From: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:23:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261117172341.3152407-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com> (raw)
The BPF verifier can accept programs with unsafe speculative paths by
inserting BPF_NOSPEC instructions instead of rejecting them. It relies
on those instructions to prevent execution of the unsafe paths.
The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
Rename spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() so that the interpreter and other
callers receive SB if supported, or DSB NSH followed by ISB otherwise.
Defining barrier_nospec() would also add barriers to the generic
copy_from_user() and copy_from_user_iter() paths. These are unnecessary
on arm64: its uaccess primitives mask user pointers so that they cannot
address kernel memory even when an access_ok() check is mispredicted.
Introduce user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr(), defaulting to true,
and have arm64 return false. Then update the uaccess sites to call
barrier_nospec() conditionally on the macro.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d6f1c85f2253 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 6 +++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 +-
include/linux/uaccess.h | 7 ++++++-
kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +--------
lib/iov_iter.c | 3 ++-
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
index 9495c4441a46..088ee29d36f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
*/
#define dgh() asm volatile("hint #6" : : : "memory")
-#define spec_bar() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
- SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
- ARM64_HAS_SB))
+#define barrier_nospec() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
+ SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
+ ARM64_HAS_SB) : : : "memory")
#define gsb_ack() asm volatile(GSB_ACK_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
#define gsb_sys() asm volatile(GSB_SYS_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 9f5bd9c69c24..6fd03dc1ae76 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
return safe_ptr;
}
+/* __uaccess_mask_ptr() prevents speculative accesses to kernel addresses. */
+#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() false
+
/*
* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
* space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
index 3bcf86154d95..c96e93eca3b9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
* could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
- spec_bar();
+ barrier_nospec();
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index 67cdb0a4f583..5a1fa4f48c77 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
#define mask_user_address(src) (src)
#endif
+#ifndef user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr
+#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() true
+#endif
+
/*
* Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
* and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
@@ -179,7 +183,8 @@ _inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
* lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
* finished:
*/
- barrier_nospec();
+ if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
+ barrier_nospec();
}
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 0b8456f2dce9..abd938d310bb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2250,14 +2250,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
/* ST, STX and LDX*/
ST_NOSPEC:
/* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
- * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
- * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
- * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
- * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
- * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
- * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
- * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
- * x86 for v4 as well.
+ * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
*/
barrier_nospec();
CONT;
diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
index fa4fe2e92383..abd27189beff 100644
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ size_t copy_from_user_iter(void __user *iter_from, size_t progress,
* lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
* finished:
*/
- barrier_nospec();
+ if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
+ barrier_nospec();
}
to += progress;
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, iter_from, len);
--
2.43.0
reply other threads:[~2026-11-17 17:23 UTC|newest]
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