From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=209.85.160.180 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794945284; b=sonuahKoPYN58SLtTAtqDDQyqjVEF6G+KiqZX8xgktxN6mSFyidQm664RfUCPIwuz/j9 9IzKgD/qV/JjDcXu7QuJpBUviiR0FSlshn+2GNC/FubP2igYjHuMt7+m9kYokCsFwEpbb YJvZu1FH+398Z7hhQOEigjZ+4zp28XvBmyhZPnab1hyRxhHmwXUJcrEgyodQyPj0RPonl 2ZQ99lSKC/0U83lXh2Ye00Iby5HEuelejBTsozuLKomzfkihZabUrKyyyy0XPAWHPUUJD 3tv+5hB41e/KSGPMPW1xx24jajQpYfMnQLvyUHwgGYC7hi5r1o8OVP4ktA1wYoVgA9Q== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794945284; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:X-Google-DKIM-Signature: X-Forwarded-Encrypted:X-Gm-Message-State:X-Gm-Gg:X-Received:Received: From:Subject:Date:Message-Id:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:X-B4-Tracking:X-Change-ID:To:Cc:X-Mailer: X-Developer-Signature:X-Developer-Key; bh=dasiy9jZCIRFl0UFRsOu4Cf4hy2TGdEpzRiCfDH1aQU=; b=H0GbNi1VtsUPukAVsL/wnOE+17pU5Qx3FpmCnDXxyGPVSS0riDBZyCqwHPuPRQLnJ1Bx O4rETliqnaQyyvJ01xq+UFO47u/foaI/+kdqCTLsyN9F/FK2d9koCKSeC11y4Uk3zTUF6 a7hR0ubfRe/5xJ5e6obh17AFppkt9dlr04xZFIUtoq2+6KuNXpM6U2HzrsQ4v+nuDYGEx 9TH5ACiwuuH+4AatK5+z1gdnF1/vSso1Z876mFtW9Gpopi+mXeHQUlYa0T0JynJAdUHR6 41aSerDEMkRvFAayCtU1MJHe0SPIv6zy3BIT5keB74LaRoTqwa3Bm4uxNKqEF5/V30g== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none header.from=toxicpanda.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=toxicpanda.com; dkim=pass header.d=toxicpanda.com header.i=@toxicpanda.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=google header.b=PANLY+yf; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=209.85.160.180 Received: from mail-qt1-f180.google.com (mail-qt1-f180.google.com [209.85.160.180]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4AC72606A330 for ; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:54:42 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org 4AC72606A330 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=toxicpanda.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=toxicpanda.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=toxicpanda.com header.i=@toxicpanda.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=google header.b=PANLY+yf Received: by mail-qt1-f180.google.com with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-55c48582654so2074811cf.0 for ; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:54:41 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=toxicpanda.com; s=google; t=1794945281; x=1795550081; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=cc:to:content-transfer-encoding:content-type:mime-version :message-id:date:subject:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to:content-type; bh=dasiy9jZCIRFl0UFRsOu4Cf4hy2TGdEpzRiCfDH1aQU=; b=PANLY+yfmO9pzRM2VvmyqOQREUtkbuz0bAZn4eCAl27+xQiSA1nLAdtYXgVKX4v5YG ZDawClxjuLuBOpyayJeO1jdAJlNRi456YfxrbTcuMoNxrGzvWn+9Gs5gWhMdRe4CnwGY 8pN2WI6Hr/8LrRfQl5qi6c/fTQXR4RQAG1+RDsdL0Fv2DlyIGkjnBhkXdvFLd1UklOSp 7hq8piBekXnpbA8L7z1anH5j2kp+LyDY6+pKiRIzD70o/zdpI6gA63CfrCISV8aNxBlt Xss+cxExlbvgRtKQLurD5UeTn9pPQr3WuH4GyHPz/EZ3r/rPn+TK/e8b+bJ4K10Cd7q+ a17Q== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20260707; t=1794945281; x=1795550081; h=cc:to:content-transfer-encoding:content-type:mime-version :message-id:date:subject:from:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:reply-to:content-type; bh=dasiy9jZCIRFl0UFRsOu4Cf4hy2TGdEpzRiCfDH1aQU=; b=0QrLCIKvVnmpDJwfSw+FKy7jksww2riygfkJVVdl16uTP5EeRUWieFMS7vUKJAKZTU +caZmGVhcssjQ9ju48KnYPW25mxcASzE+qAmrt/rIHC//QJJ9/t2fjktY4R7AqAUXGwc 37xF4f1wW619wON2hRV2310bNN8pds9I19Bh+mZYCWbziKDOX24TNChj8fT3sZ5FCmhe GtIc+WLMB1X00hZR+SlaqQoujsur0cUksd2W5kd3NQOSzcggua2NLKcuAxVxJrNP7h8c EdrTzyGZ8zimX5Qxk5FPTvVPSV59UHgJl89pZMzNyPnOBsj18ta+q+xHy2mcCo53aMlQ D48A== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AL+hErH8s1GGTMWs9MfLvdfAKqZ0FOqvhbNxoPndeutdsTvQPeV3k2KagUH3imYdNl01V+C+j+sPOEfinT49rmw=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: APuU4Z/8T1Loq6deHHj+ayayCZbTTkFqpad5rMAyRYMzL8VRKOD+yt02 WqywH59cnQQjMc+FBbRMfGM6LpBOir10ml9sWT+ROyxenNOliJ+ZqAWhSooxSW/n6pcIO8EswSH XTtJgE0k= X-Gm-Gg: AYBFou2xSwdMpVZgSTOtgPX8YpQtO0BGfEeEB5bcuDb5Qfe9YHYNwucjNWCEjCAc6NA QuWe9Y13wny7euoG5aUUj8EwcNrI3Rz//7N0airmZtpTvLdLzs4T3fC+lbZna9Q/cVJMokq5j/t VUKeD713Pj7H/sr9C2yJ83DvKqYE5gL6OCeHSCUAaI2i98zeh6YdKhl2yId0V9/qb9FpoJ+huWL /w1pXLwYHuTY436fDxUQ2awFEHIa3M2vQnsyEOJMzwxXtKnMNOsXKs8qjYZsKuPgeEICz1dfZRw cc0hI8pPneYkI0cRI+MUx2/ur8UH3j96cEDTA+9Gg0Qn/GEzOrFLa8uK7yhL2d2CAuE2xAz54Ll k+F3lbwIUyJHBSohpHI6tJtarTqOV9KsGFy3EHkA4tcYJuyfikW75k8FDtZ3UiUmehjOW9bJKQz NLAA8iBlJvhoLVVzMBvgc01l5JK0BISMebMxdaQ3Gv0BsIIqYOcql8qc9VeG0nKZeKCGExtqgLh F/HGY12vEKueXtA+7LVbqF90uEG3GUFLQRjj1mCNI9y72pUvCndI/1m3YDCC9JGEKHDINvlm5SW uiNCZWE3Fa6IkFfoLinEudQRZskOEERb9+fulj2QP+AcOn+6TYOYqV7dn/Jl4yImVQI= X-Received: by 2002:a05:622a:4084:b0:55b:f621:e7d2 with SMTP id d75a77b69052e-55d5a553982mr6173311cf.15.1794945280764; Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:54:40 -0800 (PST) Received: from toxicpanda.com ([153.61.196.243]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d75a77b69052e-55d590360fasm4709981cf.14.2026.11.17.11.54.39 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:54:39 -0800 (PST) From: Josef Bacik Subject: [PATCH v11 0/3] capabilities: close the ways around the CAP_SETFCAP rule for uid 0 Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 19:54:23 +0000 Message-Id: <20261117-b4-setfcap-userns-v11-0-2be11a2c32f4@toxicpanda.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-B4-Tracking: v=1; b=H4sIAO+w/GoC/4XSS07DMBAG4KtUWWPqsR0/WHEPxMKPMQ2CJIrTq qjq3bHLgiBGsInk0fjT75lcuoLLgKV72F26BU9DGaaxHgDudl08+PEF2ZBqoRNcaOBcs6BYwTV HP7NjvTwWlrQE23sJEWVX780L5uF8Q5+ev87lGF4xrg1qHcEXZGHxYzy00tu8D2p/K/6kW+9hK Ou0fNwSnqCZf2U5AeMsK4MGk9bciMd1Og9x9mPy93F671qgk9gwoChGNMZHlcAJC8mQjNwwAih GVsaZWMMoVBKBZNSWERSjKmOt9zzn+rGZZPotIymmrwzXtUPIgK6n0+gtQ45YV0b0GXgw0StHz 8b8y5jKhGx9b3Q2onckY7eMoRjb0mijfIpaZhlJxn0zwB3FuDabJDPnzuiI9H8DfOMAuSrgbVc q1zfVXTkuf0HX6/UT9uhXj3cDAAA= X-Change-ID: 20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-d63185a31ce3 To: Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Christian Brauner Cc: James Morris , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , "Andrew G. Morgan" , Serge Hallyn , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Shuah Khan , linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Bradley Morgan , Josef Bacik X-Mailer: b4 0.15.2 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openssh-sha256; t=1794945277; l=13703; i=josef@toxicpanda.com; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=ZQCf2hYxdpb7My2Rl42a57sI5qXecMNXQi0UUXmzXb0=; b=U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgUBr36M/n0nWN0DNbnxwzIiCZez6MG JiruuNaSCI/zXsAAAAGcGF0YXR0AAAAAAAAAAZzaGE1MTIAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA QNTMY/cObzuXJgmu32TBaDgUmwAtZohF0qMwzKQtcHtQOeigZk52i/0LBPz1FnPptYQuCYuhA78 ZwwurrvOedw4= X-Developer-Key: i=josef@toxicpanda.com; a=openssh; fpr=SHA256:C8kOX2QUJCMqnCX+KEeoqRAjLo9L+ELOSH2NSAJHqGA v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-0-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com/ v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com/ v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261021-b4-setfcap-userns-v3-0-97c7ed4e43e1@toxicpanda.com/ v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261022-b4-setfcap-userns-v4-0-88aa0ffaa08f@toxicpanda.com/ v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261023-b4-setfcap-userns-v5-0-0620223be951@toxicpanda.com/ v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v6-0-25f10b7ca497@toxicpanda.com/ v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v7-0-bf8a576f7259@toxicpanda.com/ v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261027-b4-setfcap-userns-v8-0-2674adc63f3c@toxicpanda.com/ v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261109-b4-setfcap-userns-v9-0-0d3f00976ce2@toxicpanda.com/ v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261112-b4-setfcap-userns-v10-0-84f6f7faa903@toxicpanda.com/ v10->v11: - 1/3: a namespace without a uid_map counts whenever its parent maps the joiner's root user, not only when that root user owns it: a writer in the parent can still map it. That check is a helper of its own, the joiner's root user is checked with uid_valid(), and the variables have names that say what they hold (Serge). - 3/3: the case for a namespace created by another user now expects setns() to be refused. v9->v10: - 1/3: a namespace with no uid_map yet only counts if its owner is the joiner's root user, the only one who could map it from inside, so tasks that can't map it aren't refused. The changelog says who gets refused now and what the check leaves to whoever sets up a map or an idmapped mount. - 2/3: the ptrace check no longer looks at the target's capabilities. A target that gave up CAP_SETFCAP can still get it back from its inheritable set on execve(), take it from another task of its namespace if it kept CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or write "0 0 1" to its namespace's uid_map while there is none yet. A tracer without CAP_SETFCAP and CAP_SYS_PTRACE can't attach to a task in a namespace that setns() keeps it out of (Sashiko). CAP_SYS_PTRACE no longer stands in for CAP_SETFCAP, here or in 1/3: whether it lets a task take CAP_SETFCAP from a neighbour depends on LSMs such as Yama. The changelog names the read-only users of PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH that are refused too. - 3/3: cases for those three, the idmapped mount goes under /tmp instead of creating /mnt on the host, a failure to set it up is an error rather than a skip, and the binary is in .gitignore (Sashiko). Also cases for ptrace at a non-zero uid and one level down, and one that writes the file capabilities and runs them; the test skips when it can't run rather than failing, and setup errors are caught everywhere. v8->v9: - Dropped the setfcap_level patch and the checks on the uid_map opener and writer and on file capabilities (old 1/6, 3/6 and 4/6). They only stopped a task that gave up CAP_SETFCAP from using a namespace, a map fd or a map that a task with CAP_SETFCAP set up for it, and that task could have done it all on its own (Serge). - setns() and ptrace compare kuids instead of levels: a task without CAP_SETFCAP can't join a namespace whose tasks can write file capabilities for the root user of its own namespace, and can't attach to a task with CAP_SETFCAP in one unless it has CAP_SYS_PTRACE (Serge). The check doesn't go by the task's uids, which it can move away from 0 while keeping its other capabilities. - The selftest drops the cases of the dropped patches and adds PTRACE_TRACEME, a joiner that moved its euid, a target with CAP_SETFCAP only in its bounding set, and a namespace without a uid_map under one that maps host uid 0 at uid 5, 39 cases now. v7->v8: - 6/6 only, 1-5 are unchanged. A case whose setup failed in a child waited for the harness timeout, because the parent kept its own copy of the pipe end it read from. The cases where a privileged task maps for one that gave up CAP_SETFCAP now share one helper that talks to it over a socket pair, and the others close the ends they don't use, so a failed step ends the case with a setup error at once (Sashiko). v6->v7: - 6/6 only, 1-5 are unchanged. Every case now reaches the step it is named for, and a setup step that fails is an error rather than a refusal. Cases that stopped at setns() are setns() cases now: a task that joins has CAP_SETFCAP wherever the creator had it, so nothing after setns() checks it. In the v3 rootid, nesting after dropping CAP_SETFCAP and reverse idmapped mount cases a privileged task maps a namespace created without CAP_SETFCAP, so the xattr gets written. pidfd_getfd() is a ptrace case of its own. The session keyring case joins a keyring of its own first, so it works under su, and skips without keyrings (Sashiko). v5->v6: - New 6/6: a kselftest with every case the series has been through, 48 of them. Without the series 22 fail, with v5 the 4 below fail. - 3/5: a task inside the namespace that is being mapped also has to hold CAP_SETFCAP there to open or write a uid_map that maps an ancestor's root user. Before, a task that gave up CAP_SETFCAP could write "0 0 1" and get it back from execve() (Sashiko). - 4/5: a v2 xattr on a filesystem whose namespace has no uid 0 is refused with -EINVAL instead of stored unconverted, where it was honoured nowhere. Falling through to the conversion would not do: for a writer outside that namespace it names the writer's root user instead (Sashiko). v4->v5: - 3/5: the uid_map check only looked for an extent at the parent's uid 0. The root user of an ancestor can sit at any uid in the parent, so a task without CAP_SETFCAP could map "0 1000 1" under a "1000 0 1" and get host uid 0 as its uid 0 unchecked. It now finds every ancestor root user the map contains. 4/5 already refused the file capabilities after such a map, so this is the map rule itself (Sashiko). Dropped Bradley's Reviewed-by on 3/5, which changed. v3->v4: - 4/5: a v2 security.capability xattr skipped the new checks, it was written as is whenever the writer had CAP_SETFCAP over the filesystem's namespace. It now only does that when the filesystem's root user is within reach, and goes through the v3 conversion and its checks otherwise (Sashiko). v2->v3: - The setns() check in 2/5 and the ptrace check in 5/5 only apply to namespaces that map the root user of an ancestor within the creator's CAP_SETFCAP, or that have no uid_map yet. Root users stored through an idmapped mount are left to whoever sets up the mount, so a root task without CAP_SETFCAP can join an ordinary "0 100000" container again (Serge, Christian). - 2/5 adds cred_may_setfcap_userns() for those two checks and cred_setfcap_reaches() for the uid_map check; nothing outside create_user_ns() calls cap_setfcap_level() directly (Serge). - Fixed the cap_setfcap_level() kernel-doc, @ns doesn't have to be the cred's namespace or below; cap_capable() is compared with != 0 (Serge). - Picked up Bradley's Reviewed-by on 1/5 and 3/5, not on 2/5, which changed. - Rebased onto current vfs.all. v1->v2: - The state lives on the user namespace now: ns->setfcap_level replaces ns->parent_could_setfcap, and cred->setfcap_level is gone (Serge, Christian). - New 2/5: setns() refuses a task whose CAP_SETFCAP doesn't reach as far up as the namespace's setfcap_level. It applies to every user namespace, not only to those that map the parent's uid 0, because of idmapped mounts (Serge, Christian). - 5/5 asks a tracer for what setns() asks for, also when the namespace doesn't map an ancestor's root user, again because of idmapped mounts. - Dropped "userns: don't let setns() lend the right to map uid 0", the setns() check covers it. Its nested case moved into 3/5, which checks the opener and the writer. - set_cred_user_ns() isn't touched anymore, so the put-before-use in userns_install() is gone (Sashiko). - Rebased onto current vfs.all. What it does now: Since db2e718a4798 a root task that gave up CAP_SETFCAP can't map its root user into a user namespace it creates. It can still join a namespace that another root task created, or attach to a task in one, and get CAP_SETFCAP over its root user that way. Patch 1 refuses setns() when the namespace maps that root user, at any uid, or has no uid_map yet and it can still be mapped. Patch 2 refuses ptrace attach to a task in such a namespace. Containers that don't map host uid 0, unprivileged users and anything with CAP_SETFCAP aren't affected. Testing: 3/3 runs 46 cases on their own as root in private mount namespaces. On vfs.all without the series the 20 setns() and ptrace cases that must be refused fail; with the series all pass. The pidfd, namespaces, mount_setattr and ptrace selftests give identical results with and without. --- Original email (v1) --- Hello, Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0") stops a root task that has given up CAP_SETFCAP from creating a user namespace that maps uid 0 and then writing file capabilities in it that the initial namespace honours. The check only looks at the task that creates the namespace, so if somebody who did have CAP_SETFCAP created one, there are still several ways around it: - setns() into their namespace and write uid_map from inside (patch 2) - write "0 0 1" through a uid_map fd that they opened (patch 3) - setns() into a namespace of theirs that already maps uid 0 and set security.capability there, no map write needed (patch 4) - ptrace one of their tasks and have it do any of the above (patch 5) On an unmodified kernel we took a uid 0 task with CAP_SETFCAP dropped from its permitted, effective and bounding sets and, through each of these, ended up with a file that a uid 1000 user execs with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its effective set. Patch 1 adds cred->setfcap_level, which records how far up the namespace tree a task's CAP_SETFCAP reached when it entered its namespace, and patches 2-5 check it. Patch 4 is the check that closes the class, the map patches make the uid 0 map rule mean what db2e718a4798 meant it to, and patch 5 keeps ptrace from borrowing what the target is entitled to. This does change behaviour. Everything new is -EPERM: - a task that entered a namespace without CAP_SETFCAP outside can't map uid 0 of the outside or write fscaps for that root user anymore - a uid_map fd opened by a task with CAP_SETFCAP can't be used by a task without it to map uid 0 - if a privileged task maps "0 0 1" from the parent for a namespace created by a task without CAP_SETFCAP, that namespace can no longer write fscaps honoured outside - PTRACE_ATTACH and PTRACE_TRACEME fail when the tracer gave up CAP_SETFCAP and CAP_SYS_PTRACE, the target didn't, and they share a root user Rootless containers, privileged runtimes writing the map from the parent, nested unprivileged namespaces and containers that don't map host uid 0 aren't affected. The ptrace check is one compare for targets in the initial namespace and in namespaces entered without the capability. Testing: a set of flows run on the base and patched kernels, every bypass route above gets -EPERM with the series and the 16 legitimate flows behave the same. The capabilities, namespaces, ptrace, pidfd and proc selftests give the same results before and after. Thanks, Josef --- Changes in v11: - Link to v10: https://patch.msgid.link/20261112-b4-setfcap-userns-v10-0-84f6f7faa903@toxicpanda.com Changes in v10: - Link to v9: https://patch.msgid.link/20261109-b4-setfcap-userns-v9-0-0d3f00976ce2@toxicpanda.com Changes in v9: - Link to v8: https://patch.msgid.link/20261027-b4-setfcap-userns-v8-0-2674adc63f3c@toxicpanda.com Changes in v8: - Link to v7: https://patch.msgid.link/20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v7-0-bf8a576f7259@toxicpanda.com Changes in v7: - Link to v6: https://patch.msgid.link/20261026-b4-setfcap-userns-v6-0-25f10b7ca497@toxicpanda.com Changes in v6: - Link to v5: https://patch.msgid.link/20261023-b4-setfcap-userns-v5-0-0620223be951@toxicpanda.com Changes in v5: - Link to v4: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022-b4-setfcap-userns-v4-0-88aa0ffaa08f@toxicpanda.com Changes in v4: - Link to v3: https://patch.msgid.link/20261021-b4-setfcap-userns-v3-0-97c7ed4e43e1@toxicpanda.com Changes in v3: - Link to v2: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014-b4-setfcap-userns-v2-0-fac4d19281d7@toxicpanda.com Changes in v2: - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-v1-0-f47e7ed66072@toxicpanda.com --- Josef Bacik (3): userns: don't let setns() lend CAP_SETFCAP capabilities: don't let ptrace borrow CAP_SETFCAP selftests/namespaces: test the CAP_SETFCAP rule for user namespaces include/linux/capability.h | 3 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 4 + security/commoncap.c | 83 +- tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/.gitignore | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/Makefile | 3 +- tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/config | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/namespaces/setfcap_test.c | 1509 +++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 1600 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 2c3ba1f1cb416b81d617b92a24a4bcaa48d574e3 change-id: 20261006-b4-setfcap-userns-d63185a31ce3