIC: */
- rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
- offset += rc;
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset, &size))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ offset += size;
/*
* Ensure space for the length field of TPM2B_NAME and hashAlg field of
@@ -209,18 +212,20 @@ int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name)
if (offset + 4 > tpm_buf_length(buf))
return -EIO;
- rc = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset, &size))
+ return -EIO;
+
name_size_alg = name_size(&buf->data[offset]);
if (name_size_alg < 0)
return name_size_alg;
- if (rc != name_size_alg)
+ if (size != name_size_alg)
return -EIO;
- if (offset + rc > tpm_buf_length(buf))
+ if (offset + size > tpm_buf_length(buf))
return -EIO;
- memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], rc);
+ memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], size);
return name_size_alg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public);
@@ -618,21 +623,41 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
handles = (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0);
offset_s += handles * sizeof(u32);
- val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s, &val)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */
offset_p = offset_s + val;
for (i = 1; offset_s < offset_p; i++) {
- u32 handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+ u32 handle;
u16 len;
u8 a;
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s, &handle)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* nonce (already in auth) */
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
offset_s += len;
- a = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s, &a)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
if (handle == auth->handle && auth->attrs == a) {
hmac = &buf->data[offset_s];
/*
@@ -665,7 +690,11 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf)
auth->tpm_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
auth->scratch);
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p, &len)) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
aes_prepareenckey(&auth->aes_key, auth->scratch, AES_KEY_BYTES);
aescfb_encrypt(&auth->aes_key, &buf->data[offset_p],
&buf->data[offset_p], len,
@@ -740,7 +769,10 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
struct sha256_ctx sctx;
struct hmac_sha256_ctx hctx;
u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag);
- int parm_len, len, i, handles;
+ u32 parm_len;
+ int i, handles;
+ u8 session_attrs;
+ u16 len;
if (!auth)
return rc;
@@ -770,26 +802,38 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
/* point to area beyond handles */
offset_s = TPM_HEADER_SIZE + handles * 4;
- parm_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s, &parm_len))
+ goto out;
+
offset_p = offset_s;
offset_s += parm_len;
/* skip over any sessions before ours */
for (i = 0; i < auth->session - 1; i++) {
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len))
+ goto out;
+
offset_s += len + 1;
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len))
+ goto out;
+
offset_s += len;
}
/* TPM nonce */
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len))
+ goto out;
+
if (offset_s + len > tpm_buf_length(buf))
goto out;
if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
goto out;
memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset_s], len);
offset_s += len;
- attrs = tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s);
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u8(buf, &offset_s, &session_attrs))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_s, &len))
+ goto out;
+
if (offset_s + len != tpm_buf_length(buf))
goto out;
if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
@@ -831,8 +875,8 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
auth->our_nonce, AES_KEY_BYTES + AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
auth->scratch);
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p);
- if (offset_p + len > tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_p, &len) ||
+ offset_p + len > tpm_buf_length(buf)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -888,7 +932,7 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth,
struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data;
u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- u32 val;
+ u16 val;
/* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */
tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
@@ -897,8 +941,12 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct tpm2_auth *auth,
if (tot_len != 4 + 2 + sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce))
return -EINVAL;
- auth->handle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset);
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset, &auth->handle))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(auth->tpm_nonce, &buf->data[offset], sizeof(auth->tpm_nonce));
@@ -1070,15 +1118,20 @@ static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
off_t offset_r = TPM_HEADER_SIZE, offset_t;
u16 len = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
u32 total_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length);
- u32 val, param_len, keyhandle;
+ u32 val32, param_len, keyhandle;
+ u16 val;
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r, &keyhandle))
+ return -EIO;
- keyhandle = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
if (handle)
*handle = keyhandle;
else
tpm2_flush_context(chip, keyhandle);
- param_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r, ¶m_len))
+ return -EIO;
+
/*
* param_len doesn't include the header, but all the other
* lengths and offsets do, so add it to parm len to make
@@ -1088,7 +1141,10 @@ static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
if (param_len + 8 > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &len))
+ return -EIO;
+
offset_t = offset_r;
if (offset_r + len > tpm_buf_length(buf))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1102,64 +1158,88 @@ static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
}
/* validate the public key */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
/* key type (must be what we asked for) */
if (val != TPM_ALG_ECC)
return -EINVAL;
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
/* name algorithm */
if (val != TPM_ALG_SHA256)
return -EINVAL;
- val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_t);
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_t, &val32))
+ return -EIO;
/* object properties */
- if (val != TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY)
+ if (val32 != TPM2_OA_NULL_KEY)
return -EINVAL;
/* auth policy (empty) */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* symmetric key parameters */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM_ALG_AES)
return -EINVAL;
/* symmetric key length */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != AES_KEY_BITS)
return -EINVAL;
/* symmetric encryption scheme */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM_ALG_CFB)
return -EINVAL;
/* signing scheme */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* ECC Curve */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM2_ECC_NIST_P256)
return -EINVAL;
/* KDF Scheme */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM_ALG_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* extract public key (x and y points) */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != EC_PT_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_x, &buf->data[offset_t], val);
offset_t += val;
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t);
+
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_t, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != EC_PT_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(chip->null_ec_key_y, &buf->data[offset_t], val);
@@ -1175,30 +1255,40 @@ static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
return -EINVAL;
/* creation data (skip) */
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &len))
+ return -EIO;
+
offset_r += len;
if (offset_r > param_len)
return -EINVAL;
/* creation digest (must be sha256) */
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &len))
+ return -EIO;
+
offset_r += len;
if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE || offset_r > param_len)
return -EINVAL;
/* TPMT_TK_CREATION follows */
/* tag, must be TPM_ST_CREATION (0x8021) */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &val))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (val != TPM2_ST_CREATION || offset_r > param_len)
return -EINVAL;
/* hierarchy */
- val = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r);
- if (val != hierarchy || offset_r > param_len)
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_r, &val32))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if (val32 != hierarchy || offset_r > param_len)
return -EINVAL;
/* the ticket digest HMAC (might not be sha256) */
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &len))
+ return -EIO;
+
offset_r += len;
if (offset_r > param_len)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1207,7 +1297,9 @@ static int tpm2_parse_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
* finally we have the name, which is a sha256 digest plus a 2
* byte algorithm type
*/
- len = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r);
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset_r, &len))
+ return -EIO;
+
if (offset_r + len != param_len + 8)
return -EINVAL;
if (len != SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2)
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_buf.h b/include/linux/tpm_buf.h
index f8c105d8b8bf..d0f4c1c3ee2d 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_buf.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_buf.h
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_length);
void tpm_buf_append_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 value);
void tpm_buf_append_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u16 value);
void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 value);
-u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
-u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
-u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset);
+bool tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u8 *value);
+bool tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u16 *value);
+bool tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset, u32 *value);
void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle);
#endif
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index f7a0a312a652..b4d0127539cb 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -217,6 +217,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL;
u16 parent_name_size;
int blob_len = 0;
+ u32 size;
int hash;
u32 flags;
int rc;
@@ -323,18 +324,17 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
goto out;
- blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset);
- if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) {
- rc = -E2BIG;
+ if (!tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset, &size)) {
+ rc = -EIO;
goto out;
}
- if (buf->length - offset < blob_len) {
+ if (buf->length - offset < size) {
rc = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf->data[offset], blob_len);
+ blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf->data[offset], size);
if (blob_len < 0)
rc = blob_len;
--
2.47.3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 0:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 0:50 [PATCH v3 0/5] Unsorted tpm2-sessions improvements Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] tpm2-sessions: Drop TPM2_NAME_SIZE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append_auth() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() use Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-16 0:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
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