From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795033847; b=ulCprx3qlQVgJw1ultDIypDeW1q6z2+i4mLHnXuL4mAXBixkrbllfEtsRKoCU+DGHQek f/ylDckYB+jUqyvKirvF546yIYJLJ5zBeLyqN7A7kjCt/nXzMkYOq6bRP2aQc9S+/2JYl epNVfpbJreNgLgLveFCgQIPPkJygGYjUFMxoN4gSOeIJO+EatAhvIaEpHZo32x2HsI7M3 JWrWzH0hVuu76Uy6tvxa9wS6WKkfiXignyAYUqcPGe8O79i2H5ECiSuMabXGB4zqyMtVK ZZL0sU6oDzmar9UtRL1Fe2liARVR1PIw+Z1hIr9EvcR8M2Rl7+VpxCFd+EFnCRKcC1A== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795033847; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=FB+aIq8L1fmrLNyEt2DjQ8jj7Py87jZZnAJlxx914mE=; b=BkFdeVriaR+CTx5CZOMEvY2Y4mQ9dadM+gXR7L3RHMbx7ZcO5ZimVvn6LXmYyPjUlaiq rnOJ850Vva1SvoeuplTl4w6SF14a2IEIYFGMxgWjrpDl9un9quvz+iZt1DJGtynIfoKzL 5i0dCuak8dDTfkenZqs7agBP3iPWDx1DwjvZdkEf3VQg5uUlckZ2FsU6xDeRuIJoJEqYy 2GWhBI+xKJ3VbGbA0y1+YVRMIsPkdS9BXYrAW4sIDIBFGgyfsprkCdpS7FxV70JcruCUe n71TtDzCRyksFRGudcPUKrBt+aa3u/gruvN03JnlkZZMxR8sm6Wtarp1wsqUrqiROAQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eSsG6kSH; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 62F99606A336; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:30:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=eSsG6kSH Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 22D3B1F000C6; Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:30:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795033847; bh=FB+aIq8L1fmrLNyEt2DjQ8jj7Py87jZZnAJlxx914mE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=eSsG6kSHVdjL8VGjI52bmfsguH1k2D2tE8rUPZsEuc5sMWFXlBtNyx31kZAxhaRgh lMCjLKSDN14yjKGfI3a7LY4dEro6QJ/BzlYS51phOWn9DIxhyQEiw904CoxpKzT5JF ciFPUxDLypaelxzj9y+J2d2bb1SzTtnzuT2TpMfusCa8Enf9MMLXpdcM/nniZvPNGJ BrJpS9aavLZylCZrCY6uMUfmmnRmZwu310tGxh5NLNzZiAtKPwsV27Pkr6ToYy9nJ8 7iuQXm4DGKMf/0bqs2K2N7hr6v9tEYPbwjYdfZYw1v56BYedLAXvRXcGqnSB2Z1uJr x5vto8RcdZ3Mw== Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 20:30:42 +0000 From: Simon Horman To: lirongqing Cc: David Howells , Marc Dionne , "David S . Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni , linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH net] rxrpc: rxgk: Fix uninitialised stack byte leaked via RXRPC_CHALLENGED Message-ID: <20261118203042.GR860048@horms.kernel.org> References: <20261112114305.2340-1-lirongqing@baidu.com> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20261112114305.2340-1-lirongqing@baidu.com> On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 07:43:05PM +0800, lirongqing wrote: > From: Li RongQing > > rxgk_challenge_to_recvmsg() builds struct rxgk_challenge on the stack > and passes all 8 bytes to put_cmsg() via RXRPC_CHALLENGED, but never > initialises base.pad at offset 3. The struct has no implicit padding, > so this byte contain leftover kernel stack data and be exposed to > userspace. This issue was identified by code inspection. > > Zero-initialise the structure to prevent the potential information leak. > > Fixes: 9d1d2b59341f ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)") > Signed-off-by: Li RongQing Reviewed-by: Simon Horman