From: Laveesh Bansal <laveeshb@laveeshbansal.com>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>,
syzbot+20d60aafd9a0d1f2a380@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org,
linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] blk-crypto: avoid fs reclaim under profile->lock in the fallback
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 13:31:20 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261122213120.20974-1-laveeshb@laveeshbansal.com> (raw)
Setting a key in blk-crypto-fallback can deadlock on profile->lock.
blk_crypto_get_keyslot() holds it across keyslot_program, whose setkey
allocates with GFP_KERNEL (Adiantum); direct reclaim can evict an fscrypt
inode, and blk_crypto_evict_key() then takes profile->lock again. syzbot
reports it as an fs_reclaim vs profile->lock cycle. Since
commit 5acc6f649a68 ("fscrypt: Always use blk-crypto for contents on
block-based filesystems") hitting it no longer needs -o inlinecrypt.
Use memalloc_noio_save() around both setkey calls (keyslot_program and
the blank-key clear in evict_keyslot), as blk_crypto_alloc_enc_bio()
does.
Fixes: 488f6682c832 ("block: blk-crypto-fallback for Inline Encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v7.3+
Reported-by: syzbot+20d60aafd9a0d1f2a380@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6a9b25c3.b5d4176b.238c3e.0004.GAE@google.com
Signed-off-by: Laveesh Bansal <laveeshb@laveeshbansal.com>
---
I used an LLM for the analysis, the patch and the test runs.
A scope in blk_crypto_hw_enter() would also cover hardware drivers (qcom
ICE allocates under the lock); I kept this to the fallback.
Tested on arm64 and x86_64 (QEMU, base c44104f3642d, KASAN and lockdep;
patched runs and fstests include comment-only revisions): f2fs with an
Adiantum policy, creating encrypted files and reading them back with
O_DIRECT under a memory hog, about a minute per run.
Runs showing each symptom:
base patched
lockdep cycle warning, arm64 2 of 2 0 of 6
lockdep cycle warning, x86_64 6 of 6 0 of 16
task deadlocked on its own lock, arm64 0 of 2 0 of 6
task deadlocked on its own lock, x86_64 5 of 6 0 of 16
lockdep cycle warning, x86_64 as uid 65534 2 of 2 0 of 2
task deadlocked, x86_64 as uid 65534 1 of 2 0 of 2
profile->lock -> fs_reclaim edge in
lockdep's dump (runs that got to it) 3 of 3 0 of 21
No KASAN reports. Some runs, base and patched, hit unrelated stalls under the
hog (f2fs and page allocation); none has a blk-crypto frame. fstests -g
encrypt on arm64: f2fs passes; ext4 passes except generic/435, which ran out
of space on a 1 GB scratch device and passes on 2 GB. Could not reproduce on
ext4; fstests not run on x86_64.
block/blk-crypto-fallback.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c
index 12e0b487e23a..2df418f16932 100644
--- a/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c
+++ b/block/blk-crypto-fallback.c
@@ -89,17 +89,24 @@ static struct bio_set enc_bio_set;
*/
static u8 blank_key[BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
+/*
+ * setkey can allocate while profile->lock is held, and reclaim takes that lock
+ * to evict a key. Use NOIO so those allocations can't recurse into the fs.
+ */
static void blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(unsigned int slot)
{
struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode = slotp->crypto_mode;
+ unsigned int memflags;
int err;
WARN_ON(slotp->crypto_mode == BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID);
/* Clear the key in the skcipher */
+ memflags = memalloc_noio_save();
err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], blank_key,
blk_crypto_modes[crypto_mode].keysize);
+ memalloc_noio_restore(memflags);
WARN_ON(err);
slotp->crypto_mode = BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID;
}
@@ -112,6 +119,7 @@ blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
struct blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot *slotp = &blk_crypto_keyslots[slot];
const enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode =
key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode;
+ unsigned int memflags;
int err;
if (crypto_mode != slotp->crypto_mode &&
@@ -119,8 +127,10 @@ blk_crypto_fallback_keyslot_program(struct blk_crypto_profile *profile,
blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
slotp->crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
+ memflags = memalloc_noio_save();
err = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(slotp->tfms[crypto_mode], key->bytes,
key->size);
+ memalloc_noio_restore(memflags);
if (err) {
blk_crypto_fallback_evict_keyslot(slot);
return err;
--
2.43.0
reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 21:31 UTC|newest]
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