From: YanXin Li <fadouse@pm.me>
To: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] net/sched: act_ife: return -EAGAIN after dropping rtnl_lock in load_metaops_and_vet()
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 03:07:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261122030728.9368-1-fadouse@pm.me> (raw)
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3204 bytes --]
load_metaops_and_vet() unlocks rtnl_lock() to invoke request_module()
when an IFE metadata provider module (such as act_meta_mark) is not
yet loaded, re-acquires rtnl_lock(), validates the metadata attribute,
and returns 0.
Returning 0 after dropping rtnl_lock() violates the serialization
contract of RTNL-locked classifiers (cls_basic, cls_flow, cls_fw,
cls_route, and cls_u32), which hold an unrefcounted filter pointer
(fold) across tcf_exts_validate() -> tcf_ife_init(). A concurrent
RTM_DELTFILTER can delete and RCU-free fold during the unlocked
request_module() window, after which basic_change() executes
list_replace_rcu(&fold->link, &fnew->link) and queues a second
deletion on the freed filter. Generic KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in basic_change+0xf4c/0x1220
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800e043c58 by task test_act_ife_rt/101
...
Allocated by task 101:
basic_change+0x1e0/0x1220
Freed by task 57:
...
Oops: general protectio
n fault, probably for non-canonical address
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127]
Every other TC module autoloader that drops rtnl_lock() during filter
updates (tc_action_load_ops(), tcf_em_validate(), and em_text_change())
returns -EAGAIN so tc_new_tfilter() and tcf_action_add() unwind and
replay under a fresh RTNL critical section.
Manipulating TC filters requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the target network
namespace, which is reachable by an unprivileged local user inside a
user and network namespace when CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_MODULES=y,
CONFIG_NET_ACT_IFE is enabled, and an IFE metadata module is not yet
loaded.
When load_metaops_and_vet() drops rtnl_lock() and loads the requested
metadata module, drop the module reference and return -EAGAIN so the
caller replays the request with fresh lookups. With this change, the
same concurrent RTM_NEWTFILTER and RTM_DELTFILTER sequence cleanly
loads act_meta_mark, replays without to
uching the deleted filter, and
completes with rc=0 and no KASAN or lockdep reports. Exhaustive
state-space interleaving checking confirms zero use-after-free,
double-free, or deadlock paths remain. A test case and full
validation logs are available on request.
The vulnerable code is present in upstream mainline v7.4-rc3.
Runtime verification and fix validation were performed in an x86-64
QEMU/KVM guest running v7.4-rc3 with Generic KASAN, UBSAN, and
lockdep.
Fixes: ef6980b6becb ("introduce IFE action")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: YanXin Li <fadouse@pm.me>
---
net/sched/act_ife.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sched/act_ife.c b/net/sched/act_ife.c
index 5a527da0056..5d6ca124e00 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_ife.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_ife.c
@@ -275,6 +275,14 @@ static int load_metaops_and_vet(u32 metaid, void *val, int len, bool rtnl_held)
if (rtnl_held)
rtnl_lock();
ops = find_ife_oplist(metaid);
+ if (
ops && rtnl_held) {
+ /* We dropped the RTNL mutex in order to perform the
+ * module load. Tell the caller to replay the request
+ * under a fresh RTNL critical section.
+ */
+ module_put(ops->owner);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
#endif
}
--
2.43.0
[-- Attachment #1.2: publickey - fadouse@pm.me - 0x99485AA3.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 873 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 302 bytes --]
next reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 3:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 3:07 YanXin Li [this message]
2026-11-22 3:12 ` netdev-bot+sinfo
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261122030728.9368-1-fadouse@pm.me \
--to=fadouse@pm.me \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=jhs@mojatatu.com \
--cc=jiri@resnulli.us \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®