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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process
Date: Tue, 2 Oct 2018 09:12:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20a42fd4-0026-c30e-1d82-4a345f6257cc@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181002093530.GC122128@gmail.com>

On 10/02/2018 02:35 AM, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> 
> * Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
>> To migitgate possible app to app attack from branch target buffer poisoning,
>> a new prctl is provided to control branch speculation for applications in
>> user app.  The following interfaces are provided:
> 
> s/migitgate
>  /mitigate
> 
>>
>> prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
>> - Disable branch target speculation to protect against app to app
>> style attack using IBPB and STIBP
>>
>> prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
>> - Allow branch target speculation, no mitigation for Spectre V2
>>
>> prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_INDIR_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0)
>> - Query the indirect branch speculation restriction on a process
> 
> Well 'a process' is always 'the current process' in this case, right?

Right.

> 
>> -			lite   - only turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
>> +			lite   - turn on mitigation for non-dumpable processes
>> +				 or processes that has indirect branch restricted
>> +				 via prctl's PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL option
> 
> s/or processes that has indirect
>  /or processes that have been indirect
> 
> ?
> 
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU
>> +	 * mitigation until it is next scheduled.
>> +	 * Use speculative_store_bypass_update will update SPEC_CTRL MSR
>> +	 */
>> +	if (task == current && update)
>> +		speculative_store_bypass_update_current();
> 
> Did you mean:
> 
> 	Call to speculative_store_bypass_update_current() will update SPEC_CTRL MSR

Yes.

> 
> ?
> 
> 
>> -	 * For lite protection mode, we only protect the non-dumpable
>> -	 * processes.
>> +	 * For lite protection mode, we protect processes  
>> +	 * where the user explicitly disable indirect branch
>> +	 * speculation or mark the process as non-dumpable. 
> 
> s/where the user explicitly disable
>  /where the user explicitly disables
> 
> ?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	Ingo
> 

Thanks for the corrections.  I'll update the patchset.

Tim

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-02 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-26  0:43 [Patch v2 0/4] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-09-26  0:43 ` [Patch v2 1/4] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2 Tim Chen
2018-10-02  9:23   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:24     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-02 20:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26  0:43 ` [Patch v2 2/4] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection Tim Chen
2018-10-02 19:10   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-04 19:19     ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26  0:43 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/speculation: Extend per process STIBP to AMD cpus Tim Chen
2018-09-26 17:24   ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26 19:11     ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-10-02  9:27   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 19:02   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26  0:43 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process Tim Chen
2018-10-02  9:35   ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:12     ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-03  7:25       ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 17:58   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-05 18:12     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-05 18:46       ` Thomas Gleixner

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