mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
To: Chris Arges <carges@cloudflare.com>
Cc: netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net,
	edumazet@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
	horms@kernel.org, dsahern@kernel.org, june@cloudflare.com,
	danjones@cloudflare.com, jbrandeburg@cloudflare.com,
	josef@toxicpanda.com, mason@kernel.org,
	kernel-team@cloudflare.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:15:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119141544.GA1940793@shredder> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <av5RgJZR2HKzAN2D@20HS2G4>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 07:40:01PM -0600, Chris Arges wrote:
> On 2026-11-18 17:39:27, netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org wrote:
> > Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
> > issue(s) to consider.
> > 
> > Critical: 0 · High: 1 · Medium: 0 · Low: 0
> > 
> > If you believe none of the issues are legitimate, please reply to each
> > issue of Medium severity or higher and explain why the AI is wrong.
> > If any of them are legitimate and you plan to respin, please let patchwork
> > know by including "pw-bot: cr" as a separate line at the end of your reply
> > (one such reply per series is enough).
> > 
> > - [High] The new SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM (32 KiB) checks run in only three
> >   places: when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered…
> > 
> > --
> > 
> > net: prevent receive header offset overflow during decapsulation
> > 
> > This patch limits receive headroom to 32 KiB (SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM). The
> > goal is to keep the 16-bit skb header offsets from being truncated after
> > repeated decapsulation. The check runs on entry to
> > __netif_receive_skb_core() and at the resubmit points of
> > ip_protocol_deliver_rcu() and ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(), and drops
> > packets with the new SKB_RX_HEADROOM drop reason.
> > 
> > [ ... ]
> > 
> > > diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
> > > index 3c58db732761a..6140fd9d11cd0 100644
> > > --- a/net/core/dev.c
> > > +++ b/net/core/dev.c
> > > @@ -6223,6 +6223,10 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc,
> > >  	trace_netif_receive_skb(skb);
> > >  
> > >  	orig_dev = skb->dev;
> > > +	if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) > SKB_MAX_RX_HEADROOM)) {
> > > +		drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_SKB_RX_HEADROOM;
> > > +		goto drop;
> > > +	}
> > 
> > [Severity: High]
> > 
> > This check runs once, when __netif_receive_skb_core() is entered. That is
> > before the another_round label, sch_handle_ingress(), vlan_do_receive()
> > and the rx_handler call.
> > 
> > Can headers stripped later in the same receive pass still push the 16-bit
> > header offsets past U16_MAX?
> > 
> > For example, tc act_mpls with TCA_MPLS_ACT_POP calls skb_mpls_pop() once
> > per action. Each call stores the current headroom into the u16 header
> > fields:
> > 
> > net/core/skbuff.c:skb_mpls_pop() {
> >     ...
> > 	__skb_pull(skb, MPLS_HLEN);
> > 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
> > 	skb_set_network_header(skb, mac_len);
> >     ...
> > }
> > 
> > Outside CONFIG_DEBUG_NET, the only guard in those helpers is
> > DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the value gets truncated silently.
> > 
> > The number of pops per pass doesn't look bounded:
> > 
> >   - a filter can hold up to 32 actions
> >   - a filter whose action control is continue returns a negative result,
> >     and __tcf_classify() moves on to the next tcf_proto without counting
> >     it toward max_reclassify_loop (that limit only covers the
> >     TC_ACT_RECLASSIFY / TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN reset path)
> >   - about 512 matchall or flower filters with 32 pops each comes to
> >     roughly 16K pops in one pass
> > 
> > veth_setup() sets dev->max_mtu = ETH_MAX_MTU. A frame of about 65.5 KB
> > carrying about 16K MPLS labels, sent with AF_PACKET on one veth end, would
> > reach __netif_receive_skb_core() on the peer with about 30 bytes of
> > headroom and pass this check.
> > 
> > tc ingress could then pop the labels while skb_ensure_writable() keeps
> > pulling data from the frags into the linear head. At some point
> > mac_header and network_header would wrap past U16_MAX.
> > 
> > After the wrap, the remaining skb_mpls_pop() calls would run memmove(),
> > skb_postpull_rcsum() and skb_mod_eth_type() at the truncated offsets.
> > ip_rcv_core() would then read ip_hdr() from stale bytes and set
> > transport_header from that position. L4 code could then misparse the
> > packet, for example in tcp_data_queue():
> > 
> > 	__skb_pull(skb, tcp_hdr(skb)->doff * 4);
> > 
> > Here doff comes from the wrong bytes, so could this wrap skb->len or hit
> > the BUG() in __skb_pull()?
> > 
> > This setup needs only CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_NET_RAW in a netns owned by a
> > user namespace.
> > 
> > Similar in-pass header strips look possible elsewhere:
> > 
> >   - openvswitch pop_mpls with recirculation, where
> >     ovs_dp_process_packet() runs again without re-entering
> >     __netif_receive_skb_core()
> >   - bpf_skb_adjust_room() shrinking, which adds len directly to
> >     mac_header and network_header
> >
> 
> These additional paths can be addressed in a follow-up patchset. I'd
> prefer to fix the currently known cases first.

I'm pretty sure that only skb_mpls_pop() requires a fix and the bug
being fixed here is more severe.

> 
> > The commit message says:
> > 
> >     Together, these checks
> >     prevent 16-bit header-offset truncation in cases of repeated
> >     decapsulation.
> > 
> > Is that still accurate given these paths?
> > 
> > Would it be more robust to bound the offset where it is stored, either in
> > the skb_set_*_header() / skb_reset_*_header() helpers or in the pop/shrink
> > helpers, instead of only at the chosen re-entry points?
> > 
> > [ ... ]
> > 
> > -- 
> > Sashiko AI review · https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261118-prevent_rx_header_offset_overflow-v1-1-92a5be55f994%40cloudflare.com
> 
> If the checks were moved to where the offset is stored (using something like
> skb_set_transport_header_careful()), then we could introduce potential
> performance issues.

Agreed.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 14:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:32 Chris J Arges
2026-11-18 14:38 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-18 17:39 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-19  1:40   ` Chris Arges
2026-11-19 14:15     ` Ido Schimmel [this message]
2026-11-19 14:40 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261119141544.GA1940793@shredder \
    --to=idosch@nvidia.com \
    --cc=carges@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=danjones@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dsahern@kernel.org \
    --cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=jbrandeburg@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=josef@toxicpanda.com \
    --cc=june@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=kernel-team@cloudflare.com \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mason@kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev-bot+sashiko@kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=stable@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®