From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752315AbcAGAeT (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jan 2016 19:34:19 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:33295 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751905AbcAGAeR (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jan 2016 19:34:17 -0500 Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <20160106134525.15633.73582.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20160106134525.15633.73582.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, petkan@mip-labs.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] X.509: Partially revert patch to add validation against IMA MOK keyring MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-ID: <24184.1452126854.1@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Date: Thu, 07 Jan 2016 00:34:14 +0000 Message-ID: <24185.1452126854@warthog.procyon.org.uk> To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org David Howells wrote: > Partially revert commit 41c89b64d7184a780f12f2cccdabe65cb2408893: > > Author: Petko Manolov > Date: Wed Dec 2 17:47:55 2015 +0200 > IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings > > The problem is that prep->trusted is a simple boolean and the additional > x509_validate_trust() call doesn't therefore distinguish levels of > trustedness, but is just OR'd with the result of validation against the > system trusted keyring. > > However, setting the trusted flag means that this key may be added to *any* > trusted-only keyring - including the system trusted keyring. > > Whilst I appreciate what the patch is trying to do, I don't think this is > quite the right solution. Please apply this to security/next. Thanks, David