From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
To: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>, Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
Bingyu Xian <shanbeeyoo@gmail.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:22:41 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118062242.2914385-2-den@valinux.co.jp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118062242.2914385-1-den@valinux.co.jp>
Updating the SBI STA shared structure performs 2x get_user() + 3x
put_user() calls, each of which toggles sstatus.SUM.
Keep SUM enabled across all five accesses to the shared structure.
Note that write barriers are added to order the odd sequence store
before the steal-time update and the even sequence store after it.
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
---
To reviewers: please let me know if you'd prefer
scoped_user_rw_access() here.
arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
index 60e50296a008..cfc6f22c3e33 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
#include <asm/bug.h>
#include <asm/current.h>
#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_sbi.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/sbi.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
static void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_sta_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -26,13 +27,13 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
gpa_t shmem = vcpu->arch.sta.shmem;
u64 last_steal = vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal;
- __le32 __user *sequence_ptr;
- __le64 __user *steal_ptr;
+ struct sbi_sta_struct __user *st;
__le32 sequence_le;
__le64 steal_le;
u32 sequence;
u64 steal;
unsigned long hva;
+ bool dirty = false, success = false;
gfn_t gfn;
if (shmem == INVALID_GPA)
@@ -51,31 +52,39 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return;
}
- sequence_ptr = (__le32 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
- offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, sequence));
- steal_ptr = (__le64 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
- offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, steal));
-
- if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence_le, sequence_ptr)))
- return;
-
- sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le);
- sequence += 1;
-
- if (WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr)))
+ st = (struct sbi_sta_struct __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem));
+ might_fault();
+ if (WARN_ON(!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st))))
return;
- if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal_le, steal_ptr))) {
- steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
- vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
- steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
- WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), steal_ptr));
- }
-
+ unsafe_get_user(sequence_le, &st->sequence, fault);
+ sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le) + 1;
+ unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
+ dirty = true;
+
+ /* Publish the odd sequence before updating stolen time. */
+ smp_wmb();
+ unsafe_get_user(steal_le, &st->steal, update_sequence);
+ steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
+ vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
+ steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
+ unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), &st->steal, update_sequence);
+ success = true;
+
+update_sequence:
+ /* Publish stolen time before completing the update. */
+ smp_wmb();
sequence += 1;
- WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr));
-
- kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
+ unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
+ goto out;
+
+fault:
+ success = false;
+out:
+ user_access_end();
+ WARN_ON(!success);
+ if (dirty)
+ kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
}
static int kvm_sbi_sta_steal_time_set_shmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 6:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 6:22 [PATCH 0/2] RISC-V: KVM: Lessen steal time update overhead Koichiro Den
2026-11-18 6:22 ` Koichiro Den [this message]
2026-11-20 16:40 ` [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:20 ` Koichiro Den
2026-11-18 6:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] RISC-V: KVM: Skip steal-time updates when run_delay is unchanged Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:45 ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:25 ` Koichiro Den
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