From: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
To: cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: CVE-2025-68212: fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string()
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2026 20:13:21 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <234e1969-d574-469e-a571-e1165d274cef@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2025121630-CVE-2025-68212-eab7@gregkh>
Hi Greg,
On 16/12/25 19:27, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
>
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string()
>
> In statmount_string(), most flags assign an output offset pointer (offp)
> which is later updated with the string offset. However, the
> STATMOUNT_MNT_UIDMAP and STATMOUNT_MNT_GIDMAP cases directly set the
> struct fields instead of using offp. This leaves offp uninitialized,
> leading to a possible uninitialized dereference when *offp is updated.
>
> Fix it by assigning offp for UIDMAP and GIDMAP as well, keeping the code
> path consistent.
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-68212 to this issue.
>
>
> Affected and fixed versions
> ===========================
>
> Issue introduced in 6.14 with commit e52e97f09fb66fd868260d05bd6b74a9a3db39ee and fixed in 6.17.10 with commit acfde9400e611c8d2668f1c70053c4a1d6ecfc36
> Issue introduced in 6.14 with commit e52e97f09fb66fd868260d05bd6b74a9a3db39ee and fixed in 6.18 with commit 0778ac7df5137d5041783fadfc201f8fd55a1d9b
> Issue introduced in 6.12.14 with commit d49c64c1d723c167f521833f429ab28d3ca7e0d9
> Issue introduced in 6.13.3 with commit c3787a4fae66e710543137b4b1b073cb2bff3bca
>
I have reviewed the broken commit/vulnerable commit for this:
Probably the logic in scripts is to find the oldest Fixes tag if there
are more than one Fixes' tags in the commit message:
commit 0778ac7df5137d5041783fadfc201f8fd55a1d9b
Author: Zhen Ni <zhen.ni@easystack.cn>
Date: Mon Oct 13 19:41:51 2025 +0800
fs: Fix uninitialized 'offp' in statmount_string()
In statmount_string(), most flags assign an output offset pointer
(offp)
which is later updated with the string offset. However, the
STATMOUNT_MNT_UIDMAP and STATMOUNT_MNT_GIDMAP cases directly set the
struct fields instead of using offp. This leaves offp uninitialized,
leading to a possible uninitialized dereference when *offp is updated.
Fix it by assigning offp for UIDMAP and GIDMAP as well, keeping the
code
path consistent.
Fixes: 37c4a9590e1e ("statmount: allow to retrieve idmappings")
Fixes: e52e97f09fb6 ("statmount: let unset strings be empty")
For the CVE fix, the actual broken commit which is more appropriate is
37c4a9590e1e introduces the STATMOUNT_MNT_{U,G}IDMAP cases but only
writes sm->mnt_* = start while leaving offp unset, so the shared tail of
statmount_string() later dereferences an uninitialised pointer.
Hence 37c4a9590e1e is probably the more appropriate vulnerable commit
for this CVE.
Should I send a patch to add CVE-2025-68212.vulnerable for getting it
updated correctly ?
Thanks,
Harshit
> Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
> kernel versions by the kernel community.
>
> Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
> older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
> https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-68212
> will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
> up to date information about this issue.
>
>
> Affected files
> ==============
>
> The file(s) affected by this issue are:
> fs/namespace.c
>
>
> Mitigation
> ==========
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
> stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
> changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
> release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
> supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
> the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
> issue can be found at these commits:
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acfde9400e611c8d2668f1c70053c4a1d6ecfc36
> https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0778ac7df5137d5041783fadfc201f8fd55a1d9b
>
next parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-17 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2025121630-CVE-2025-68212-eab7@gregkh>
2026-01-17 14:43 ` Harshit Mogalapalli [this message]
2026-01-17 15:21 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=234e1969-d574-469e-a571-e1165d274cef@oracle.com \
--to=harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com \
--cc=cve@kernel.org \
--cc=gregkh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox
all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®