From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Ada Smith" <adasmithgt@gmail.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Matt Bobrowski" <matt@bobrowski.net>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:17:36 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117101738.2523492-2-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117101738.2523492-1-mic@digikod.net>
PR_SET_SECUREBITS checks CAP_SETPCAP with cap_capable(), which skips the
LSM capable hooks, so a task can change privileged securebits despite an
LSM denial.
Use ns_capable() instead, as PR_CAPBSET_DROP already does. Move the
check to a helper that only requires CAP_SETPCAP when needed, so that
changes limited to the unprivileged securebits still do not reach the
LSMs or set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Matt Bobrowski <matt@bobrowski.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) <sergeh@kernel.org>
Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202811.2409395-2-mic@digikod.net
- Check the non-change case separately, with its own comment (suggested
by Serge Hallyn).
- Shorten the commit message (suggested by Serge Hallyn).
- Add Serge Hallyn's Reviewed-by.
---
security/commoncap.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index d47ab3022343..9794a594bdd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1283,6 +1283,26 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
return commit_creds(new);
}
+/*
+ * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the
+ * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. Indeed, the
+ * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but
+ * by user space on itself. Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps
+ * LSMs from seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes.
+ */
+static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+ const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
+ SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
+ const unsigned long changed = old ^ new;
+
+ /* For legacy reasons, a non-change requires privilege. */
+ if (!changed)
+ return true;
+
+ return changed & ~unpriv_and_locks;
+}
+
/**
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
* @option: The process control function requested
@@ -1346,28 +1366,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
/* cannot change a locked bit */
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the
- * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits.
- * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not
- * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on
- * itself.
- */
- if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
- CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) {
- const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks =
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED |
- SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1;
- const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2;
-
- /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */
- if (!changed)
- return -EPERM;
-
- /* Denies privileged changes. */
- if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks)
- return -EPERM;
- }
+ if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) &&
+ !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
--
2.56.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 10:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 10:17 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix LSM mediation of PR_SET_SECUREBITS Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-17 10:17 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-11-17 10:17 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation Mickaël Salaün
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