From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
seanjc@google.com, peterz@infradead.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
ardb@kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, aik@amd.com, Michael.Roth@amd.com,
KPrateek.Nayak@amd.com, Tycho.Andersen@amd.com,
Nathan.Fontenot@amd.com, jackyli@google.com, pgonda@google.com,
rientjes@google.com, jacobhxu@google.com, xin@zytor.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, babu.moger@amd.com,
dyoung@redhat.com, nikunj@amd.com, john.allen@amd.com,
darwi@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Add RMPOPT support.
Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 09:15:13 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2398df04-082d-4d98-beca-f85de385941a@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cc930514-b0c0-4b9f-8287-aaee2878e668@amd.com>
On 2/18/26 09:03, Kalra, Ashish wrote:
>> They are known not to contain any SEV-SNP guest memory at the
>> moment snp_rmptable_init() finishes, no?
> Yes, but RMP checks are still performed and they affect performance.
>
> Testing a bit in the per‑CPU RMPOPT table to avoid RMP checks
> significantly improves performance.
Sorry, Ashish, I don't think I'm explaining myself very well. Let me try
again, please.
First, my goal here is to ensure that the system has a whole has good
performance, with minimal kernel code, and in the most common
configurations.
I would wager that the most common SEV-SNP configuration in the whole
world is a system that has booted, enabled SEV-SNP, and has never run an
SEV-SNP guest. If it's not *the* most common, it's certainly going to be
common enough to care about deeply.
Do you agree?
If you agree, I hope we can also agree that a "SNP enabled but never ran
a guest" state is deserving of good performance with minimal kernel code.
My assumption (which is maybe a bad one) is that there is a natural
point when SEV-SNP is enabled on the system when the system as a whole
can easily assert that no SEV-SNP guest has ever run. I'm assuming that
there is *a* point where, for instance, the RMP table gets atomically
flipped from being unprotected to being protected. At that point, its
state *must* be known. It must also be naturally obvious that no guest
has had a chance to run at this point.
If that point can be leveraged, and the RMPOPT optimization can be
applied at SEV-SNP enabled time, then an important SEV-SNP configuration
would be optimized by default and with zero or little kernel code needed
to drive it.
To me, that seems like a valuable goal.
Do you agree?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-18 17:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-17 20:09 Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 20:09 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_AMD_RMPOPT feature flag Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 23:06 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2026-02-17 20:10 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/sev: add support for enabling RMPOPT Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 22:06 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 3:08 ` K Prateek Nayak
2026-02-18 14:59 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 16:55 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 17:01 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 17:07 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 17:17 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 22:17 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 22:56 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-17 20:10 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/sev: add support for RMPOPT instruction Ashish Kalra
2026-02-18 16:28 ` Uros Bizjak
2026-02-17 20:11 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/sev: Add interface to re-enable RMP optimizations Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 20:11 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/sev: Use configfs " Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 22:19 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 3:34 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 4:39 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 15:10 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-17 20:11 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/sev: Add debugfs support for RMPOPT Ashish Kalra
2026-02-17 22:42 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2026-02-17 22:11 ` [PATCH 0/6] Add RMPOPT support Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 4:12 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 15:03 ` Dave Hansen
2026-02-18 17:03 ` Kalra, Ashish
2026-02-18 17:15 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2026-02-18 21:09 ` Kalra, Ashish
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