mirror of https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,  Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	"open list:KEYS-TRUSTED" <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	 stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null()
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 00:47:44 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <27e3ac1678bde5e107691e12c09fa470ab47a5b2.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241028055007.1708971-3-jarkko@kernel.org>

On Mon, 2024-10-28 at 07:50 +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
[...]
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
> @@ -915,33 +915,37 @@ static int tpm2_parse_start_auth_session(struct
> tpm2_auth *auth,
>  
>  static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
>  {
> -       int rc;
>         unsigned int offset = 0; /* dummy offset for null seed
> context */
>         u8 name[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + 2];
> +       u32 tmp_null_key;
> +       int rc;
>  
>         rc = tpm2_load_context(chip, chip->null_key_context, &offset,
> -                              null_key);
> -       if (rc != -EINVAL)
> -               return rc;
> +                              &tmp_null_key);
> +       if (rc != -EINVAL) {
> +               if (!rc)
> +                       *null_key = tmp_null_key;
> +               goto err;
> +       }
>  
> -       /* an integrity failure may mean the TPM has been reset */
> -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL key integrity failure!\n");
> -       /* check the null name against what we know */
> -       tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, NULL, name);
> -       if (memcmp(name, chip->null_key_name, sizeof(name)) == 0)
> -               /* name unchanged, assume transient integrity failure
> */
> -               return rc;
> -       /*
> -        * Fatal TPM failure: the NULL seed has actually changed, so
> -        * the TPM must have been illegally reset.  All in-kernel TPM
> -        * operations will fail because the NULL primary can't be
> -        * loaded to salt the sessions, but disable the TPM anyway so
> -        * userspace programmes can't be compromised by it.
> -        */
> -       dev_err(&chip->dev, "NULL name has changed, disabling TPM due
> to interference\n");
> +       /* Try to re-create null key, given the integrity failure: */
> +       rc = tpm2_create_primary(chip, TPM2_RH_NULL, &tmp_null_key,
> name);
> +       if (rc)
> +               goto err;

From a security point of view, this probably isn't such a good idea:
the reason the context load failed above is likely the security
condition we're checking for: the null seed changed because an
interposer did a reset.  That means that if the interposer knows about
this error leg, it would simply error out the create primary here and
the TPM wouldn't be disabled.

Regards,

James


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-30 15:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-28  5:49 [PATCH v8 0/3] Lazy flush for the auth session Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28  5:49 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] tpm: Return tpm2_sessions_init() when null key creation fails Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28 13:00   ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-28 15:27     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28  5:50 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] tpm: Rollback tpm2_load_null() Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28  6:13   ` Paul Menzel
2024-10-28 12:10     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28 12:38       ` Paul Menzel
2024-10-28 12:42         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-30 15:47   ` James Bottomley [this message]
2024-10-30 23:44     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-30 23:50       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28  5:50 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] tpm: Lazily flush the auth session Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-28 17:52   ` Stefan Berger
2024-10-28 20:56     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=27e3ac1678bde5e107691e12c09fa470ab47a5b2.camel@HansenPartnership.com \
    --to=james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com \
    --cc=eric.snowberg@oracle.com \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=peterhuewe@gmx.de \
    --cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stefanb@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox

all inboxes | Powered by JetHome®