From: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
To: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Christopherson,,
Sean" <seanjc@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
H Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 11:08:57 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2a7bd52d-441e-a8da-9c1b-dbc60f6bad7e@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230605140725.32ogo6gbhqyl4kfl@yy-desk-7060>
On 6/5/2023 10:07 PM, Yuan Yao wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 01, 2023 at 10:23:06PM +0800, Zeng Guang wrote:
>> Intel introduces LASS (Linear Address Separation) feature providing
>> an independent mechanism to achieve the mode-based protection.
>>
>> LASS partitions 64-bit linear address space into two halves, user-mode
>> address (LA[bit 63]=0) and supervisor-mode address (LA[bit 63]=1). It
>> stops any code execution or conditional data access[1]
>> 1. from user mode to supervisor-mode address space
>> 2. from supervisor mode to user-mode address space
>> and generates LASS violation fault accordingly.
>>
>> +/*
>> + * Determine whether an access to the linear address causes a LASS violation.
>> + * LASS protection is only effective in long mode. As a prerequisite, caller
>> + * should make sure vCPU running in long mode and invoke this api to do LASS
>> + * violation check.
>> + */
>> +bool vmx_check_lass(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 access, u64 la, u32 flags)
>> +{
>> + bool user_mode, user_as, rflags_ac;
>> +
>> + if (!!(flags & X86EMUL_F_SKIPLASS) ||
>> + !kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_LASS))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_long_mode(vcpu));
>> +
>> + user_as = !(la >> 63);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * An access is a supervisor-mode access if CPL < 3 or if it implicitly
>> + * accesses a system data structure. For implicit accesses to system
>> + * data structure, the processor acts as if RFLAGS.AC is clear.
>> + */
>> + if (access & PFERR_IMPLICIT_ACCESS) {
>> + user_mode = false;
>> + rflags_ac = false;
>> + } else {
>> + user_mode = vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3;
>> + if (!user_mode)
>> + rflags_ac = !!(kvm_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (user_mode == user_as)
> Confused by user_as, it's role of address(U/S) so how about
> "user_addr" ? "if (user_mode == user_addr)" looks more clear
> to me.
>
Actually "as" stands for "address space". I suppose it more precise. :)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-06 3:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-01 14:23 [PATCH v1 0/6] LASS KVM virtualization support Zeng Guang
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 1/6] KVM: x86: Consolidate flags for __linearize() Zeng Guang
2023-06-27 17:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 5:13 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-28 7:27 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 2/6] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LASS Zeng Guang
2023-06-05 1:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-06 2:57 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-27 17:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 8:19 ` Zeng Guang
2023-08-16 22:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 3/6] KVM: VMX: Add new ops in kvm_x86_ops for LASS violation check Zeng Guang
2023-06-05 3:31 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-05 12:53 ` Zhi Wang
2023-06-06 2:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-06 3:53 ` Zhi Wang
2023-06-07 6:28 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-05 3:47 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-06 6:22 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-05 14:07 ` Yuan Yao
2023-06-06 3:08 ` Zeng Guang [this message]
2023-06-27 18:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 22:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 18:50 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 4/6] KVM: x86: Add emulator helper " Zeng Guang
2023-06-27 18:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-29 15:06 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 5/6] KVM: x86: LASS protection on KVM emulation Zeng Guang
2023-06-06 4:20 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-01 14:23 ` [PATCH v1 6/6] KVM: x86: Advertise LASS CPUID to user space Zeng Guang
2023-06-02 0:35 ` [PATCH v1 0/6] LASS KVM virtualization support Sean Christopherson
2023-06-06 2:22 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-05 1:39 ` Binbin Wu
2023-06-06 2:40 ` Zeng Guang
2023-06-27 17:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 8:42 ` Zeng Guang
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