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From: Will Drewry <redpig@dataspill.org>
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/1] support optional non-VFS capability inheritance  without disabling file caps
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2009 23:24:34 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2359eed20908152124s1af8d95eu7d4706ec3a50bc33@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <551280e50908151022tde71278gc0a745c52a8415ed@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 12:22 PM, Andrew G. Morgan<morgan@kernel.org> wrote:
> Naive process inheritance of privilege is one of the things this whole
> infrastructure is trying to discourage...

Hrm I know that was more of the intent of POSIX file capabilities
(AFAICT), but I was under the impression that the full picture of
capabilities in linux were more about moving away from a default-on,
binary superuser privilege policy.  But you'd know what your intentions
were better than me :)

I was hoping that a process inheritance approach wouldn't be considered
the same as root inheritance is now.  It operates with the same
granularity as the file-based approach except that it allows these
lesser privilege sets to be limited in time for a binary. E.g.,
it'd be nice if pulseaudio could be started with privileges only at,
let's say, login-time for a user and not when a remote attacker needs to
bypass mmap_min_addr.

> Overlays aside, is there some limit on the sophistication of your
> filesystem setup? Presumably, one could create a small filesystem in a
> file and, using the loopback device, mount it. Such a filesystem could
> have xattrs ACLs and filecaps and give you all the specificity you
> need for this purpose. /chroot/mnt/sbin/ etc.

That's a perfectly nice workaround (especially since it'd be easy enough
to pair with some symlinks), but I am interested in both issues --
xattr-less filesystems and the inflexibility of filesystem-based
security policy.

If the patch (and my intentions) are irreconcilably at odds with the
capability system (and securebits) goals, then I can definitely evaluate
other avenues as well as revisit the underpinnings of my plans.  I was
just hoping that this would fit in under the current umbrella (e.g., like
the other root-to-capability-mode transition fixups).

If it's a hopeless case, please let me know!  However, I'm happy to
make any number of changes if something like this is feasible.

thanks!
will

  reply	other threads:[~2009-08-16  4:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-08-14  4:15 Will Drewry
2009-08-14 13:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-08-14 15:40   ` Will Drewry
2009-08-15 17:22     ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-08-16  4:24       ` Will Drewry [this message]
2009-08-17  4:50         ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-08-17 14:38           ` Will Drewry
2009-08-17 15:26             ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-08-17 16:48               ` Will Drewry
2009-08-18  0:30                 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2009-08-18 14:07 ` David Howells

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