From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 09:12:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20a42fd4-0026-c30e-1d82-4a345f6257cc@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181002093530.GC122128@gmail.com>
On 10/02/2018 02:35 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
>
> * Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>> To migitgate possible app to app attack from branch target buffer poisoning,
>> a new prctl is provided to control branch speculation for applications in
>> user app. The following interfaces are provided:
>
> s/migitgate
> /mitigate
>
>>
>> prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
>> - Disable branch target speculation to protect against app to app
>> style attack using IBPB and STIBP
>>
>> prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
>> - Allow branch target speculation, no mitigation for Spectre V2
>>
>> prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0)
>> - Query the indirect branch speculation restriction on a process
>
> Well 'a process' is always 'the current process' in this case, right?
Right.
>
>> - lite - only turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
>> + lite - turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
>> + or processes that has indirect branch restricted
>> + via prctl's PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option
>
> s/or processes that has indirect
> /or processes that have been indirect
>
> ?
>
>> + /*
>> + * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
>> + * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
>> + * Use speculative_store_bypass_update will update SPEC_CTRL MSR
>> + */
>> + if (task == current && update)
>> + speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
>
> Did you mean:
>
> Call to speculative_store_bypass_update_current() will update SPEC_CTRL MSR
Yes.
>
> ?
>
>
>> - * For lite protection mode, we only protect the non-dumpable
>> - * processes.
>> + * For lite protection mode, we protect processes
>> + * where the user explicitly disable indirect branch
>> + * speculation or mark the process as non-dumpable.
>
> s/where the user explicitly disable
> /where the user explicitly disables
>
> ?
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ingo
>
Thanks for the corrections. I'll update the patchset.
Tim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-02 16:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-26 0:43 [Patch v2 0/4] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 1/4] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2 Tim Chen
2018-10-02 9:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-02 20:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 2/4] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection Tim Chen
2018-10-02 19:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-04 19:19 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/speculation: Extend per process STIBP to AMD cpus Tim Chen
2018-09-26 17:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26 19:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-10-02 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process Tim Chen
2018-10-02 9:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:12 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-03 7:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 17:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-05 18:12 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-05 18:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
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