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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>,
	rkrcmar@redhat.com, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	ovich00@gmail.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	nigel.edwards@hpe.com,
	Boris Lukashev <blukashev@sempervictus.com>,
	Hossam Hassan <7ossam9063@gmail.com>,
	"Ahmed Lotfy igor . stoppa @ gmail . com"
	<A7med.lotfey@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V6 0/8] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 21:25:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <24f900ba-6459-c6aa-4e97-92f0ec744896@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181104171124.5717-1-ahmedsoliman0x666@gmail.com>

On 04/11/2018 18:11, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> Our model assumes that an attacker got full root access to a running guest and
> his goal is to manipulate kernel code/data (hook syscalls, overwrite IDT ..etc).
> 
> There is future work in progress to also put some sort of protection on the page
> table register CR3 and other critical registers that can be intercepted by KVM.
> This way it won't be possible for an attacker to manipulate any part of the
> guests page table.
> 

Do you have patches that enable usage of ROE in the kernel?
Alternatively you can write testcases in tools/testing/selftests/kvm to
test how guests should use it.

I would remove CONFIG_KVM_ROE altogether.  You can enable it
unconditionally.

I will continue reviewing the patches soon.

Paolo

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-08 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-04 17:11 Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 1/8] KVM: State whether memory should be freed in kvm_free_memslot Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 2/8] KVM: X86: Add arbitrary data pointer in kvm memslot iterator functions Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 3/8] KVM: Document Memory ROE Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 4/8] KVM: Create architecture independent ROE skeleton Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 5/8] KVM: X86: Enable ROE for x86 Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 6/8] KVM: Add support for byte granular memory ROE Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 7/8] KVM: X86: Port ROE_MPROTECT_CHUNK to x86 Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-04 17:11 ` [PATCH V6 8/8] KVM: Log ROE violations in system log Ahmed Abd El Mawgood
2018-11-08 20:25 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-11-08 20:54   ` [PATCH V6 0/8] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel Hardening Ahmed Soliman

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