From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=83.166.143.174 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795021900; b=jouHNQODe0Lg0LSwbarCIFbV81YT/v1ERf3UgnHTOMPDZyvxFjvSP35qsk7IkwyptcUT vZg5ixbRFK081kAt7l4kCqu1mFbpWqSFCSIuPBljCX8vXutw2UvAKRwIGWmUeICuZsSev nM2tey/UENMx70xe2aKPh2/k0gU1vZlOKaP1OqvI0QbOqMAS/vmdQMurF3BoE2CpDeQAD mhxPgZ4UpTXbkBZw++yu7THBqEAsZeUQmVMscv39KckETJWK/wMVXD42anft8JsexDp9j 3aNSb8XQuc63hSn8WFnxioCwsu68EoagGB6p3vsYAL6ySFHzFAN3SbyRE7iKrVMKrXQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795021900; h=DMARC-Filter:Received:DKIM-Signature:Received:Date:From:To:Cc: Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Disposition:Content-Transfer-Encoding:In-Reply-To: X-Infomaniak-Routing; bh=7jx+RlrY6hDpG8QT3cFVyASFCwKqa6uSd484Aq4omxY=; b=nOmYnY8EMz8Z9Vx7GCbZ1RriVUDQUSJlfhY2kiRxWlCSw5Ugn+TodYgJkfnJSn3vd8O2 /cJ2vQ4FjpqVuLHeN1y8cyb2lS8H5aGv4SdyNd2PFPvLW7KbCWA7j5xoiU4qBoIa1jlsV drpqAYU350D4Izjvr23I9n/Fb41+IfCw4Rz3OAx5Cy9w7KCEqmgsb6h9fdKjNWo5fmG6R OpDmeSwKgeEn8t0FQUqPAbJIXZbXLUyaHITt8giLFgxK3GsC1eZwXM1Dm7LjC186nkoO0 rRGU9xuLgxLSDfzf51yrHtWBRmwr/io3P/OJEHf1OoVt5kmPzGsPBGZjJzISYlQx6wQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none header.from=digikod.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net; dkim=pass header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=zu2Jn0fa; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=83.166.143.174 Received: from smtp-8fae.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-8fae.mail.infomaniak.ch [83.166.143.174]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D646D606A333 for ; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 17:11:37 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 smtp.subspace.kernel.org D646D606A333 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20191114 header.b=zu2Jn0fa Received: from smtp-4-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-4-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch [10.7.10.107]) by smtp-3-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4jV7Rq6FRvzKR; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:11:35 +0100 (CET) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1795021895; bh=7jx+RlrY6hDpG8QT3cFVyASFCwKqa6uSd484Aq4omxY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=zu2Jn0fa8u5u18uihYuSzHQIIUL2cQiGbptCFr4vhw8itb0vRYiEjTcu2wp3dTILe TkmE3FDRnpgVW9Y6bd/5w34wGkmx0KBsgPN5Qn5xZYSIoTihD3m9PqTGBt7yBBeRhp izzsq/IfFugIAK/KIetaSusUXgH4uaTvzP9Cy1qg= Received: from unknown by smtp-4-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4jV7Rp3y56zBLc; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:11:34 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:11:31 +0100 From: =?utf-8?Q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: =?utf-8?Q?G=C3=BCnther?= Noack Cc: Ada Smith , Hungyu Lin , James Morris , Josef Bacik , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , Serge Hallyn , kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 6/6] landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation Message-ID: <20261118.Ee0ahpae0Qui@digikod.net> References: <20261117101157.2520463-1-mic@digikod.net> <20261117101157.2520463-7-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: X-Infomaniak-Routing: alpha On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 05:25:07PM +0100, Günther Noack wrote: > On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:11:56AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > Some documented claims about LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE do not > > hold for every capability check. Remove them instead of listing their > > exceptions, and call it a permission instead of a hook. > > > > Cc: Günther Noack > > Cc: Paul Moore > > Cc: Serge Hallyn > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn (AMD) > > Fixes: 97c8386f1d74 ("landlock: Enforce capability restrictions") > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün > > --- > > > > Changes since v1: > > https://patch.msgid.link/20261110202436.2408244-7-mic@digikod.net > > - Add Serge Hallyn's Acked-by. > > --- > > Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 8 ++++---- > > Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 8 ++++---- > > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 6 +++--- > > 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > > index d81f1c2cd236..98c2e7139e8d 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst > > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation > > ================================== > > > > :Author: Mickaël Salaün > > -:Date: October 2026 > > +:Date: November 2026 > > > > Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To > > harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process, > > @@ -359,9 +359,9 @@ framework in ``log.c``, compiled under ``CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG`` > > (automatically selected by ``CONFIG_AUDIT`` or ``CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS``). > > > > Audit records respect audit configuration, the domain's Landlock log > > -flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire unconditionally, > > -independent of these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is > > -always incremented regardless of logging configuration. > > +flags, and ``LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED``. Tracepoints fire independently of > > +these settings. The denial counter (``num_denials``) is > > +incremented regardless of logging configuration. > > > > Each denial tracepoint carries a ``logged`` field reporting the > > audit-logging verdict: whether the denial would be written to the audit > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > > index 3d45b956b640..d00e94d8ed37 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst > > @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control > > ===================================== > > > > :Author: Mickaël Salaün > > -:Date: October 2026 > > +:Date: November 2026 > > > > The goal of Landlock is to enable restriction of ambient rights (e.g. global > > filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock > > @@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ acquisition via :manpage:`open_tree(2)` / :manpage:`fsmount(2)`. Namespaces > > the process is already a member of when the domain is enforced are implicitly > > allowed (the process could not continue running otherwise); rules describe > > which new namespace types the process may acquire. > > -``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates every exercise of a capability > > +``LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE`` gates the exercise of capabilities > > after the domain is enforced, regardless > > of how the capability was obtained (inherited credentials, ``CLONE_NEWUSER`` > > grant, ``setuid``/file-cap-bearing :manpage:`execve(2)`, etc.). Configuring > > @@ -641,9 +641,9 @@ after a domain is enforced through user namespace entry or :manpage:`capset(2)`; > > privileged sandboxes that did not set ``PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`` may also gain > > capabilities through :manpage:`execve(2)` of binaries with file capabilities. > > In all cases, :manpage:`capget(2)` will report the credential's capability sets, > > -but any denied capability will fail with ``EPERM`` when exercised. Do not rely > > +but any denied capability will fail when exercised. Do not rely > > on :manpage:`capget(2)` to determine whether the policy permits a given > > -capability; only the actual operation will return ``EPERM`` upon denial. > > +capability. > > > > Truncating files > > ---------------- > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > index 24510e5d8479..c9e4ce23778b 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h > > @@ -622,9 +622,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr { > > * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux > > * capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission > > * is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a > > - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can > > - * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never > > - * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in > > + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This permission is purely restrictive: it > > "The permission is purely restrictive"... that sounds like an > oxymoron, similar for "[The permission] can deny capabilities..." in > the sentence below. > > It is not complicated though; How about just shortening the sentences > "This hook is purely restrictive: it can deny ..., but it can never > grant capabilities that the kernel already denied" down to > > Landlock only reduces the capabilities that processes can use. It > does not let processes use capabilities that they don't already have > without Landlock. Much better, thanks! > > ? > > > + * can deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can > > + * never grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in > > * Landlock ABI version 12. > > */ > > #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0) > > -- > > 2.56.0 > > > > Reviewed-by: Günther Noack >