From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C76642D781B; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:43:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788172997; cv=none; b=D0yaDZxsieOIrmdIcnEo0nFmY4dCacyAGiiO4tQxR0lOUz5B9soAf81sVMfpGataNz5mlEQUWAIgcpSGkpQojU5soAjTKYF+o2EnXm0Wx7BafT4p6RECt4bRWMzV3EqaLYxRdNg3lO1w1atk2YOStpaRwRPmAWARpMmhNyjRwTY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788172997; c=relaxed/simple; bh=lW+liWO8qmv4ZSh1ff1E2l311S9sZ5fYoySavkW1RJo=; h=Content-Type:MIME-Version:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: Subject:From:To:Cc:Date; b=pXsbquLXk5TT8HQIbPaxsS53bSH9wI7YdPc4KhVdIkRYx+iImmaWm6JCPwpw6ghMjpu6Vctl+k0lTBuANzUS68wXEPGxDBj0hPQqidZV5P1sxnD+EX5J8EAzGfXytlwpHOd/aJDrXnlD+xN2ayyCaOX8r+pyGJUxHxIOb3OrFPo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=g9qx3Oy+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="g9qx3Oy+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8D7AF1F000E9; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:43:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1788172995; bh=1zRiZoEe+cziUvxkvj8KRKsW5kQ9BPFWyKQ48V5U48c=; h=In-Reply-To:References:Subject:From:To:Cc:Date; b=g9qx3Oy+sEirhBlaPWlATBQb6Wt+QnUbSr1uatSFzBcPbN+Hzm5139c6BIVUd405B hQgDp6gBYQzjJPyxjPW6yEQLBcgIwAI9BY3Dp8HDsSgg9aG/aeiiqzvqU6dgypNN0v +0qsyKBQb5pkem5mHcAPoDc3q0UlDA6jVm92NA5HUjdPbbzcZrvA5oANPXIsfpP18o fRW99ndcB67wuop3tQ+nicsSUvSQxjPUVMk5Ba07fL3XD+iyGVelFq3vA4NJxBEasn Y41838p1p4M4dXkpTI2b+G2zVHOpawy4qFAOrvvqtK8oUFmfeYnLWbU0/6TDjwhKnZ aHrG2wtbCUAwQ== Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============6575441848940488516==" Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <2163fb3e4198f7feac29b37aa7c659535eb5d11248f681bb25c3bc97838aa1b0@mail.kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20260831092305.42062-7-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> References: <20260831092305.42062-7-tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 6/7] bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null From: bot+bpf-ci@kernel.org To: tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com,bpf@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,linux-mm@kvack.org,linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,brauner@kernel.org,akpm@linux-foundation.org,david@kernel.org,ast@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,andrii@kernel.org,eddyz87@gmail.com,memxor@gmail.com,kpsingh@kernel.org,matt@bobrowski.net,song@kernel.org,utilityemal77@gmail.com,tasos.papagiannnis@gmail.com,ast@kernel.org,andrii@kernel.org,daniel@iogearbox.net,martin.lau@kernel.org,eddyz87@gmail.com,yonghong.song@linux.dev,mason@kernel.org,ihor.solodrai@linux.dev Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 10:43:14 +0000 (UTC) --===============6575441848940488516== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > bpf: Mark linux_binprm->mm as trusted-or-null > > Mark linux_binprm->mm as a trusted-or-null nested pointer so BPF programs > can pass it to kfuncs after a NULL check. The linux_binprm owns this mm > throughout the bprm_check_security hook and clears the pointer only after > exec_mmap() installs the new address space. Is the changelog's description of when bprm->mm is cleared accurate? Enumerating every write to bprm->mm in the tree shows three places where the pointer is cleared, not just "after exec_mmap()": fs/exec.c:bprm_mm_init() bprm->mm = mm = mm_alloc(); /* assign */ ... bprm->mm = NULL; /* error path, before mmdrop */ fs/exec.c:begin_new_exec() bprm->mm = NULL; /* after successful exec_mmap() */ fs/exec.c:free_bprm() bprm->mm = NULL; /* before mmput() */ Two of these three are not accounted for by the changelog. The bprm_mm_init() error path clears the pointer before mmdrop(), and free_bprm() clears it before mmput(). The free_bprm() case is actually load-bearing: it's what commit d3633d366b08f ("exec: Clear bprm->mm before dropping its reference") in this same series was added for, and that commit's changelog says it's "required for eBPF kfuncs where bprm->mm is either NULL or points to a live mm_struct." The real invariant this verifier change depends on is "bprm->mm is always either NULL or a live mm," established across all of fs/exec.c. The changelog instead asserts a narrower property that doesn't hold. This matters because the marking isn't scoped to bprm_check_security. Any BPF program with a trusted linux_binprm pointer (all five bprm_* LSM hooks in include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h, plus fentry/fexit/tp_btf on any kernel function taking a linux_binprm) now gets a trusted mm. Justifying it from one hook leaves a reviewer unable to check the other attach points. Could the changelog drop "only" and state the actual invariant, perhaps something like: "bprm->mm is either NULL or points to a live mm_struct at every point a BPF program can observe a linux_binprm: exec_mmap() transfers ownership and begin_new_exec() then clears the field, and free_bprm() clears it before dropping the reference (see the preceding patch)"? > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > index 386401fe051d4..584c79326b9c7 100644 > --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c > +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c [ ... ] > @@ -6012,6 +6016,7 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, > { > BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket)); > BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry)); > + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct linux_binprm)); ^^^^ > BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct)); > > return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, Does the patch ordering break bisect here? The preceding commit in the series, 146a2bd992c3d ("selftests/bpf: Cover trusted-or-null BTF pointer reads"), adds a test in tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_lsm.c that expects this marking to exist: SEC("lsm.s/bprm_check_security") __description("store through trusted-or-null bprm->mm is rejected") __failure __msg("R{{[0-9]+}} invalid mem access 'trusted_ptr_or_null_'") int BPF_PROG(store_through_trusted_or_null_bprm_mm, struct linux_binprm *bprm) { bprm->mm->task_size = 0; return 0; } At commit 146a2bd992c3d, walking bprm->mm in a sleepable LSM program takes the final else arm of check_ptr_to_btf_access() (flag = PTR_UNTRUSTED) because in_rcu_cs() is false. The subsequent store fails at the 'if (atype != BPF_READ && bpf_may_fault_on_deref(reg->type))' check with "only read is supported" rather than "invalid mem access 'trusted_ptr_or_null_'". The __msg() assertion doesn't match and 'test_progs -t verifier_lsm' fails at that intermediate commit. Swapping the order makes every commit in the series independently testable. The ordering issue is present in the posted series as well (lore message-ids 20260831092305.42062-6 and -7). --- AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug. See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/33379004067 --===============6575441848940488516==--